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ABSTRACT
T h e  a c tiv itie s  o f  th e  s n ip e r  o n  th e  W e s te rn  F ro n t  h a v e  b een  
d is re g a rd e d  by m any  m ilitary  h is to r ia n s  over th e  d ecad es . The sn ip e r , desp ite  
th e  la ck  o f  sch o la rly  reco g n itio n , w a s  as  co m m o n  to  th e  t r e n c h e s  o f th e  
W es te rn  F ro n t as  a rtille ry , no m a n 's  la n d  a n d  m u d . W here th e  m ilita ry  elite 
to u n d  t re n c h  deadlock , th e  sn ip e r to u n d  co n sis ten cy . Drawm p rim arily  trom  
m ilita ry  d o cu m en ts  a t  th e  N ational A rchives o f C a n a d a  in O tta w a , th is  th esis  
ex am in es  th e  tactical n a tu re  of sn ip ing .
T he purpose  o f th is  th esis  is  to  illu stra te  tw o poin ts: f irs t, th a t  sn ip ing  
in  th e  G re a t W ar w as a n  evo lu tionary  p rocess; sec o n d , th a t th e  s n ip e r  w as a 
c r i t ic a l  c o m p o n en t o f  th e  w ar e ffo rt on  th e  W e s te rn  F ro n t. T h is  w ork 
e x a m in e s  th e  early  o rig in s  of sn ip in g  in  th e  G re a t W ar. from  th e  G erm an  
in itia tio n  to  th e  Allied re sp o n se . T h e  form ation  o f sn ip e r  s c h o o ls  in  F rance  
an d  E n g lan d  formally in s titu tio n a lized  sn ip ing  in th e  military" e s ta b lish m e n t and  
m a rk e d  a  tu rn in g  p o in t in  s n ip e r  d o c trin e . T h e  s n ip e r 's  a c tiv it ie s  in  the  
tre n c h e s  be tw een  1 9 1 5 -1 9 1 7  a re  ex am in ed  b e c a u se  tre n c h  w a rfa re , th o u g h  
am o u n tin g  to  deadlock for m ilitary en g ag em en ts, w a s  th e  ideal b a tt le  condition 
for w ell-a im ed  rifle-fire. E qually  ac tiv e  in open  w arfa re , th e  s n ip e r  quickly 
b e ca m e  a n  in teg ra l p a r t  o f th e  o ffensive  an d  p u r s u i t  to  M ons in  1918. An 
e x a m in a tio n  o f aU th e  above fac to rs  will d e m o n s tra te  th a t  th e  s n ip e r  evolved 
tro m  a  ra n d o m  c ra c k s h o t  to  fu ll-fled g ed  m a rk s m a n , c o m p le te  w ith  th e  
n e c e ssa ry  equ ipm ent to  co n d u c t h is  w ork  successfu lly . M oreover, th is  grow th 
en ab led  th e  sn iper to  c o n trib u te  su b s ta n tia lly  to  th e  w a r effort a n d  su b se q u e n t 
v ic tory  in  1918.
ill
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
D edicated  to  
Pte. R obert M epham # 1 9 3 1 1 8  
Sniper, 13th  B attalion , CEP
*  *  *
R eported  M issing in  A ction  
8 th  October, 1 9 1 6
iv
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
A cknow ledgem ents
F irst a n d  fo rem ost, sp ec ia l th a n k s  to T obi Leitch - m y  so u l-m a te  - for 
ta k in g  th e  tim e to  lis te n  to  m e  b ab b le  on  a b o u t  a  topic s h e  k n ew  n o th in g  
a b o u t. H er rev is io n s  a n d  s u p p o r t  have b e e n  in s tru m e n ta l  in  see in g  th is  
p ro jec t to  com pletion. To h e r I ow e th e  m ost.
Special c o n s id e ra tio n  is  g iven to  Dr. I. P em b erto n  w h o  ag reed  to  be 
m y a d v iso r d esp ite  b e in g  so  c lo se  to  re tire m e n t. I am  a lso  in d e b te d  to  th e  
o th e r  m em b ers  of m y co m m ittee . P ro fesso r R. H o sk in s  a n d  D r. M. F rank lin , 
for ta k in g  on th is  ta s k  a m id s t a ll o f th e ir  o th e r  ac tiv itie s . W ithou t th e ir  
com m itm en t, th is  w ork cou ld  n e v e r  have been  acco m p lish ed .
F o r g u id a n ce  1 w ou ld  like  to  th a n k  D r. B. M illm an w h o  w as v e ry  
en co u rag in g  w hen I s ta r te d  p u rs u in g  th is  top ic. H is p re lim in a ry  su g g es tio n s  
s e n t m e in  the  righ t d irec tio n s  a n d  a lth o u g h  h e  c o u ld  not be h e re  to  a ss is t m e 
in  m y re sea rch , he w as m ore th a n  willing to h e lp  from  a d is ta n ce . Also, to  Bill 
R aw ling a t  Nationed D efence H e a d q u a r te rs  w h o se  ex p ertise  o n  th e  RG9 files 
w as m o s t help fu l. He d is c u s s e d  th is  top ic o p e n ly  w ith  m e  a n d  offered a  
n u m b e r  o f  id e a s  w ith  w h ic h  to  e x p a n d  o n . H is  book  S u rv iv in g  T re n c h  
W arfare  w as m ost u se fu l a n d  s e rv e d  a s  m y “G re a t W ar Bible" th ro u g h  m u c h  
o f m y s tu d y . T h a n k s  to  Tim D u b e , a t  th e  N a tio n a l A rch ives fo r p ro \dd ing  
in fo rm a tio n  on th e  M a n u sc rip t D ivision, for it w a s  MG30 E 2  th a t  w as th e  
b re a k th ro u g h  file in  m y re se a rc h . Tim. who a n sw e re d  m any  q u e s tio n s  d u rin g  
m y s ta y  in  O ttaw a, a lso  g ra n te d  m e access  to  a  new ly-arrived  w a r d iary  th a t  I 
u se d  in th is  work.
I w ould a lso  like to  th a n k  M au reen  a n d  th e  In te r-L ib ra ry  Loan Office 
s ta f f  in  th e  Leddy L ibrary  for lo ca tin g  so  m any  m a te r ia ls  th a t  I th o u g h t w ould  
be u n availab le . Of all th e  re q u e s ts  I su b m itted , o n ly  two w ere den ied . M uch  
ap p rec ia tio n , in  ad d itio n , to th e  s ta f f  in  th e  R ead in g  an d  R eference  Rooms a t 
th e  N ational Archives in  O ttaw a. They w ere p a t ie n t  a n d  u n d e rs ta n d in g  w ith  a  
s tu d e n t  w ho  k n e w  li t t le  a b o u t  th e  A rc h iv e s  a n d  w e re  m o re  t h a n  
accom m odating  to  m y  req u ests .
L ast, b u t certa in ly  no t le a s t ,  th a n k s  to  m y  friends in  G ra d  S tu d ies  for 
m a k in g  th e  school y e a r  a n  en jo y ab le  one. S p ec ia l co n s id e ra tio n  to  Andy H all 
for rev ising  c h ap te rs , show ing in te re s t  in  my to p ic , a n d  d is c u s s in g  ideas w ith  
m e. a n d  to  Renee H illier for k e ep in g  m e co m p an y  a n d  h e lp in g  m e with id eas  
d u rin g  m y re sea rch  in  O ttaw a. B es t of luck  to  a ll o f  you  in  th e  fu tu re .
F or those  o f you  I d id  n o t leave room  for m en tio n , y o u  k n o w  who y o u  
a re ...  th an k s!
L.M.




A cknow ledgem ents








V ita  A uctoris
In tro d u c tio n . Snip ing  Before the  G re a t W ar
S e ttin g  th e  S tage
S n ip e r  T rain ing
S n ip in g  in  T rench  W arfare
S n ip in g  in  O pen  W arfare













Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
LIST OF DIAGRAMS & ILLUSTRATIONS
B ritish  & G erm an  T rench  S y s tem s 15
Snipe rsc o p es  2 4
Use of C am ouflage. F irst Army S n ip ing  School 46
Types of T elescopic  S ight 5 8
Loophole-plate C on stru c tio n  63
“M ouse T rap  Loophole“ 6 4
A Dead H u n  S n ip e r in  His N est 6 7
Use of D u m m y  H ead s  73
S ources a n d  C o u rse  of Front Line Intelligence 76
B attalion  Intelligence 77
S n ipers  in  th e  O pen . F irst Arm y Snip ing  School 8 8
“Beehive S n ip e r Post" 89
B attalion  F o rm ed  Up in  the  T ren ch es  Ready for th e  A ssau lt 9 6
vii
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
In tro d u ctio n  
Sniping B efore th e  Great War
Any book on  th e  G reat W ar o f  1914-1918 . w ould  provide a  g rea t deal 
of in form ation  ab o u t th e  im p o rtan t fa c e ts  of the  conflict. The g re a t b a ttle s  - 
th e  M arn e . 1914 . V e rd u n  a n d  th e  S o m m e. 1 9 1 6 . V im y R idge a n d  
P assch en d ae le . 1917. a n d  A m iens. 1918 - ten d  to  a b so rb  the  m ajo rity  of the  
spo tligh t. O ther fac to rs  - tre n c h  w a rfa re , no  m an ’s  lan d , artillery  shelling, a ir 
an d  n av a l com bat, gas  w arfare  e tc . - te n d  to be g iven  a satisfV'ing a m o u n t of 
a tte n tio n , a lth o u g h  th e ir  scope a n d  d e ta il vary  by  so u rce . An h is to r ia n  can  
easily  a cc e ss  th ese  de ta ils  by p e ru s in g  th e  index a t th e  back  of a  g iven work. 
O ften  n e g le c te d  from  th e  m a n y  in d e x e s  is th e  sn ip e r ; h is  fu n c tio n , 
im p o r ta n c e , a n d  m e th o d s . G ra n te d ,  som e h is to r ia n s  h a v e  s o u g h t to 
d o c u m en t the  activ ity  o f s n ip e rs  b u t  on ly  in  a  re fe ren ce  or tw o. a n d  very 
rare ly  a re  these  sp ec ia lis ts  given a n y  sc ru tin y . O f th e  official h is to r ie s  on the 
C a n a d ia n  E x p ed itio n a ry  Force (CEP), only  th a t  o f  F. D ugu id  m a k e s  an y  
re fe ren ce  to  the  C an a d ia n  m a rk s m a n ; G.W.L. N icho lson ’s a c c o u n t n eg lec ts  
th e  su b je c t entirely . O th e r C a n a d ia n  h is to r ia n s  - D esm ond  M orton . Pierre 
B ert on . J.L . G ra n a ts te in  an d  D an ie l D an co ck s to  n a m e  a  few - h av e  provided 
only  m eag re  c o n s id e ra tio n  o f th e  s n ip e r .  O f c o u rs e , m an y  o f  th e  above 
h is to r ia n s  have ta k e n  a  b ro ad e r e x a m in a tio n  of th e  w ar. an d  d e ta ils  o f m inor 
en g ag em en ts  a re  b o u n d  to be o m itte d . Yet. so  o b sc u re  a re  th e  re fe ren ces
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th a t  Paddy G riffith  c o n te n d s , “s n ip e r s  a p p e a r  to  h av e  b een  so su c c e ss fu l In 
th e ir  u n d e rc o v e r activ ities th a t  th e y  h av e  left very  few  traces  in  th e  g en era l 
li te ra tu re  o f th e  w a r.“ i N ev e rth e le ss , sn ip in g  h a s  a  h is to ry  of i ts  ow n. one 
th a t  d a tes  b a c k  before the  G re a t W ar.
The o rig in s  o f “sn ip in g "  - o r a t  le a s t  th e  te rm  “sniping" - a p p e a r  to  
have  com e from  e ig h teen th  c e n tu r \’ In d ia  w here  B ritish  Army officials found  
e n jo y m en t h u n t in g  th e  s n ip e , a  lo n g -b illed  g am e b ird  c o m p arab le  to  th e  
w oodcock. S m a ll in  size, th e  sn ip e  w as a  ch a lleng ing  ta rg e t for riflem en  a n d  
req u ired  fine a n d  precise  sh o o tin g  sk ill In  o rd e r  to  h it one . In m ilita ry  te rm s , 
“snlpm g" w as firs t d o c u m en ted  in  In d ia  in  1773 a s  “so ld ie rs  pu t th e ir  h a ts  on 
th e  p a ra p e t fo r th e  enem y to  sh o o t a t .  a n d  h u m o u ro u s ly  called it sn lp in g .“ 2 
The term  "sn iper" , how ever, d id  n o t com e in to  w id esp read  use  u n til  th e  early  
tw e n tie th  c e n tu ry . C on fin ed  to  th e  A n g lo -d o m in a ted  sec to rs  o f  th e  globe 
d u r in g  th e  n in e te e n th  c e n t u r \ \  “s n ip e r "  o f te n  p a ra lle l le d  th e  te rm  
“sh a rp sh o o te r" . In fact, h is to ry  b o o k s  o f n in e te e n th  c e n tu ry  N orth  A m erica, 
p a rticu la rly  th e  U nited  S ta te s , freq u en tly  re fe r to  th e  la tte r . R egard less o f the  
tw o te rm s' t r e n d s , th ey  b o th  Im ply o ne  factor: a c c u ra te  rifle fire.
E x am p le s  o f p rec is io n  sh o o tin g  in  m ilita ry  en g ag em en ts  d a te  a s  far 
b a ck  as  th e  o rig in s  o f the  te rm  itself. D u rin g  th e  e ig h te en th  cen tu ry , tac tica l 
th eo ry  a n d  d o c tr in e  were g re a tly  tra n s fo rm e d  by  th e  In d u s tr ia l R evolu tion . 3 
The im pact o f  th e  rifled m u s k e t a d d e d  in c re a se d  firepow er to th e  in d h d d u a l 
o n  th e  b a t t le f ie ld  a n d  p e r m a n e n t ly  c h a n g e d  ta c t ic a l  fo rm s. T h e  rifle 
c o m p an ie s  o f  th e  N apo leon ic  W ars  th u s  w ere th e  f irs t to  b rin g  a c c u ra te  
m u sk e try  to  th e  b a ttle g ro u n d . At th e  sam e  tim e in  th e  W estern  h e m isp h e re , 
th e  rebe lling  A m erican s  w ere  b u s y  re fin in g  th e ir  o w n  rifle sk ills . B ritish  
m a rk s m a n s h ip  w as re la tiv e ly  p o o r in  th e  A m erican  W ar of In d e p e n d e n c e . 
1776-1783 . s in c e  very little e m p h a s is  w as  p laced  on  ta rg e t p rac tice . In  light
■> Paddy Griffith; Battle Tactios of the W estern Front. (London, 1994). p .73.
2 Adrian Gilbert: Sniper. (New York, 1994). p.xi.
3 Edward Hagerman: The American Civil War and the Origins of Modem Warfare. (Indianapolis, 1988). 
p.xi.
2
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o f th is  in e p titu d e . G e n e ra l J o h n  B urgoyne, b y  1777. h a d  “form ed a  b o d y  o f
s h a rp s h o o te rs  by  se le c tin g  a  g ro u p  of s o b e r , active, r o b u s t  m en  from  e ac h
regim ent." ■* T he e x te n t o f th e ir  e ffec tiveness rem a in s  u n d o c u m e n te d . The
A m ericans, m ean w h ile , h a d  organ ized  th e i r  ow n b a n d  o f  m a rk sm e n  b y  th e
1780’s a n d  fu lly  in te g ra te d  th e m  in th e  a t ta c k .  In th e  B a ttle  o f C o w p en s .
1781 . a  s e m i-o rg a n iz e d  u n i t  o f s h a r p s h o o te r s  from  G eo rg ia  a n d  N o rth
C aro lina w ere  p u t  in to  th e  fo rw ard  line o f a t ta c k .
The s h a r p s h o o te r s  in  th e  front Une in  irreg u la r fo rm a tio n  w ere to 
tak e  cover b e h in d  tre e s . They w ere  to  w ithho ld  th e ir  fire u n til  th e  
a d v a n c e  o f th e  e n e m y  w as ^ t h i n  fifty  y a rd s , a n d  th e n  to ta k e  
c a re fu l a im  a t th e  m e n  w ith  th e  e p a u le ts .  A fter tw o  volleys th e y  
were to  re tire  slowly, firing a t wiU. a n d  fall into sp a c e s  in  the  sec o n d  
Une o f  m ilitia . 5
The B ritish  fo rce s , u n d e r  th e  d irec tio n  o f  Lt. Col. T a rte lto n . a tte m p te d  to  
co u n te rac t th e  m a rk s m e n 's  fire by c lea rin g  th e m  ou t w ith  c a v a lr \\ T he ru s h  
w as swift a n d  e n d ed  a b ru p tly  w h en  the  A m erican  c ra c k s h o ts  "em ptied fifteen  
sadd les."  ®
L ess th a n  a h u n d re d  y e a rs  la ter, sh a rp sh o o tin g  w a s  ag a in  p re s e n t in 
a n  A m erican  confU ct. n a m e ly  th e  C ivil W ar. 1 8 6 1 -6 5 . The d e fe n s iv e  
b rea s tw o rk s  a n d  c o n s ta n t  sk irm ish in g  b e tw ee n  the  B lue a n d  G ray  in ten s ified  
sh a rp sh o o tin g  o n  th e  o p e n  battle fie lds, p a r tic u la r ly  a m o n g  th e  S o u th e rn e rs . 
C o n fed era te s  w ith  a  "sp>orting fram e of m in d "  w ere k een ly  a ttra c te d  to  long- 
ran g e  sn ip in g  a s  th e  d is ta n c e s  betw een c o m b a ta n ts  ex p an d ed . ? C o n fed era te  
s h a rp sh o o te rs  a lso  fo u n d  p le a su re  in sn ip in g  from  b u ild in g s , a  p rac tice  th a t 
u su a lly  re s u lte d  in  th e  b u rn in g  dow n of th e  s tru c tu re . M ain ta in in g  d isc ip lin e  
in  th e  U n ion  A rm y, p a r tic u la r ly  w ith  th e  n e w  re c ru its  o f  1863-64 . w a s  a 
problem  for m a n y  officers a n d  p u n ish m e n ts  u su a lly  re s u lte d  in  being tie d  to  a  
ra c k  or d ra g g e d  b eh in d  a  b a tte ry  w agon. T he following a lte rn a tiv e  to  th e se  
d iscip linary  m e a s u re s  w a s  so m etim es ju s t  a s  d ish ea rte n in g  a s  th e  crim e:
4 Edward E. Curtis; The Organization of the British Army in the American Revolution. (New York. 
1969). p.20.
5 Christopher Ward; The War of the Revolution. (New York. 1952). p.757.
6 Ibid.. p.758.
7 Gerald F. Linderman; Embattled Courage. (New York. 1987). p. 148.
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L ym an d e sc r ib e d  so ld ie rs  o f th e  N in th  C orps w h o  h a d  fled b a tt le  
m ad e  to  w e a r “C ow ard" p la c a rd s  a n d  to  s ta n d  a to p  barre ls  p la ce d  
o n  th e  U n io n  fb r tif lc a tio n s  a t  P e te rsb u rg , th e  d e c is io n  w h e th e r  
th e irs  w as a  c ap ita l offense ap p a ren tly  left to  e n e m y  sh a rp sh o o te rs .
8
P e rh a p s  th e  m o s t in te r e s t in g  a c c o u n t  o f C o n fe d e ra te  sn ip in g  c a m e  a t  
S p o tsy lv an ia  in  1864 w h en  M ajor-G enera l J o h n  S edgw ick  ch astized  h is  m en  
for cow ering  u n d e r  en em y  g unfire . D isg u sted  a t  th is  d isp la y  o f b a ttle  frigh t. 
Sedgw ick stood  u p  a n d  sh o u te d  to h is  m en . “"Why. w h a t a re  you dodg ing  for? 
They cou ld  no t h it a n  e lep h a n t a t  th a t  d is t- ’ - only to  b e  s h o t  th rough  th e  h e ad  
in th a t  in s tan t."  9
N orth o f th e  b o rd e r, th e  C a n a d ia n  m ilitia  w as fo rce d  to  deal w ith  well 
h id d en  F en ian  s h a rp s h o o te rs  in th e  ra id  o f 1866. 'o T h e  F en ians te n d e d  to 
be b e t te r  t ra in e d  w h e n  it cam e  to  f irea rm s , a n d  m a rk s m a n s h ip  w a s  o ften  
lim ited  to a  ran g e  of 2 0 0  y a rd s . i ' In th e  C an ad ian  M ilitia, ta rgets exceed ing  
100 y a rd s  w ere left for s h a rp s h o o te rs  s in ce  th e  r a n k  a n d  file cou ld  n o t be 
relied u p o n  to  m ak e  h its  a t  g re a te r  d is ta n c e s .
As th e  G rea t W ar d rew  c lo ser to  reality^, technology^ con tin u ed  to  have 
a  p ro fo u n d  effect o n  f ire a rm s  d e v e lo p m en t. F irep o w er, sp eed  a n d  firing  
d is ta n c e  w ere a ll im p ro v ed  in  th is  ag e  o f m e c h a n ic a l dev e lo p m en t. The 
U nited  S ta te s  by  th e  189 0 ’s  h a d  d ev eloped  a  w ealth  o f  rifles; S p ring fie ld s . 
R e m in g to n s  a n d  W in c h e s te r s .  T h e  B r it is h  w ere  e x p e r im e n tin g  w ith  
p ro to ty p es  o f th e  E nfield  a t th is  tim e a n d  in C an ad a . S ir  C harles  R o ss  h ad  
c re a te d  th e  R oss Rifle by  1896. R ifles from  a ro u n d  th e  w orld  were d isp lay ed  
a n d  te s te d  a t n u m e ro u s  sh o o tin g  m a tc h e s , th e  m ost w ell know n being B isley 
in  E n g lan d . M atch es  a t  th e  “Bisley School" typically d e te rm in e d  the q u a lity  of 
a  sp o rtin g  rifle a n d  it w as th e re  th a t th e  R oss earn ed  its  e a r ly  rep u ta tio n .
Before th e  n in e te e n th  c e n tu ry  co u ld  d raw  to a  c lo se , an o th er w a r  h a d
8 Ibid.. p. 173.
9 Ibid. p. 141.
10 Robert McGee: The Fenian Raids on the Huntingdon Frontier. 1866  and 1870. (Canada. 1967).
p .10.
11 Hereward Senior: The Last Invasion of Canada. (Toronto. 1991). p.89.
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d is tu rb e d  the  p eace ; th is  tim e  in  S o u th  Africa - th e  Boer W ar. By 1899. a  
fully  e n tre n c h e d  sty le  of w a rfa re  b eg an ; m u c h  like th e  A m erican  Civil W ar. 
th e  B oer W ar w as  a  p re lu d e  to  th e  cond itions o f  th e  G reat W ar. S n ip ing  in  
th e  B oer W ar w as m ore co m m o n  am o n g  the  D u tc h  B oers w hose fo rtifications 
w ere s e t  u p  for rifle re s ts . S o m e  B oers even  u tiliz ed  sm o k e le ss  pow der in  
th e ir  rifles to low er th e  p o ssib ility  to  being d e te c te d  by  the B ritish . 12 The 
B o ers  w ere  o ften  h igh ly  re g a rd e d  for th e ir  m a rk s m a n s h ip  a s  o n e  e ld erly  
fellow, know n by  th e  n ick n am e  “G randfa ther" , e a rn e d  resp ec t a n d  ad m ira tio n  
from  th e  B ritish  fo r h is  m u s k e t ry  sk ills , so  m u c h  re sp e c t, in  fac t, th a t  
so ld ie rs  who saw  h im  in th e  o p en  re fu sed  to  fire  a t  h im . o  R ifles, a t  th is  
s tag e  o f  developm ent, were c o n s id e re d  le th a l (if in  p ro p e r h a n d s) a t  d is ta n ce s  
u p  to  200 0  y a rd s  a n d  the  B oers  co n tin u a lly  rep e lled  B ritish  a t ta c k s  at S pion  
Kop. C olenso  a n d  M odder R iver w ith  su c h  p re c is io n . M a rk sm a n s h ip  
a m o n g  th e  B o e rs  w ns n o t a lw ay s  a t  its  b e s t ,  how ev er, a s  C ol. O tte r , 
c o m m an d in g  th e  C an a d ia n  c o n tin g e n t, w as s p a re d  th e  fate  o f th e  A m erican  
Sedgw ick after a  bu lle t s tru c k  only  h is  chin. '5 C a n a d ia n  so ld iers, who w ould 
f irs t d isp lay  th e ir  sh o o tin g  p o te n tia l  in  S o u th  A frica, w ere a lso  sk illed  in  
a c c u ra te  rifle fire. In  the  g u erilla  w arfare  th a t d o m in a te d  th e  rem a in in g  y ears  
o f th e  conflict, a  sm a ll b a n d  o f  C a n a d ia n  so ld ie rs  - m a rk sm en  am o n g  th em  - 
h e ld  approxim ate ly  6 0 0  B oers a t  b ay  w ith excep tiona l shoo ting  skill a t Rooival. 
1901 . 16
C an ad ian s, w ho h ad  le a rn e d  to se ttle  th e  h in te rla n d  w ith  som e degree 
o f h u n te r  in s tin c t, p roved  to  b e  h igh ly  p roficien t in  m usketry ’ by th e  tim e o f 
w a r in  1914. T h e ir re sp o n se  to  th e  B ritish  p le a  for a s s is ta n c e  in  a u tu m n . 
1 9 1 4 . a t t r a c te d  m a n y  c r a c k  r if le m e n  fro m  th e  C a n a d ia n  p la in s , i?
12 j. Castell Hopkins; South Africa and the Boer-British War Volume 2 . (Toronto, n.d ). p.573.
13 ibid.. p.597.
14 Bill Rawling; Surviving Tranch Warfare. (Toronto. 1992). p .9.
15 Desm ond Morton; “Colonel Otter and the First Canadian Contingent in South Africa. 1899-1900" 
Policv bv Other Means. Michael Cross & Robert Bothwell eds.. (Toronto. 1972) p 110.
16 Hopkins; South Africa, p .795.
1 7 ---------------- : “Canada in War Time”. The Detroit Tribune. (Sunday. December 6. 1914). p 14
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U n fo rtu n a te ly  for th e se  C a n a d ia n s , a s  m e m b e rs  o f  th e  B ritish  E x p ed itio n a ry  
Force (BEF) in  th e  early  going, g re a te r  e m p h a s is  w as p laced  o n  th e  bayonet in  
a rm y  t r a in in g .  T he  J a p a n e s e  v ic to ry  o v e r th e  R u s s ia n s  in  1905 h a d  
co n v in ced  th e  B ritish  h ig h  c o m m a n d  th a t  th e  b a y o n e t w a s  th e  “d o m in a n t 
w eap o n  o f  w a r“ d e sp ite  th e  fa c t th a t  th e  s tru g g le  w ith  th e  B o ers  w a s  
c h a ra c te r iz e d  by  m u s k e try  fire , is T h u s , a s  B ritish  a n d  C a n a d ia n  fo rce s  
m a rc h e d  to  th e  b a ttle f ie ld s  o f  F ran c e  a n d  F la n d e rs , m a n y  w ere  f ir s t- ra te  
riflem en b u t  w ere d en ied  th e  o p p o rtu n ity  to  sh o w  th e ir  sk ill in  ligh t of b a s ic  
tra in in g . If  th e  b a y o n e t c h a rg e  w as to  b e  th e  firs t o rd e r  o f a t ta c k  on  th e  
W estern  F ro n t, sn ip in g  w as going to have  to  w ait for th e  o p p o rtu n ity  to sh o w  
its im p o rtan c e  in  a  w ar o f techno logy  a n d  e n tre n c h e m e n t.
T h e  p u rp o se  of th is  th e s is  is tw o-fo ld ; first, it will d e m o n s tra te  th a t  
sn ip in g  in  th e  C a n a d ia n  C o rp s , a n d  on  a  g e n e ra l level, w a s  a n  ev o lu tio n a ry  
p ro cess  in  th e  G rea t W ar. T he co n d itio n s  c re a te d  by  t r e n c h  w arfa re  e n a b le d  
th e  s n ip e r  to  em erge  a s  a  u n iq u e  sp e c ia lis t o n  th e  W e s te rn  F ro n t - from  a 
local C a n a d ia n  c ra c k s h o t  to  fu ll-fled g ed  m a rk s m a n , c o m p le te  w ith  th e  
n e c e s sa ry  eq u ip m e n t to c o n d u c t h is  w ork  in \dsib ly  a n d  effectively . J u s t  a s  
the  C a n a d ia n  C orps le a rn ed  from  th e ir p re v io u s  c a m p a ig n s  a n d  refined  th e ir  
tac tics , so  too  d id  th e  sn ip er.
T h e  seco n d  objective o f th is  w ork  is  to  reveal ho w  m u c h  th e  s n ip e r  
c o n tib u te d  to  th e  overall w a r effort - d e sp ite  th e  lack  o f s c h o la r ly  recogn ition . 
M any a  m em o ir a n d  field m e ssa g e  from  th e  fro n t will a t t e s t  to  th e  skill a n d  
effect o f  th e  s n ip e r  (on b o th  s id es) in  th e  G re a t W ar. W h ere  g re a t g u n s , 
whole b a tta lio n s  a n d  h igh  c o m m a n d  fo u n d  tre n c h  w arfa re  to  b e  a  dead lo ck , 
th e  s n ip e r  d isco v e red  c o n s is te n c y . In  a ll  fa c e ts  o f w a rfa re , th e  C a n a d ia n  
sn ip e r w a s  p re se n t a n d  effective, m ak in g  h im  a s  e sse n tia l to  th e  w a r effort a s  
18 -pound  a rtille ry  can n o n s , a rm o u re d  ta n k s , a ttr itio n a l c o m b a t a n d  m ach in e- 
gun s.
18 Rawling; Surviving, p.11.
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In  th e  n e x t c h a p te r , th e  b a c k g ro u n d  a n d  o u tb re a k  o f w a r  p reced es  
th e  analy sis  o f  ea r ly  sn ip ing . W hat follows is a  su rv ey  o f G erm an  sn ip ing , for 
it w as  the  e n em y  th a t  in itia ted  th e  a r t  o f p rec ision  sh o o tin g  in  th e  G rea t W ar. 
M any  B ritish  a n d  C an a d ia n  so ld ie rs’ “b ap tism  o f fire“ cam e a t  th e  h a n d s  of a  
sk ille d  B av a ria n  o r P ru s s ia n  a n d  it w as  n o t u n ti l  1915  th a t  m e a s u re s  were 
ta k e n  to  c o u n te ra c t th e se  p ro fic ien t m a rk sm en . At th is  level, s n ip in g  by the 
C a n a d ia n  c o n tin g e n t  w as  in  its  in fan cy  a n d  it w o u ld  req u ire  m o re  form al 
tra in in g  an d  kn o w led g e  of fu n d a m e n ta ls  to  tu r n  o u t a n  ex ce p tio n a l sn iper. 
S u c h  is the  sco p e  of C h a p te r  HI - S n ip e r  T rain ing. T he B ritish  w ere  th e  first 
to  in a u g u ra te  th is  p ro g ram , th o u g h  co n v in c in g  h ig h  c o m m a n d  o f su c h  a 
m e a s u re  w as. a t  tim e s , a  d ifficult ta s k . The e x p e r tise  of M aj. H. H esk e th - 
P rich a rd . of th e  BEF. soon  v au lted  sn ip in g  in to  a  sem i-o rg an ized  form . The 
s u b s e q u e n t  e s ta b l i s h m e n t  a n d  g ro w th  of C o rp s  S n ip in g  S c h o o ls  finally  
s ignalled  the  in s titu tio n a liz a tio n  o f sn ip in g  w ithin th e  m ilitary  h ie ra rch y .
O nce t r a in e d , th e  C a n a d ia n  s n ip e r  p u t  h is  sk ills  to  w o rk  in  the  
tre n c h e s  of th e  W este rn  F ron t. C h a p te r  IV. S n ip ing  in  T rench  W arfare , th u s  
ex am in es  th is  ac tiv ity , from  th e  se lec tio n  of a rm s  a n d  sn ip in g  p o s ts  to the  
effect the  s n ip e r  h a d  on  th e  front. T h is sec tion  rev ea ls  th e  evohdng m a tu rity  
o f  th e  sn iper, fo r it w as  in  th e  m u d -la d e n  tre n c h e s  o f  F ran ce  a n d  F lan d ers  
th a t  th e  m o d e m  sn ip e r  fo u n d  h is  ro o ts . A lthough th e  m ajo rity  o f  th e  G reat 
W ar w as fo u g h t a c ro s s  th e  s c a r re d  s tr ip s  of no  m a n ’s lan d , t r e n c h  w arfare  
w as  no t the  o n ly  b a ttle  fe a tu re  on  th e  W este rn  F ro n t. F igh ting  in  th e  open 
d id  occu r, th o u g h  le s s  c o n s is te n tly  so . N ev erth e le ss , th e  t ru e  m a rk s m a n  
m a d e  effective u s e  o f open  g ro u n d , w h e th e r  a lone in  th e  v a s t re a c h e s  of no 
m a n ’s  lan d , in  th e  a d v a n c e  o f a n  offensive o r in  p u r s u i t  o f th e  re tre a tin g  
G e rm a n  Army in  th e  la s t 100 d ay s  o f th e  war.
T h u s , t h e  ro le  of th e  s n ip e r  in  th e  G re a t W ar. d e sp ite  re m a in in g  
u n d o c u m e n te d  u n til  now. w as a n  im portem t one. F rom  h is  early  a p p e a ra n c e  
in  th e  tre n c h es  o f  1914 a n d  1915 to  com plete  fru ition  t y  1918. s n ip in g  in  the 
C a n a d ia n  C orps w as a n  evo lu tionary  p ro cess . ’The ab ility  of the  s n ip e r  to  find
7
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a  co n sis ten cy  in  a ll face ts  o f th e  G re a t W ar re v e a ls  h is  s ignifican t co n trib u tio n  
to  th e  w ar effort a n d . su b seq u en tly , to  v ictory  o n  11 N ovem ber. 1918.
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C h a p te r  II 
S ettin g  th e  S tage
W ith  th e  o u tb re a k  of w ar in A u g u s t. 1914. th e  n a tio n s  of E u ro p e  se t 
fo rth  on  a  jo u rn e y  o f p o w er, te ch n o lo g y  a n d  d e s tru c tio n . The d e s ire  for 
g re a te r  pow er fertilized tech n o lo g ica l p ro g re s s  b u t d e s tru c tio n  w as th e  e n d  
p roduct. W hile th e re  a re  h o rro rs  in an y  w ar. th e  tria ls  a n d  trib u la tio n s  o f th e  
G reat W ar ex ceed  all o th e r s ,  for n o  o th e r  so ld ie r w o u ld  ever e n d u re  th e  
harrow ing  ex periences o f tre n c h  w arfare .
T h is  c h a p te r  s e t s  th e  s tag e  fo r th is  d e s tru c tiv e  w ar. T he w a r of 
m ovem ent, th a t  w^as to  be  over by C h r is tm a s  1914. qu ick ly  g ro u n d  to  a 
steady  h a lt a n d  the “d igg ing  in" of th e  in fa n try  en su ed . In  th ese  first m o n th s  
of the  tre n c h  dead lock , th e  Allies, it will be  a rg u ed , u n d e rw e n t a n  ev o lu tion  
w ith reg ard  to  sn ip ing . B ec a u se  sn ip in g  w a s  a  private p ra c tic e  am ong  a  sm all 
n u m b er o f sk illed  m a rk sm e n , it did n o t im m ed ia te ly  a r is e  from  the  d e p th s  of 
th e  tre n c h e s . The e v o lu tio n a ry  p ro c e s s , how ever, d id  beg in  m  th is  in itia l 
p h ase  o f w ar. F irst, a  sum m ary^ of th e  e v e n ts  - the  b u ild -u p  of h o s tilitie s , 
o u tb reak  o f  th e  w ar. a n d  p u rs u it  to th e  s e a  - will p reced e  th e  ex am in a tio n  of 
sn ip ing . T h is  oveivlew  w ill fu r th e r  fam ilia rize  th e  re a d e r  wdth th e  e x te n t of 
th e  tre n c h  co n d itio n s  o n  th e  W estern  F ro n t in to  th e  y e a r  1915. The sec o n d  
focus o f th is  c h a p te r  is  a n  ex am in atio n  o f  G e rm an  sn ip in g  in  the conflict, for
9
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it w as from  th e ir  sk illed  h a n d s  th a t  sn ip ing  o rig inated  in  t re n c h  w arfare. T he 
d o m in an ce  o f  th e  G e rm an  s n ip e r  served  to  te a c h  th e  Allies o f  th e  d an g ers  o f 
c a re le s sn e ss  in  t r e n c h  w arfare . F rom  the n u m e ro u s  c a s u a lt ie s  th a t  m o u n te d  
in  1915. it w a s  a  h a rd  lesso n  le a rn ed . Finally, w ith  som e defensive  m e a su re s  
in  p lace, th e  A llied c o u n te rac tiv ity  will be a s s e s s e d , for it w a s  th is  reac tio n  in  
1915 th a t  ig n ite d  th e  fuse  for o rg an ized  sn ip in g  in  th e  B ritish  E x p ed itio n ary  
Force (BEF) a n d  th e  C a n a d a  C o rp s  in  y e a rs  to  com e. In  su m m a tio n , th is  
c h a p te r  will re v e a l th a t  th e  f ir s t  y e a r  an d  a  h a lf  o f th e  w a r  w as a le a rn in g  
p ro c e ss  for th e  A llies, one th a t  involved th e  f irs t fetal s ta g e s  in  developing  a  
critical sn ip in g  u n it.
I
A re \dew  o f a  n u m b e r  o f g en era l h is to rie s  on th e  G re a t W ar will reveal
one  of two c o m m o n  th e m e s  a t  th e ir  beg inn ing : som e e m p h a s iz e  G e rm a n
C hancello r O tto  von  B ism arck 's  p roc la im ation  th a t  “som e d a m n  foolish th ing"
in  th e  B a lk a n s  w o u ld  ignite  a  E u ro p e a n  w a r k  o th e rs  te n d  to  focus o n  th e
ba lm y  c o n d itio n  o f th e  w e a th e r  in  th e  s u m m e r  of 1914. 2 R eg a rd le ss  o f
w hich  one is m o re  im p o rtan t, b o th  w ere critical fac to rs  in  th e  G rea t W ar. T he
fo rm er p o in t lo o k s  in to  th e  o rig in s  o f th e  conflic t, s ta r t in g  w ith  B ism arck
him self. F o llow ing  th e  P ru s s ia n  tr iu m p h  over th e  F ren ch  a n d  u n ifica tio n  o f
th e  G erm an  s ta t e s  in  1871. B ism arck  c rea ted  a  n e tw ork  o f a llian ces  th a t k e p t
th e  new^ b a la n c e  o f pow er in  ch eck .
B ism arck  d id  n o t expec t th e  F rench  to  like the  new  o rd e r  o f th ings, 
a n d  h e  w a s  rig h t. T h ro u g h o u t the  n ex t severa l y e a rs  h e  m an ag ed  to  
k eep  F r a n c e  iso la ted : h e  s e c u re d  a n  a llian ce  w ith  A u s tr ia , w hom  
G e rm a n y  h a d  a lso  re c e n tly  defea ted , a n d  w ith  R u ss ia , w ho h a te d  
A u s tr ia . F o r m ore  th a n  a  d ecad e  B ism arck  su c c e s s fu lly  jugg led  
G erm an y . R u ss ia , a n d  A u s tr ia  in  the T hree  E m p ero rs’ League. 3
The rise  o f K a ise r  W ilhelm  II ev en tu a lly  led  to  B ism arck ’s  fall, a n d  w ith  th e  
C hancello r w e n t th e  sy stem  of a llian ces . This w as  co m p o u n d ed  by  the  im p ac t
1 Daniel Dancocks; W elcom e to Flanders Fields. (Toronto, 1988). p.7.
2 Desmond Morton; When Your Number’s  Up . (Toronto. 1993). p. 1, J am es L. Stokesbury; A Short 
History of World War O ne. ((New York. 1981 ). p.11.
3 Stokesbury; Short History, p. 16-17.
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o f s u c h  id e o lo g ie s  a s  n a tio n a lis m , p o lit ic a l  a n d  s o c ia l  D a rw in ism  a n d  
m ilita rism  w h ic h  w ere r a m p a n t  in  th e  n a t io n s  of E u ro p e . T he la tte r  w as 
particu la rly  c ritic a l a s  th e  grow ing  a rm s ra c e  coincided w ith  a  d ivorce betw een  
th e  m ilitary  a n d  dem ocracy . T h a t is. m ilita ry  com m and  w a s  ta k in g  d ip lom atic  
m a tte rs  in to  th e ir  ow n h a n d s .  The p a ss iv e  B ism arck  a llia n c e  sy s tem  w as  
rep laced  by  a n  a ggressive  o n e  th a t  re s u lte d  in  two a rm e d  c am p s : B rita in . 
F rance  a n d  R u ss ia  in  one. G erm any , A u stria -H u n g ary  a n d  Ita ly  in  th e  o th e r. 
By th e  c o n c lu s io n  o f the firs t decade  of th e  tw en tie th  c e n tu ry . E u rope  w as a  
brew ing p o w d e r keg  w aitin g  fo r a  sp a rk . A nd , ju s t  a s  th e  fo rm er G e rm a n  
C hancello r h a d  h in ted , th a t  s p a rk  cam e from  th e  B a lk an s  in  J u n e .  1914 w ith  
th e  a s s a s s in a tio n  o f A u strian  h e ir-a p p a ren t. F ranz  F e rd in a n d . T he d ip lom atic  
c h ao s  th a t  e n s u e d  p re p a re d  th e  C en tra l a n d  Allied p o w e rs  for w h a t w as 
m ean t to be a  “sh o rt war".
The s u m m e r  of 1 9 1 4  c o m m a n d s  a s  m u c h  a t te n t io n  a s  B ism arck ’s 
n in e te e n th  c e n tu ry  p red ic tio n . At th e  s a m e  tim e p eo p le  w ere  en joy ing  th e  
su m m e r’s h e a t ,  th ey  were eag e rly  lis ten ing  to  th e  ru m b lin g  o n  th e  E u ro p ean  
fron tier. T he  re sp o n se  to  a  com in g  w ar w a s  a n  e n th u s ia s t ic  o n e  in  C an ad a . 
The violation o f  Belgian n e u tra li ty  on A u g u st 4 th . 1914 b y  th e  G erm an  Army 
led to  a  B r itish  ( a n d  c o n seq u en tly . C an ad ian ) d ec la ra tio n  o f w ar. 4 The ill- 
fa ted  “S ch lie ffen  Plan" w as d esig n ed  to  in flic t a  swift a n d  decis ive  blow, so  
qu ick , in fac t, th a t  the  K a ise r e n su re d  h is  m e n  they w o u ld  be hom e “before 
th e  leaves fell from  the  tre e s ."  5 The ba lm y, d ream y  s u m m e r  o f 14 su d d en ly  
becam e a  n ig h tm a re  of w ar.
In th e  rem ain in g  fo u r m o n th s  o f 1914. b o th  C e n tra l a n d  Allied p>owers 
co n d u c ted  th e  only  open w a rfa re  th a t ex is ted  o n  the  W e s te rn  F ro n t u n til th e  
s p r in g  o f 1 9 1 8 . The G e rm a n s  b a rg e d  in to  B elg ium  w ith  e a s e  a n d  th e  
m in iscu le  B elg ian  Army re tre a te d  to  A ntw erp. The F re n c h  m eanw hile , u n d e r  
th e  guise o f  P lan  XVII. th r u s t  in to  Alsace a n d  Lorraine o n  A u g u s t 14 m ak in g
4 Dancocks: W elcom e, p.8.
5 Jay Winter & Blaine Baggett: The Great War and the Shaping of th e  20th Century. (New York, 
1996). p.59.
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som e m e asu re a b le  g a in s  th a t  w ere  ch eck ed  b y  a  su p e rio r  G e rm a n  artille ry  
c o u n te r -a tta c k . A seco n d  F re n c h  a t ta c k  in  th e  A rdennes e ig h t d ay s  la te r  
proved ju s t  a s  costly  a s  th e  F re n c h  Army, only  th re e  w eeks in to  th e  conflict, 
w as su d d en ly  cripp led .
In  B elgium , th e  G e rm a n  a d v a n c e  w as  h a lte d  by th e  s m a ll B ritish  
E xped itionary  Force w ho held  o ff th e  g ian t a d v e rsa ry  a t M ons w ith  a ccu ra te  
m u sk e try  a n d  rifle-fire. 6 W h a t e n s u e d  w as a  “ra c e  to  the  sea"  w here th e  
F ren c h  a n d  B ritish  m oved to  th e  n o r th , o p p o s ite  th e  eq u a lly  p e rs is te n t 
G erm an s, try ing  to  o u t-flan k  th e  o p p o n en t. T he race  cam e to a n  a b ru p t en d  
a t th e  Belgian tow n o f N ieuport o n  th e  coast o f th e  N orth  Sea. O ne la s t effort 
by th e  G erm an  A rm y to  b reak  in to  F ran ce  w as a g a in  th w arted  by  th e  B ritish  
an d  F ren ch  a t  th e  B attle  of th e  M arne  on  S e p te m b e r 7 th . E x h a u s te d  by the  
m obile ru s h  th ro u g h  n o r th e rn  F ra n c e  an d  F la n d e rs , b o th  s id e s  se ttled  in to  
th e ir respective p ositions - giving b ir th  to tren ch  w arfare .
T rench  w arfa re  h a d  e x is te d  p rio r to  th e  G re a t W ar. th e  m o s t recen t 
exam ple being th e  B oer W ar in  S o u th  Africa a t th e  tu rn  of the  cen tu ry . Prior 
to  th a t, tren ch es  h a d  ex isted  in  th e  A m erican Civil W ar though  th e y  were not 
a s  com plex  a s  th o se  on  the  W e s te rn  F ron t. M oreover, the  m ilita ry  m indse t 
w as th a t  in s ta n c e s  like th e s e  w e re  a ty p ic a l a n d  u n lik e ly  to  re c u r . " 
N evertheless, tre n c h  w arfare  w a s  a  rea lity  in  F ra n c e  an d  F lan d e rs  a n d  b o th  
sides w ere swift to  e s tab lish  a  n e tw o rk  of w inding furrow s from th e  N orth S ea  
to th e  Sw iss bo rd er. Typical o f  th e  B ritish  line w as th e  th re e -tie re d  tre n c h  
sy stem : front, s u p p o r t  a n d  re se rv e . At th e  fore w as the  fron t t re n c h  th a t 
w as m ad e  u p  of a  fire an d  c o m m a n d  line. The fire tre n c h  fro n ted  no  m an 's  
land , p ro tec ted  by  b e lts  of b a rb e d  w ire. C o n tin u o u s  in  length, it zig-zagged 
along th e  front a t in te rv a ls  b e tw ee n  18 an d  30  feet. 8 W ithin e a c h  strip , o r 
trav erse , h u d d led  a  g ro u p  of so ld ie rs  averag ing  a  dozen . Built from  san d ag s. 
c o rru g a ted  iron a n d  a n y  o th e r d e b ris  th a t  cou ld  b e  found , the fo rw ard  tren ch
 6--------------; “Rifles of the Great War". War Machine, no.86, n.d. p .1704-1705.
7 Tony Ashworth: Trench Warfare: The Live and Let Live System . (New York. 19801. p.1.
8 Ibid.. p.5.
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w en t to  a  d e p th  o f a p p ro x im a te ly  sev en  to  te n  fee t. At th e  very  b o tto m  a  
tre n c h  m a t o r “d u ck b o ard "  r a n  p a ra lle l to  th e  s lig h tly  ra ised  fire -step . From  
th is  la tte r  po sitio n  th e  so ld ie rs  “w en t over the  top". At th e  to p  o f  th e  tre n c h  
lay  th e  “p a rap e t" , th e  m o s t fo rw ard  p a r t  of th e  line  facing th e  enem y. It 
o ffered  th e  so ld ie r th e  la s t  m e a n s  o f p ro te c tio n , th o u g h  b u lle ts  very  o ften  
p e n e tra te d  th e  sa n d b a g s . O ccas io n a lly , s a n d b a g s  w ere filled w ith  b ro k en  
ro ck  to  s tre n g th e n  th e  line, s  B uilt in to  th e  p a ra p e t w ere m any  loopholes a n d  
p e risco p es  for o b se rv a tio n  o f th e  en em y  Une. The fo rm er becam e p a rticu la rly  
u se fu l for the  sn ip er. The r e a r  p a r t  o f th e  tre n c h  w as  know n a s  th e  “p arados"  
a n d  ten d ed  to  be sUghtly h ig h e r: a s  a  re su lt it w as  o ften  to m  u p  by  rifle a n d  
m ach in e -g u n  fire. “S aps", o r  sm a ll a rtille ry  o b se rv a tio n  a n d  U sten ing  p o s ts  
s tre tc h e d  out in to  no m a n ’s la n d  a t odd  angles.
C onnected  by n a rro w er co m m u n ica tio n  tre n c h e s , the  com m a n d  tre n c h
w as s itu a ted  rough ly  20  y a rd s  to  th e  re a r . Following a  s im ilar p a tte rn  as  th e
fire line, it w as b e tte r  fortified w ith  d u g o u ts . la tr in e s  a n d  m ach in e -g u n  pxjsts.
It w as h ere  th a t officers a n d  sp ec iaU sts  (including sn ip e rs) m ost o ften  resided .
th o u g h  som e p re fe rred  to  im prov ise:
H um bler so ld ie rs  c a rv ed  th e m se lv e s  "funkho les" in  th e  tre n c h  wall 
a n d  h u d d le d  u n d e r  3 foo t-by-5  foot ru b b e r  s h e e ts  u n til d riv ing  ra in  
s e n t  v isc o u s  m u d  o o z in g  o u t o f th e  s a n d b a g s ,  a n d  th e  w alls  
g rad u a lly  co llapsed . By. 1916. m o s t tre n c h e s  h a d  enough  d u g o u ts  
to  provide c ram p ed , sm elly  sh e lte r  for everyone, lo
T he co m m u n ica tio n  lines, m ean w h ile , w ere  m o st freq u en tly  u s e d  for tro o p  
m ovem ent, su p p ly  tra in s  a n d  te lep h o n e  cab les.
The su p p o rt tren ch , e x ten d in g  b a c k  som e 7 0 -1 0 0  y ard s , o ften  h o u sed  
re lie f  tro o p s , a n d  se rv ed , a t  t im e s , a s  a  p lace  o f  s h e lte r  a f te r  a  h eav y  
b o m b a rd m e n t. It a lso  w o rk ed  to  p rov ide  a  b a se  to  re -g ro u p  for c o u n te r ­
a t ta c k s  following a n  en em y  ra id  o f th e  fron t line . ' * M edical o fficers a n d  
C o m p an y  H ead q u arte rs  w ere o fte n  s itu a te d  a t th e se  locations a s  well.
9 Maj. H. Hesketh-Prichard; Sniping in France. (London. 1920). p.33.
10 Morton. Number's Up . p. 122.
11 Ashworth: Trench Warfare, p.6.
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At th e  very b a c k  (400 -600  y a rd s )  lay th e  re se rv e  line w h e re  b a tta lio n
H e a d q u a r te rs  a n d  h ig h e r  ra n k in g  officers c o n d u c te d  th e ir  lo g is tic a l w ork.
F u r th e r , it co n ta ined  w hole b a tta lio n s  o f su p p o rt tro o p s  th a t re liev ed  front line
in fa n try  a f te r  a  g iven  p eriod . J u s t  b eh in d  th e  re se rv e  line, a n d  w ell ou t of
ra n g e  of sm all a rm s  fire w as th e  a rtille ry , w h ich  o fte n  p u lv e rized  th e  enem y
lines a t  ca lcu la ted  d is ta n c e s . >2
T he G erm an  lin e s , th o u g h  sim ilarly  p ro te c ted  by ro lls  o f  b a rb e d  w ire.
w ere s ligh tly  d ifferen t from  Allied lin es . The fro n t line w as fu lly  g a rriso n ed
w ith  s u p p o rt an d  re se rv e  tre n c h e s  ex ten d in g  b a ck  so m e 2 0 0 0 -3 0 0 0  yard s . i3
M ore so p h is tica ted , fortified  a n d  co n sid erab ly  d eep e r, the  G e rm a n s  g radually
p e rfe c ted  th e ir  tre n c h  sy s tem , a  w elcom e prize for a  c o n q u e rin g  Allied force.
• A nchoring  th e ir d e fen ces  w ere sev era l m ach in e -g u n  po sts , so m e  h o u sed  in
c o n c re te  sh e lte rs , s p re a d  ap p ro x im a te ly  800 y a rd s  a p a r t .  S i tu a te d  ab o u t
1000 y a rd s  from  th e  fro n t line , th e y  w ere th e  m o s t d ead ly  fe a tu re  of th e
G e rm a n  tre n c h  sy s tem . T he d ia g ra m  on  the follow ing page o u tl in e s  the two
re sp ec tiv e  tre n c h  n e tw o rk s .
M ore im p o rtan tly , th e  c o n d itio n s  c re a te d  by  th e se  tre n c h lin e s  along
th e  W este rn  Front w ere su itab le  for sn ip ing . The te rra in , from  th e  o p en  fields
o f  F la n d e rs  to  th e  ro ll in g  h il ls id e s  in  e a s te r n  F ra n c e , p ro v id e d  am p le
o p p o rtu n ity  for a  c ra c k sh o t to  te s t  h is  skills.
T ren c h  life w as  d a n g e ro u s . E ven  in  a  q u ie t sec to r, a  to u r  o f  the  
fro n t seldom  c o s t  a  b a tta lio n  few er th a n  h a l f  a  d ozen  d e a d  and  
w ounded . S igns w a rn ed  so ld ie rs  ab o u t sn ip e rs , a n  im p o r ta n t cau se  
o f d ea th . >5
Rifle-fire w as  a  m a in s ta y  o n  th e  W este rn  F ron t a n d . a s  th is  a n d  s u b se q u e n t 
c h a p te rs  will show , “sn ip in g  w as im p o r ta n t in th e  w ar. for th e  la y o u t of th e  
tre n c h e s  gave sn ip ers  good  c h an c e s  to  inflict m a te ria l a n d  m o ra l lo ss  upo n  the  
enem y ."  U n fo rtu n a te ly  for th e  B ritish  an d  C a n a d ia n  fo rces, th e  value o f
12 Bill Rawling; Survivino Trench Warfare. (Toronto. 1992). p.27-28.
13 Ashworth: Trench Warfare, p .6.
14 W inters Bagget: The Great War. p.91.
15 Morton: Number’s  Up . p .126.
16 Ashworth: Trench Warfare, p .57.
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sn ip in g  in  t r e n c h  w a rfa re  w ould  f ir s t  h a v e  to  be  le a rn e d  th ro u g h  th e  
c ro ssh a irs  o f  the  G erm an sn ip e r 's  s ig h ts .
n
O nce th e  zig-zag p a t te rn  o f tre n c h e s  s c a tte re d  th e ir  way a c ro ss  the  
W estern  F ro n t, th e  long  p ro c e s s  o f “tr e n c h  dead lock" b eg an . H u d d led  in 
m ake-sh lft d itch es  an d  s e p a ra te d  by a  m an g led  belt o f te r ra in  referred  to  as 
n o  m an’s la n d , soldiers on  b o th  sides b e g a n  to  Uve a  troglodytic lifestyle. On 
a  m inor sca le , a tte m p ts  to  b re a k  th e  s ta le m a te  cam e in  th e  form of shelling, 
tre n c h  m o r ta rs  a n d  g re n a d e s  w hich  w ere  firs t in it ia te d  by  th e  G e rm a n s . 
S n ipers  a lso  m ade  th e ir  a p p e a ra n c e  in  th e  tre n c h e s  o f  th e  W estern  F ron t, 
an o th er in itia tive  of th e  A llies’ enem y - a n d  “proved th em selv es  to be m a s te rs  
of im provisation , an d  th e  sp e e d  with w h ich  th ey  developed effective sn ip in g  in 
th e  a u tu m n  o f 1914 w as te s tim o n y  to  th a t  ta len t."  in  fac t, the fu tu re -F irs t 
Army S n ip in g  Officer. M ajor H. H e sk e th -P ric h a rd  a t te s te d  th a t “it w a s  th e  
G erm ans, a n d  no t th e  B ritish , who b e g a n  sn ip in g , is By th e  end  o f 1914. 
G erm an  m a rk s m e n  w ere  e q u ip p e d  w ith  a n  e s t im a te d  2 0 .0 0 0  te le sc o p ic  
s ig h ted  r if le s  a n d  w ere u s in g  th em  w ith  g re a t e ffic iency . More o f th e s e  
firearm s cam e  before th e  y e a r ’s en d  a f te r  th e  D uke o f  R atibor co llec ted  a 
n u m b er o f sp o rtin g  rifles from  acro ss  G e rm a n y  a n d  s e n t  th em  to  th e  fron t. 
T hese rif le s , th e  M a u se r  G ew ehr. o r “G ew  ’98". w ere  am ong  th e  m o s t 
a c c u ra te  f ire a rm s  on  th e  W este rn  F ro n t - p a r tic u la r ly  w hen fitted  w ith  
telescopic s ig h ts . >9 T hat th e  G erm an s w ere  fo re ru n n e rs  in  th e  developm ent 
of optical d ev ices fu r th e r  e n h a n c e d  th e  p o te n tia l o f th e se  rifles. In  cap ab le  
h an d s, th e se  firearm s w ere deadly .
G e rm a n  sn ip e rs  d ev e lo p ed  th e i r  s n ip in g  f in e s se  qu ick ly  o n  th e  
W estern  F ro n t, su rp a ss in g  th e  Allies in s ta n tly  in  th is  reg a rd . Their inc ip ien t 
sk ills  w ere  m a s te r fu l , fo r a s  one o ff ice r  n o te d , “w h e re  th ey  w ere  o u r
17 Adrian Gilbert; Sniper. (New York. 1994). p.42.
18 Hesketh-Prichard; Sniping, p.28.
1 9 -------------; “Rifles of the Great War”, p. 1702 In fact. Gew 98 sniper rifles were one of the first
German rifles u sed  to pierce armoured tanks at the Som m e This w a s done by using blunt-end 
bullets that were able to puncture the metal on impact.
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s u p e r io rs  w as in  th e ir  h u n te r 's  in s tin c ts  - they  s tu d ie d  th e ir  p rey ."  20  M any  
G e rm a n  m a rk s m e n  w ere re g u la r  h u n te r s  o r w ere re c ru ite d  fro m  th e  F o re s t 
G u a rd s  a n d  B a ttle  Police - in d iv id u a ls  w ith  ex cep tio n a l sh o o tin g  sk ills . 21 
T hese  la tte r  re c ru its  were a lso  k n o w n  to  v en tu re  in to  no m a n ’s la n d , a  p lace  
over w hich  m a n y  a  s n ip e r  s o u g h t co m p le te  d o m in a tio n . O th e rs  re so r te d  to  
d isgu ising  th em se lv es  in  s to len  u n ifo rm s or F lem ish  civilian c lo th e s , p ra c tis in g  
th e ir  a r t  w ith L uger au to m a tic  p is to ls  o n  lone B ritish  o r C an ad ian  so ld ie rs. 2 2
W hat m a d e  p a rt of th e  G e rm a n s ’ su p erio rity  so  high w as  th e ir  m e th o d  
o f  sn ip ing . A lth o u g h  sh o o tin g  from  co n cea led  p o s itio n s  w as co m m o n  in  th e  
ea rly  p a rt o f th e  w ar. G erm an  s n ip e rs  w ere q u ick  to  u se  “loopho le  p la tes" , a  
p ro tec tiv e  m e ta l  s la te  w ith  a n  op>ening for rifles. By 1915. m a n y  of th e s e  
p la te s  d e c o ra te d  th e  G e rm a n  l in e s ,  so m e  n o tic e a b le , o th e r s  c le v e rly  
cam ouflaged . 23 W ith a s  m a n y  a s  3 0  p la te s  in  th e  line a t one tim e , th e  A llies 
w ere  o fte n  le ft p u z z le d  a s  to  th e  w h e re a b o u ts  o f th e  d e a d ly  G e rm a n  
c ra c k sh o t. A n o th e r fac to r in  th e ir  s u c c e s s  w as th e  Linear n a tu re  o f th e  f irs t 
A llied tre n c h lin e s . P erfectly  p la c e d  sa n d b a g s  a n d  f la tte n e d  w ith  sh o v e ls . 
Allied p a ra p e ts  m v ited  a  G e rm a n  s n ip e r ’s b u lle t tim e  an d  ag a in . M ovem ent 
b e h in d  th ese  lin es  w as easily  d e te c ta b le  for th e  en em y  b ecau se  th e  c o n to u rs  
o f  th e  h u m a n  b o d y  a n d  h e a d  s to o d  o u t a g a in s t  th e  e v e n  p a r a p e t .  
N evertheless, c h a n g e s  to th e se  “tex tbook" sty le tre n c h e s  did  n o t com e u n ti l  
e a rly  1916.
O rg a n iz ed  a t  c o m p a n y  level, th e  G e rm a n  s n ip e r s  h a d  b u t o n e  
objective - kill th e  enem y. A nd th is  th e y  did  well, ad d in g  m c e s s a n t  n u m b e rs  
to  th e  Allied c asu a lty ’ lis ts . H e sk e th -P iic h a rd  n o te d  "in early  1915 we lo s t 
e ig h teen  m en  in  a  single b a tta lio n  in  a  single day  to  enem y sm p ers ."  24 it d id  
n o t ta k e  long  fo r B ritish . C a n a d ia n  a n d  F re n c h  so ld ie rs  to  l e a m  o f th e
20 n a g , RG9 III 03 /3867/107/2 , “Lecture Given at N.C.O.’s  School of Instruction. 2nd Army", p.4.
21 Ian Skennerton; The British Sniper. (London. 1984). p.11.
22 Col. J.A.Currie: The Red Watch. (Toronto. 1916). p. 163-164.
23 Hesketh-Prichard: Sniping, p. 108.
24 Ibid.. p.2.
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d a n g e rs  o f  p e e r in g  over th e  p a ra p e t. P te . W ill B ird o f th e  4 2 n d  Bn. re c a lls
th is  p e rilo u s  activity;
L arso n ...[w as] th rilled  w ith  th e  front lin e  [and] w an ted  to  know  h o w  
n e a r  th e  G e rm an s  were. I to ld  him  a n d  h e  sa id  it so u n d e d  u n re a l to  
h im . It h a d  becom e lig h t a s  he  ta lk e d , a n d  w h en  I p u t  u p  th e  
p e risc o p e  it w as sh o t aw ay  by  a  G e rm a n  sm per. “T h a t fellow m u s t  
b e  v ery  near", s a id  L arson . “Til tak e  a  q u ic k  look".
“D on't!" I yelled  a n d  g ra b b e d  h is c o a t. He s tre tch e d  u p  in  sp ite  o f 
m y  p ro te s t. The bu lle t e n te re d  h is  fo re h e a d  an d  w en t o u t  th e  b a c k , 
b re a k in g  th e  s t r a p  o f h is  he lm et a n d  ca rry in g  it to  th e  re a r  o f th e  
p o s t .  I low ered  th e  b o d y  to  th e  t r e n c h  floor an d  co v ered  th e  face  
w ith  a  c lean  san d b ag . 25
The s t r ik e  o f a  b u lle t h a d  a  d e v a s ta tin g  e ffec t on  every  in d iv id u a l in  th e
tre n c h . S tr a y  b u lle ts  - o ften  from  a  d i s ta n t  enem y m a c h in e -g u n  - w ere
com m on  in  th e  tre n c h e s  an d  w hile  m any  so ld ie rs  becam e u s e d  to  it. o n ly  th e
foo lhardy  w ere v ictim s. As M ag n u s  Hood reca lled . “W hen y o u  h e a r  th e  c ra ck .
the  b u lle t h a s  gone  p a s t  you . I t’s  the  o ne  y o u  d o n ’t h e a r  th a t  h its  y o u .“ 26
The s n ip e r ’s  b u lle t, how ever, ty p ica lly  r e a c h e d  its  ta rg e t. T he s ig h t o f a
c a re le ss  so ld ie r, w ho rem ain ed  exposed  for a  m o m en t too long, falling in  th e
th ro e s  o f  d e a th  h a d  a c u m u la tiv e  effect o f  d ep le tin g  tro o p  m ora le . In  th e
B ritish  tre n c h e s , a  y o u n g  C h arles  C arrin g to n  vividly recalled s u c h  a  m o m en t:
A lm o st a s  we a p p ro a c h e d  th e  sam e  s n ip e r  fired a g a in  from  th e  
v illage  to  o u r  left, an d  a  m a n  called P r a t t  d ropped  Uke a  s to n e  ju s t  
w h e re  th e  co rp o ra l h a d  fa llen . He. to o . h a d  a  sm all ro u n d  hole in  
h is  tem p le  a n d  th e  b ack  o f h is  sk u ll b lo w n  aw ay. P ra tt w as  b ey o n d  
h o p e . H is h e a d  w as sh a tte re d : sp la tte r in g s  of b ra in  lay  in a  pool o f 
b lo o d  u n d e r  h im ; b u t. th o u g h  he  h a d  n e v e r  been  c o n sc io u s  s in c e  
th e  sh o t w as  fired, he re fu se d  to die. A n old co rpo ra l looked a f te r  
h im , h e ld  h is  body  an d  a rm s , w hich  w rith e d  and  fough t feebly a s  h e  
lay . It w as  over two h o u rs  before he  d ied , h o u rs  of J u ly  s u n sh in e  in  
a  c ro w d ed  s p a c e  w here  p e rh a p s  a  d o z e n  m en  s a t  in  a  d itc h  te n  
y a rd s  long  a n d  five feet w ide, reek ing  w ith  th e  sm ell o f blood, w h ich  
a ll th e  tim e, above the  so o th in g  voice o f  th e  corporal, a  gu rg ling  a n d  
a  m o a n in g  cam e from  h is  Ups. now  h ig h  a n d  Uquid. now  low a n d
d r y ...27
In s ta n c e s  like th e se  c re a te d  tw o very  d iv erse  effects: on  o n e  h a n d , it ta u g h t  
so ld ie rs  to  k e e p  th e ir  h e a d s  dow n, while o n  th e  o ther, it in s tille d  a  fe a r  th a t
25 Will R. Bird: G hosts Have Warm Hands. (Toronto. 1968). p. 17.
26 Morton: Number's Do. p. 123.
27 Gilbert: S n ip er, p.46.
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som e h a d  d ifficu lty  overcom ing. C o m p a n io n sh ip  w as o n e  o f  th e  few th in g s  
th a t  h e ld  tro o p s  together. M any h a d  e n lis ted  to g e th e r a n d  m a n y  w ere in  th e  
sa m e  u n its .  T h u s , to  see a  fr ien d  fall a t th e  m ercy  of a  snipper's b u lle t w as  
very  u n n e rv in g  to  th e  indiv idual. As H esk e th -P ric h a rd  n o te d , “if yo u r tre n c h  
is  d o m in a te d  by  enem y  s n ip e rs , life in  it is  rea lly  a  v e ry  h a rd  th in g , a n d  
m o ra le  m u s t  inev itab ly  suffer." 28  For H e rb e r t M cBride, a  sn ip e r w ith  th e  
2 1 s t B n ., lo s in g  com rades to  a n  en em y  m a rk s m e n  brew ed a  vengence w ith in  
h im . O n e  o f  M cB ride 's c o m p a n io n s . P te . C h a rlie  W endt, w as  s tru c k  b y  a  
sn ip e r’s  b u lle t w h en  on patro l. T h o u g h  s h ro u d e d  by b u s h  a n d  g rass . W end t. 
M cBride a n d  th e  ju s t  arrived s tre tc h e r  b e a re rs  w ere co n tin u a lly  sho t a t by  th e  
sam e  c ra c k sh o t b eh in d  the  G e rm a n  lines. T h o u g h  the  re s t  o f  h is  sh o ts  failed  
to  h it an y o n e , h is  d e te rm in a tio n  m a d e  c lea rin g  th e  w o u n d ed  so ld ier aw ay  a  
difficult ta sk . W end t only lived long  e n o u g h  to  re ach  th e  re se rv e  lines w h ere  
he w as la te r  g iven a  proper b u ria l. For M cB ride, th e  p e rs is te n c e  of the  sn ip e r  
s tir re d  a n g e r  w ith in  him  an d  from  h e n ce -fo rth . h e  vowed to  avenge th e  d e a th  
of h is  co m pan ion . 29
H is to rian s  have identified  a  form  of tru c e  a n d  fra te rn iza tio n  am o n g  th e  
c o m b a ta n ts  in  th e  G reat W ar. M odris E k s te in s  in The R ite s  o f S p rin g  a n d  
B row n a n d  S e a to n ’s  C h ris tm as  T ru ce : T he W este rn  F ro n t D ecem ber. 1914  
b o th  re flec t u p o n  th e  u n d o c u m e n te d  cea se -fire  by bo th  s id e s  in  light o f th e  
first C h r is tm a s  ho liday  of th e  w a r. T h is s y s te m  of “Uve a n d  let live" w a s  a  
cooperative  v e n tu re  th a t eased  th e  a lread y  to rr id  life of th e  so ld iers  s e p a ra te d  
by a  s c a r re d  no  m a n ’s land . T h e  d e lib e ra te  re s tr ic tio n  o f h o s tile  ac tiv ity  by  
one s id e  w as  co n d itio n a l u p o n  th e  c o m p lia n ce  by  th e  o th e r .  30 in  m a n y  
m e m o irs  o n e  w ill find  in s ta n c e s  o f  s p o n ta n e o u s  tru c e , e i th e r  am o n g  la rg e  
g ro u p s  o r b e tw ee n  two in d iv id u a ls . Will B ird , a n  a m a tu e r  sn ip e r  tu r n e d  
p a tro lm a n , e n g a g e d  in  s u c h  a n  in c id e n t w h e n  exp lo ring  a n  old s a p  th a t  
s tre tc h e d  in to  n o  m a n ’s land. A fter a  s t r u ggle th ro u g h  a  s e r ie s  of tr ip  w ires.
28 Hesketh-Prichard; Sniping, p.2.
29 Herbert McBride: A Rifleman Went to War. (Mt. Ida. AK, 1987). p.74-78.
30 Ashworth: Trench Warfare, p. 19.
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B ird  c am e  face to  face  w ith  a  G e rm a n  sen try , lik e ly  a  p a tro lm a n  h im se lf. 
T here  w as a  b rief s ta n d o ff  a n d  th o u g h  th e  G erm an  k n e w  h e  w as co v ered  by 
B ird’s  rifle, he  p roceeded  to  low er h is  h a n d g u n  a n d  slow ly s te p  aw ay, sm iling  
a s  he  d id  so . T hough  B ird in te n d e d  to  tak e  him  p r iso n e r  - or sh o o t h im  if 
h e  tr ied  to  flee - he  le t th e  s e n try  go a f te r  a  sligh t w ave  a n d  “h a lf-sa lu te"  by 
th e  G erm an . O n a  la rg e r level, th e re  a re  in s ta n ce s  w h ere  n u m b ers  o f so ld ie rs  
c o m m u n ic a te d  from  a  d is ta n c e , e x c h a n g in g  s to rie s  o v e r th e ir  lim ited  tru c e . 
T ru ces  s u c h  a s  th e se  w ere u s u a lly  u n s p o k e n  a n d  u n o ffic ia l a n d  v a r ie d  m 
len g th  o f  tim e. An u n d e rs ta n d in g  a m o n g  in fan try m en , “live a n d  le t live" w as 
co n tra ry  to  w h a t th e  h igh  co m m an d  d e s ired  - th e  “k ill o r be killed“ policy . 32 
F ra te rn iz a tio n  w ith th e  enem y, a f te r  all, w as  illegal a n d  w ith  it cam e se r io u s  
co n seq u en ces .
D e trim en ta l to  th is  sy stem  o f cooperative p e ac e  w as th e  sm p er. w hose  
h a r r a s i n g  a c t iv i t ie s  q u ic k ly  d is p e l le d  a ll n o t io n s  o f  f r a te r n iz a t io n ,  
c o m m u n ic a tio n  a n d  cease-fire . As th e  “w ar of tech n o lo g y "  d eveloped  in to  
1915. tre n c h  ra id s, h a n d  g re n a d es  a n d  tre n c h  m o r ta rs  co n tm u ed  to  s h a t te r  
th e s e  u n o ff ic ia l t ru c e s .  B u t it w a s  w e ll-a im ed  r if le -f ire  th a t  re m a in e d  
c o n s is te n t o n  th e  W este rn  F ron t a n d  se rv ed  to  re m in d  so ld ie rs, w ho  sp e n t 
m u c h  o f th e ir  tim e h u d d led  in  d u g o u ts  u n d e r  ru b b e r  g ro u n d sh e e ts . t h a t  they  
w ere s till a t  w ar. 33 As th e  ferocity  o f  th e  w ar m c re a s e d . th e  G e rm a n  a n d  
Allied s n ip e r s  beg an  to  d is re g a rd  a ll h u m a n ity  for th e  w a r  effort. S om e 
sm p ers . like Will B ird - w ho. a fte r fo u r su ccessiv e  k ills , felt h e  had  h is  s h a re  - 
w ere left w ith  the  m e n ta l a n g u ish  o f  ta k in g  dow n a  so ld ie r  in co ld  b lood . 
L ikew ise, th e  poet R obert G raves, w h o  h a d  a  b a th m g  G erm an  in  h is  s ig h ts  
declined  th e  o p p o rtu m ty  w hich  w as su b se q u e n tly  ta k e n  u p  b y  his s e rg e a n t. 34 
O ther m ark sm en , who h a d  th e  ab ility  to  seco n d -g u ess  th e ir  conscience, fo u n d  
so lace in  claim ing  a n  “eye for a n  eye", a s  in  th e  earlie r ex am p le  by M cBride.
31 Bird; G hosts, p.51.
32 Ashworth. I  ranch Warfare, p .19.
33 Ibid. p.57.
34 Gilbert: Sniper. p.61
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G erm an  s n ip e r s  w ere  e q u a lly  h o s tile  w ith  th e ir  rif le -flre . C h a rle s
S tev en s recalled  a n  inc iden t w h e re  m ora lity  w as d isca rd e d  in  fa v o u r o f  add ing
to  C an ad ian  c a s u a lty  lis ts . A fte r a  sh e ll s t ru c k  a  p o rtio n  o f th e ir  t re n c h  lines.
S tev en s  a n d  h is  c o m p an io n s  fo u g h t ag g ressive ly  in  th e  o p en  a n d  w en t w ith
th e  s tre tc h e r  b e a re r s  to  re tr ie v e  G allager. th e ir  co o k  w ho w as  in ju re d  in  th e
b la s t . Hoping th a t  th e  en em y  s n ip e r  in  th e  a re a  w o u ld  have  re m o rse , given
th e  C h ris tm a s  h o lid a y  a n d  th e  e x te n t  o f in ju ry  to  th e  m a n . th e  s tr e tc h e r
b e a re rs  began  to  m ove ou t in  th e  o p en  to rem ove G allager. W ith in  a  m om ent.
th e  s m p e r  p u t  a  b u lle t  t h r o u g h  o n e  b e a re r .  R ed  T aylor, w h ic h  follow ed
th ro u g h  a n d  s t r u c k  a n o th e r .  In  a n  in s ta n t ,  th e  b e a re r s ,  d ro p p in g  th e
s tre tc h e r  in  th e  m idd le  of th e  ro a d , ro lled  off in to  a  n e a rb y  d itch .
B u t th e  s n ip e r  c o n tm u e d  to  p u t a n o th e r  b u lle t m to  th e  w o u n d ed  
m a n  on  th e  s tre tc h e r  a n d  h e  w as w o u n d ed  b y  b u lle ts  a s  w ell a s  t y  
shell. W ell. H arry  B oyer, a  s t r e tc h e r  b e a r e r  w ho h a d  s h a r e d  my 
d u g o u t w ith  m e .. . .w i th o u t  a n y  h e s i ta t io n , [ran ] aw ay  fro m  th e  
p ro te c tio n  o f  th e  t r e n c h  o u t  in to  th e  ro a d  to  d r e s s  th e  new  
c a su a ltie s  a n d  a s  he  b e n t  ov er T ay lor to  d re s s  [his] w o u n d s , th e  
sm p er p u t a  bu lle t th ro u g h  h im . 35
R ein fo rcem en ts  so o n  a rriv ed  a n d  w ere  ab le  to  p u ll  th e  s t r e tc h e r  m  by  tym g  
w ire to  it. M iracu lously , G a llag e r su rv ived  th e  o rd e a l o n  th e  s tre tc h e r ;  Taylor 
a n d  Boyer, how ever, d id  not.
D uring  th e  ea rly  y e a rs  o f  th e  w ar. th e re  e x is te d  a  m y th  th a t  G erm an s  
w ere “bad  sh o ts" , th o u g h  th is  ta le  qu ick ly  d is s ip a te d  m  light o f th e  m creasm g  
n u m b e r  of h ead  w o u n d s  m  A llied tre n c h e s . 36 M edical u m ts  a t  C a n a d ia n  field 
h o sp ita ls  w ere c o n s ta n tly  o c c u p ie d  tre a tm g  h e a d  w o u n d s . A t L oos. 1915. 
m e d ic a l re p o rts  l is te d  an  u n u s u a l ly  h ig h  n u m b e r  o f  h e a d  w o u n d s . In th e  
figh t m g  a t Hooge m  April. 1 9 1 6  th e re  w a s  a  s e c to r  o f  th e  f r o n t  th a t  w as 
co n sid e red  a  “s n ip e rs  p a ra d ise ...w h e re  th e  m a rk s m a n s h ip  w as so  d ead ly  th a t 
it w as  ha rd ly  sa fe  to  m ove a t  a ll  b y  day ."  37 m  th is  s a m e  s e c to r ,  th e  No. 1 
C a n a d ia n  G en era l H o sp ita l n o te d  "m an y  w o u n d s  o f  th e  h e a d  a n d  o n  active
35 n a g . RG41/V.10. GBG In Flanders Fields. “Interview with G hatles Stevens. 20th Bn ”, p. 12.
36 Dancocks W elcome, p.87.
37 Ralph Hodder-Williams; Princess Patricia s  Ganadian Light Infantry. 1914-1919. (Toronto. 1923). 
p. 103.
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d ay s n o t in fre q u e n tly  e ig h t sk u lls  w ere  o p en ed  to  rem o v e  m iss ie s ."  38 By 
w ar's  en d . h e a d  an d  n e c k  w o u n d s w ere th e  th ird  h ig h e s t c au se  o f  c a s u a lt ie s , 
w o u n d s  to  th e  lower a n d  u p p e r  ex trem itie s  being h ig h e r. 39 W o u n d s  o f th e  
h e ad  a n d  n e c k  w ere o fte n  so  d e v a s ta tin g  th a t  little  c o u ld  be d o n e  to  revive 
ind iv iduals. D espite  o p e ra tio n s  an d  a n e s th e tic , m an y  d ied  sh o rtly  a f te r  be in g  
s tru c k . O f c o u rse , fo r th e  tru e  s n ip e r  a t  le a s t, a  c a re fu lly  a im e d  b u lle t 
u su a lly  re su lte d  in  d e a th  for it w as th e  in te n tio n  to  sh o o t to  kill.
W h a t m ad e  th e  G e rm a n  s n ip e r s ’ effect so  d e v a s ta t in g  w a s  th e  
a m m u n itio n  th e y  u se d . N ickel-po in ted  b u lle ts  a t  a  h ig h  velocity  te n d e d  to  
p ierce th e  sk in , p e n e tra te  th e  bone a n d  exit the  b o d y  a s  p rec ise ly  a s  th ey  
e n te red . T h e  sam e  b u lle t ,  u n d e r  low er velocity, h a d  a  d ifferen t effect; it 
te n d e d  to  e n te r  c lean ly  b u t  f r a c tu re d  th e  in te rio r , te a r in g  th e  f le s h  a n d  
sp lin te rin g  bo n e  m a tte r . G e rm a n  s n ip e rs  ev en tua lly  b e g a n  u sm g  re v e rsa b le  
a m m u n itio n , o r "d u m -d u m "  b u lle ts . T h e se  p ro je c tile s  h ad  a  d e s tru c t iv e  
c o n se q u e n c e  in  th a t  th e y  h it th e ir  ta rg e t  b lun tly , f ra c tu r in g  b o n e  m a tte r , 
ripping flesh  a n d  leaving a  g ap in g  exit w o u n d , P ra tt . th e  soldier m e n tio n e d  
earlier, w as  likely killed b y  a  reversab le  b u lle t.
By th e  en d  of 1915. m edical u n its  co n tin u ed  to  see  "u n u su a l"  n u m b e rs  
o f h ead  w o u n d s  am o n g  th e  in ju red . T he p ro p e n s ity  o f  th e se  w o u n d s  finally  
p ro m p ted  th e  C a n a d ia n  C o rp s  to  e q u ip  th e ir  m e n  w ith  s tee l h e lm e ts  by 
J a n u a ry . 1916 . They h a d  h a d  only c lo th , so ft-fittin g  c a p s  p rev io u sly . The 
issu e  o f h e lm e ts  soon “p ro v ed  th e ir  v a lu e  a n d  th e ir  u s e  w as re flec ted  in  th e  
m a rk e d  d e c re a s e  in th e  n u m b e r  of h e a d  in ju r ie s ."  4i T h u s , p re v e n tio n  
becam e th e  first s tep  m  k eep m g  c a su a lty  figures low a n d  G erm an  s n ip e r s  less 
su cc e ss fu l. A lte ra tio n s  to  th e  Allied p a ra p e ts  soon  follow ed a s  th e  C a n a d a
38 Kenneth Cameron; No t Canadian General Hospital. 1914-1919. (Sackville. NB. 1938). p.205.
39 Andrew McPhaii: Official History of the Canadian Forces Inthe Great War. 1914-1919 - The Medical 
Services. (Ottawa. 1925). p.396. T h ese  wound statistics account for all types of injury, thus a  certain 
proportion were likely caused by shrapnel a s  well a s  gun-fire.
40 j .  George Adami. War Storv of the Canadian Army Medical Corns. Volume I. (London, 1918). 
p .199.
41 Cameron: N o.1. p.241.
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C orps b e g an  to  develop w ays to  co u n ter th e  G erm an  sn ip in g  th re a t.
m
W ith  th e  above m e n tio n e d  d e fen siv e  m e a su re s  in  p lace , th e  Allies 
rea lized  th e  n e ed  to  c u rb  G e rm an  sm p e r activ ity . W hile sh e llin g  a  pxossible 
sn ip e r  p o s t  w as a lw ays one  w ay to d eac tiv a te  enem y sm p e rs . it co u ld  n o t be 
re lied  o n  com pletely . M any loophole p la te s  ex isted  in  th e  G erm an  line a n d  by 
1915. sh e llin g  G e rm an  sm p e rs  u su a lly  cam e  p rio r to  a  local tre n c h  a t ta c k . 42 
A m o re  effective m e a n s  o f c o u n te rin g  th e  en em y  c ra c k sh o ts  w as th e  u s e  of 
rifle b a t te r ie s  a n d  s m p e r  sco p es . The rifle b a tte ry  c o n s is te d  of a  s ta t io n a ry  
rifle p laced  u p o n  a  m e ta l fram e w hich w as often  se t u p  to th e  re a r  o f th e  front 
lin es . Left to  a n  N .C.O. a n d  tw o o th e r r a n k s  for o p e ra tio n , b a tte r ie s  ra n g e d  
an y w h ere  from  th re e  to  s ix  a long  a  b a tta lio n  fron tage . For d irec t fire , p e t 
ta rg e ts  for th e  rifle b a tte ry  w ere “a p p ro ach  ro a d s , a ssem b ly  p laces , b rid g es , 
c ro s s ro a d s . H e a d q u a r te rs , ra tio n  rendezv'^ous a n d  d u m p s ."  43 in d ire c t  fire, 
u su a lly  c o n d u c te d  in  th e  d a rk , ten d ed  to  focus on w eak p o in ts  in  th e  en em y  
line a n d  c o m m u n ic a tio n  tre n c h e s . W here th e  s lop ing  te r ra in  p re v e n te d  a 
s tra ig h t sh o t (parallel to  th e  ea rth ) a  sy stem  o f m easu rin g  th e  tra jec to ry  o f the  
bu lle t w ith  th e  c o n to u r o f th e  g round  allow ed for m ore a c c u ra te  fire.
S m p e rs c o p e s  w ere  p rim arily  u s e d  m  th e  fro n t lin e s  to  h a r a s s  th e  
en em y  a n d  te s t  h is  m ora le . 44 a  p eriscope w as a tta c h e d  to th e  b u t t  o f  the  
rifie a n d  a ligned  w ith  th e  s ig h ts  on  the  b a rre l. T hen it w as p laced  on  a  m e ta l 
fram e b u ilt in to  th e  p a ra p e t, a n d  co n cea led  w ith  d u m m y  sa n d b a g s . At its 
b e s t, th e  sm p ersco p e  h a d  a n  a ccu ra te  ran g e  o f 200  y a rd s , th o u g h  a s  lo n g  a s  
a ta rg e t w as  visible, it h a d  po ten tia l. The fram e allowed th e  riflem an to  sp o t a 
ta rg e t a n d  fire d irec tly  a t  it w ith o u t ever look ing  over th e  to p  of th e  tre n c h . 
W hile th e re  w ere m e c h a n is m s  th a t  a llow ed for a d ju s tm e n t a n d  e lev a tio n , 
m an y  rifle b a tte r ie s  a n d  sm p ersco p es  w ere u s e d  for in d irec t fire, a t  irreg u la r
42 Col. Fortescue Duguid; Official History of the Canadian Forces in the Great War. 1 9 1 4 -1 9 1 8 . 
(Ottawa. 1938). p.493.




Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
in te rva ls , b o th  n ight a n d  day . T hu s, th e y  did not req u ire  a  p a rticu la rly  skilled 
shot to u s e  them . (See d iag ram )
5c-.:rr- S.AC M C 30 E2 v I \  A D .A rm strong Papors X h a p f r r  X \ t • Rsflr B a ttrn o s  S n ipo rscop rs an d  Rifl- Ro»’>.' r
These b a tte r ie s  an d  sn ip e rsc o p e s  a p p e a re d  sp o rad ica lly  in  the  BEF a s  e a r ly  
as  D ecem b er. 1914. b u t b\" 1916 th e ir  p re sen c e  w a s  com m onplace  in  m any  
B ritish  a n d  C a n a d ia n  t r e n c h e s .  45 S n ip e r s  e v e n tu a lly  to o k  o v e r th is  
responsib ilit} ' a s  the w ar d ragged  on.
W h en  s n ip e r  fire  w a s  d e te c te d  from  a G e rm a n  lo o p h o le  p la te . 
C a n a d ia n  a n d  B ritish  so ld ie rs  took  to  firing  u p o n  it a s  a re m in d e r to  the  
sn ip er o f  h is  identified  lo ca tio n . H e sk e th -P ric h a rd  so o n  began  te s t in g  rifles 
on s tee l p la te s , the  Je ffre y s  h igh  velocity  .333 an d  e le p h a n t g u n s  p rov id ing  
im p re s s iv e  r e s u lts .  46 E v e n tu a lly . B r i t is h  a n d  C a n a d ia n  s h a r p s h o o te r s  
re so rted  to  u s in g  a rm o u r  p ie rc in g  a m m u n tio n  (A.P.A.). w h ich  h ad  th e  effect of 
c u rb in g  G e rm a n  sn ip e r  a c th i t ie s .  47 A vailability  o f A.P.A. w as m o d e ra te  at 
th is  s ta g e  o f th e  w ar. b u t  by  m id -1916 it w as b e ing  u s e d  to g rea t effect. In 
som e in s ta n c e s , the  im p a c t o f th e  bu lle t p ro m p ted  th e  co llapse of th e  loophole
45 Ashworth. Trench Warfare, p .59.
46 Hesketh-Prichard: Sniping, p.9
47 NAC. MG30 E574. “War Diary of CpI J A Holland. 07/18/1916"
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plate  a n d  su b se q u e n tfy . th e  sn ip er’s  p o s t. 48
T h e  Allied re s p o n se  to  sn ip ing  w a s  fairly e rra tic  in  the  f irs t y e a r  o f th e  
w ar. T he F re n c h  A rm y, th o u g h  h av ing  sn ip e rs  in  th e  field, failed to  u s e  th e m  
to a n y  c o n s id e ra b le  e x te n t  b e c a u se  o f  th e ir  “low  p rio rity" in  th e  m ilita ry  
h ie ra rch y . 49 in  th e  B E F . a  few se le c t sn ip e rs  - o n e  in  each  C o m p an y , o r 
four p e r  B a tta lio n  - m a d e  th e ir  first a p p e a ra n c e  a s  e a r ly  a s  O c to b er. 1914. so 
Their v a lu e  a t  th is  s ta g e  o f th e  w ar. how ever, re m a in e d  u n ack n o w led g ed . A 
few u n its  in  th e  BEF d id  m a k e  g rea te r u s e  o f m a rk s m e n  a s  the  y e a r  d rew  to  a 
close, u s in g  a  m ild, flex ib le form  o f o rg an iza tio n . R eg u la r in fa n try m e n  a lso  
c o n t ib u te d  by  h o n in g  th e i r  rifle s k il ls  a n d  s h o o t in g  a t o n ly  th e  m o s t 
p re se n ta b le  ta rg e ts .
B y e a r ly  1915 . s n ip in g  m  th e  1st C a n a d ia n  D ivision w a s  p a r t  o f a  
b ro ad e r s c h e m e  th a t  in c lu d e d  aggressive  p a tro ls  a n d  m ino r ra id s  to  ach ieve  
su p e rio rity  over th e  en em y , si In th is  s tag e  o f th e  w a r com pany  c ra c k s h o ts  
found  a  u s e fu l  role a s s is t in g  ra id s  a n d  local a t ta c k s .  S n ip e rs  w e re  p laced  
a top  th e  p a ra p e t  to  ta rg e t  re tre a tin g  G e rm a n s  a fte r th e  ra id e rs  le p t o u t o f th e  
tre n c h . S2 T heir v ic tim s w ere m in im a l, how ever. B y th e  s u m m e r  o f 1915. a  
lim ited  n u m b e r  o f R o ss  M ark  III a n d  Lee-Enfield rif les  (about 12 each ) w ere 
fitted  w ith  te le sco p ic  s ig h ts . The re la tive ly  low n u m b e r  o f te le sco p ic -s ig h ted  
rifles m ay  b e  ex p la in ed  by  th e  p rob lem  o f finding th e  p ro p e r c o m b in a tio n  o f 
sight a n d  rifle. In D ecem b er. 1915. e ig h t scopes w ere  re tu rn e d  to  O rd n a n ce  
S to res  by  th e  2 n d  B rig ad e  b e ca u se  th e y  d id  no t fit th e  R oss. 53 a  re q u e s t to  
find th e  a p p ro p ria te  s ig h ts  su b se q u e n tly  followed a n d  m ore  te lescop ic  s ig h ted  
rifles m a d e  th e ir  w ay to  th e  C an ad ian  tre n c h e s  by 1916. Skilled m a rk s m e n  in  
the  BEF, p a rtic u la rly  h u n te r s ,  began  sn ip in g  a t th e ir  ow n  p leasu re  s in ce  th e re  
w as n o  fo rm a l o rg an iza tio n  in  the m ilita ry  h ie ra rch y . T he k een es t o f  h u n te rs
48 NAC, RG9 III 03 /4104/15/2 , ‘Summary of Intelligence - 4th Inf. Bde., 05/11/1916".
49 Gilbert; Sniper, p.44.
50 Ashworth: Trerxih Warfare. p ,57.
51 Duguid: Official, p. 183.
52 Bird. G hosts. p.31.
53 NAC, RG9 III C 3/4166/19/9, "2nd Inf. Bde. C.M.R. to G.O.C. Canadian Corps. 12 /15/1915’
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so o n  rea lized  th a t  th e y  co u ld  m ak e  th e ir  b e s t sc o re s  w hen  a  n ew  G erm an  
b a tta lio n  w as en te r in g  th e  line. It d id  n o t take  the  enem y long to  realize the ir 
c a r e le s s n e s s ,  b u t  m a n y  a  s n ip e r  in  B r itish  a n d  C a n a d ia n  tre n c h e s  took  
ad v an tag e  o f th e  in itial o p p o rtu m tie s  offered to them .
T h e se  e a r ly  e x p lo its  by  b a tta lio n  m a rk sm e n  e v e n tu a lly  en ab le d  a
p re v io u s ly  ig n o ra n t h ig h  c o m m a n d  to  see  the  v a lu e  o f sn ip in g  in  tre n c h
w arfa re . S u d d e n ly , o rd e rs  w ere b e in g  is su e d  to  b rig ad e  O fficers to  deploy
th e ir  s n ip e rs  a s  qu ick ly  a s  po ssib le . 54 Skilled sh o ts  w ere so o n  fitted  w ith
te le sco p ic -s ig h ted  rifles, a n d  th e ir  activ ity  p rom oted  dow n to  B atta lio n  level.
It to o k  th e  g e n iu s  o f  H e sk e th -P r ic h a rd  to  take  th e  in c ip ien t s te p s  tow ard
s ta n d a rd iz e d  sn ip ing .
If we o rg an ize  sn ip in g , we c a n  ge t solid  a n d  tan g ib le  r e s u lts  by 
k illing  th e  en em y  a n d  sav in g  th e  lives o f o u r ow n m en . O nly those  
w ho  h a v e  b e e n  in  a  t r e n c h  o p p o s ite  H un  s n ip e r s  th a t  h a d  th e  
m a s te ry , know  w h a t a  hell Ufe c a n  be m ade u n d e r  th e se  conditions.
55
T h o u g h  th e  in fo rm a l o rg a n iz a tio n  o f sn ip in g  in  th e  B EF o ffe red  so m e 
s u b s ta n t ia l  r e s u l t s  th ro u g h  1915. th e  G erm an  m a rk s m a n  re ta in e d  h is  
su p e rio rity  over th e  A llies. W hat w as n eed ed  w as a  sy s te m a tic  o rgan ization  
th a t co u ld  be m o n ito red  a n d  con tro lled . A form of e d u ca tio n  an d  tra in in g  w as 
req u ired  if th e  Allies w ere to  m a tc h  th e ir  skilled c o u n te rp a rts .
In  su m . th e  o u tb re a k  of w a r in  1914 b ro u g h t on  a  y e a r  o f m issed  
o p p o r tu n itie s . T he ho p e  for a  q u ick  a n d  decisive v ictory  on  b o th  sides w as 
im m ed ia te ly  s h a tte re d  by  th e  ev en ts  in  th e  fall a n d  w in te r o f 1914. The few 
m ajo r c am p a ig n s  - re tre a t  to  M ons. th e  b a ttle  of th e  M arne - en d ed  in  su d d en  
s tan d o ffs  th a t  p ro m p te d  a  “race  to  th e  sea". W ith th e  shallow  ~S" sh ap e  o f 
t r e n c h e s  s lin k in g  th e ir  w ay  a c ro s s  th e  fields o f F ra n c e  a n d  F la n d e rs , th e  
p h e n o m e n o n  of tre n c h  w a rfa re  - e x is ta n t in  the  A m erican  Civil W ar an d  the  
B oer W ar - w as re su rre c te d . "Indeed , th e  en tire  tre n c h  sy stem  w as  sim ply a
54 NAC. RG9 III 03 /4140/10/13 . “2nd Division to 6th Inf. Bde.. 11/15/1915".
55 Hesketh-Prichard; Sniping, p.23.
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re sp o n se  to  th e  d e s tru c tio n  o f m o d e m  firearm s."  56 And so  b eg an  a  p a in ful 
le s so n  for th e  A llies. They so o n  le a rn e d  th a t sn ip ing , by w ay of the  G e rm a n  
exam ple , w as a  fe a tu re  of t re n c h  w arfa re  th a t cou ld  only be con tro lled  if th e y  
s u rp a s s e d  it. It took  som e tim e to  realize th is  fac t, bu t by  1915 th e  B ritish  
a n d  C a n a d ia n s  h a d  developed  c e r ta in  c o u n te rm e a su re s  in  re a c tio n  to  th e  
G e rm an  sn iper. U nfo rtu n ate ly , th e se  were no t enough: defensive  re sp o n se s  
only  solved h a lf  th e  problem . As a m a te u r  sn ip e rs  took  to  th e  field, th e re  w a s  
a  s u d d e n  rea liza tio n  th a t th e y  w ere e sse n tia l to  th e  w ar effort. By w ay o f a  
h a rd  lesso n  th e  p ro c e ss  of s n ip e r  evo lu tion  w as in itia ted : th e  m o d em  s n ip e r  
h a d  b een  b o m  o n  th e  W estern  F ro n t bv  1915.
56 Gilbert; Sniper, p.42.
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C h ap te r HI 
Sniper Training
A fter th e  h ig h  c o m m a n d  rea lized  th e  im p o r ta n c e  o f sn ip in g  in  th e  
tren ch es , th e  B ritish  E x p ed itio n a ry  Force (BEF) took  n e c e s sa ry  s tep s  to  m ake  
it p a rt o f th e  m ilitary  ag en d a . It w as c lear in  th e s e  ea rly  s ta g e s  th a t G e rm an y  
held  th e  u p p e r  h a n d  in  sn ip in g  o n  the W este rn  F ron t: s u rp a s s in g  th e m  w as 
th e  p rim e objective. H ow ever, s u c h  a m e a s u re  re q u ired  a n  o rgan ized  sy s te m  
of sn ip ing  th a t  w ould  g u a ra n te e  B ritish  a n d  C an a d ia n  s u c c e s s . The B E F  w as 
th e  first m ilitary  e s ta b lish m e n t to  c rea te  a n  o rgan ized  sch o o l for sn ip in g  a n d  it 
w as from  th is  in itia l b re a k th ro u g h  th a t a  n u m b e r  o f sm a lle r  sn ip ing  sch o o ls  - 
inc lud ing  th o se  m  th e  C a n a d a  C orps - c am e  in to  be ing . T his c h a p te r  will, 
therefore , d ea l wdth th e  co m p le te  tra in in g  o f th e  C a n a d ia n  sn ip er. F irs t will 
com e a n  ex am in a tio n  o f th e  F irs t Army S n ip in g  S ch o o l fo r th e  B E F  a n d  its  
fo u n d er. M ajor H. H e sk e th -P r ic h a rd . It w a s  from  h is  b ra in c h ild  th a t  th e  
concept o f o rgan ized  sn ip in g  grew , not on ly  for the  C a n a d a  C orps b u t  for th e  
e n tire  A llied c o m p o n e n t. T he  re m a in d e r  w ill e x a m in e  th e  s e le c t io n  o f 
in d iv id u a ls , th e  t r a in in g  p ro g ra m , th e  e q u ip m e n t u s e d  a n d  th e  s n ip in g  
c o m p e titio n s  th a t  k e p t  th e s e  s p e c ia l is ts ' sk ills  u p  to  th e  m a rk . T he 
c o n se q u e n ce s  o f th is  t r a in in g  w ere  th ree -fo ld ; firs t, t r a in in g  th e  in d iv id u a l 
sn ip e r e n a b le d  h im  to  s u r p a s s  th e  enem y  a t  a  gam e w h ic h  the  A llies w ere
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c u rre n tly  losing: s ec o n d , sn ip e r s ta tu s  w en t fro m  sp o rad ic  c ra c k sh o o tin g  to  
full recognition  a s  a  com ponen t o f th e  BEF (an d . su b se q u e n tly  th e  CEF): a n d  
th ird , th is  o rganizing  a n d  institu tionedizing  e v en tu a lly  laid  th e  g ro u n d w o rk  for 
w h a t h a s  becom e th e  m o d em  sn ip er.
I
S n ip in g  o n  th e  W este rn  F ro n t in  th e  e a r ly  m o n th s  o f th e  w ar w as
r a th e r  sp o ra d ic  for th e  B ritish  a n d  C o m m o n w e a lth  fo rces. T h e  ir re g u la r
sh o o tin g  by  a  b a tta lio n  m a rk sm an  w as all th a t  e x is ted  in  an y  fo rm  of sniping.
As th e  en co u rag e m e n t to  u se  sn ip in g  m ore fre q u e n tly  in c reased , th e  n u m b e r
of sp ec ia l m a rk sm e n  b egan  to  r ise  slowly. H ow ever, m ore w ere req u ired  a n d
e s ta b l is h in g  a  s n ip in g  schoo l in  th e  B r i t is h  A rm y w as th e  f ir s t  s te p  in
ach iev in g  s u c c e s s  o ver the  e n em y  in  t r e n c h  w a rfa re . M ajor H . H esk e th -
P r ic h a rd  o f th e  B E F  v e n tu re d  to  F ran c e  in  M ay o f 1915 to  e x am in e  th e
co n d itio n s  on  the  W este rn  Fron t w ith  a n  in te n t to  sh o w  the  h igh  co m m an d  th e
b e n e f its  o f  h a v in g  a n  o rg an ized  sn ip in g  u n i t  in  th e  field. A rm ed  w ith
te le sco p ic -s ig h ted  rifles. H e sk e th -P ric h a rd  d isc o v e re d  a c o n s is te n t  p rob lem
am o n g  b a tta lio n  sh a rp sh o o te rs : m a n y  lacked  su ffic ien t know ledge to  o pera te
a n d  m a in ta in  th e se  specially  s ig h ted  rifles th a t ,  in  la te -1914. w ere  reire a t th e
F ron t. 1 He w as eag e r to  pom t o u t to  th e se  m e n  th a t  the  a c c u ra c y  o f a rifle's
sh o t d ep en d ed  u p o n  th e  u se r 's  ab ility  to  have it s e t  properly.
For th e  b en efit o f the u n te c h n ic a l r e a d e r  it will be well h e re  to 
re m a rk  th a t  if a  te lescopic  s ig h t se t u p o n  a  4 -in ch  b a se  is  one- 
h u n d re d th  o f a n  in ch  o u t o f i ts  t r u e  a lig n m e n t, it w ill s h o o t 
in c o r re c te  a t  th e  ex ten t o f 9  in ch es  a t  100 y a rd s , an d  o f c o u rse  
18 in ch es  a t 2 0 0  yard s , a n d  5 4  in ch es  a t  6 0 0  y a rd s . 2
This a tte n tio n  to  d e ta il w as c ritica l o n  th e  W es te rn  F ro n t since th e  d is tan ce  of
1 Maj. H. Hesketh-Prichard; Sniping In F rance. (London, 1920). 4-5, 31-32, 148. Examples of 
problems abound. Upon questioning a  soldier armed with a  telescopically sighted rifle. Hesketh- 
Prichard w as surprised to discover that the soldier had no idea  of how to set the elevation drum. In 
this particular instance, the individual had the sight set for 100 yards while the German trenches were  
at a  distance of 400 yards.
2 Ibid.. p.5.
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th e  G erm an  tre n c h e s  so m etim es  ex ce e d ed  6 0 0  y a rd s , a t  tim es ev en  1000 
y a rd s . W hile it is c lear th a t  there  w ere so m e te lesco p ic -sig h ted  rifles in  the  
field a s  early  a s  1914. th e  effect w hich th e s e  w eapons h a d  w as m in im ized  by 
th e  o p era to r’s  lack  of know ledge on how  to  u s e  it.
T hese in co n sis ten c ie s , along w ith  th e  m o u n tin g  c asu a ltie s  in flicted  by 
G e rm an  s n ip e r s , w ere e n o u g h  to e a r n  th e  M ajor a  p ro m o tio n  a s  "sn ip in g  
expert" in  th e  T hird  Army. H is job  req u ired  h im  to  survey  th e  va rio u s  u n its  in  
th e  BEF a n d  in s tru c t officers an d  o th e r  r a n k s  how  to  sh o o t w ith  p rec ision . 
T h ere  w ere p ro b lem s, how ever. B ec a u se  th e re  w as n o  e s ta b lish e d  sn ip in g  
com ponen t in  th e  Army, th e re  began a  long  a n d  a rd u o u s  p ro cess  of c rea tin g  
o n e . 3 O ften . H e sk e th -P r ic h a rd ’s  w o rk  w a s  s u b je c t to  th e  w h im s o f a  
c o m m a n d in g  officer a s  to  w h e th e r s u c h  in s tru c t io n  w o u ld  ta k e  p lace . 4 
W ork ing  w ith  th e  VII C o rp s . H e sk e th -P r ic h a rd 's  sn ip m g  u n it m a d e  very  
effective g a in s  in  k eep in g  th e  G e rm an  s n ip e r s  a n d  g e n e ra l in fa n try  from  
po p p in g  th e ir  h e a d s  over th e  p a ra p e t. H is to u r  th ro u g h  th e  tre n c h e s  k ep t 
h im  b u sy  in fo rm in g  th o s e  e q u ip p ed  w ith  sp ec ia l r if le s  a n d  s e t t in g  th e  
te lescopic s ig h ts  a t the  prop>er po in ts. T he sn ip in g  m ovem ent sp re ad  rap id ly  
th e re a f te r  s a n d  it w as n o t long befo re  th e  M ajor b e g a n  s e a rc h in g  for a 
p e rm a n e n t s c h o o l w here  h e  cou ld  e d u c a te  officers o n  th e  p ra c tic a lity  of 
sn ip in g . By th e  fall o f 1915. B ritish  A rm y H e a d q u a rte rs  b egan  p e titio n in g  
u n i ts  in th e  B E F  for th e ir  in p u t on  th e  v a lu e  of a  sn ip in g  schoo l. The 
C a n a d ia n  c o n tin g e n t w a s  in c lu d ed  a n d  th e i r  re s p o n se  w as m o re  th a n  
favourab le . In rep ly  to  a  B ritish  S eco n d  A rm y m em o, d a te d  13 N ovem ber.
1915. the  8 th  C a n a d ia n  In fan try  B rigade  offered  a  v a rie ty  o f re a so n s  a s  to  
w hy a  sn ip in g  schoo l sh o u ld  be e s tab lish ed . A m ong th em  w as a req u irem en t 
for b e tte r  t ra in e d  sn ip in g  officers, th e  n e e d  to  utilize N .C .O .s a n d  m e n  w ith
3 Hesketh-Prichard. in fact, had to take a  demotion in order to s e e  out his sniping dreams. His pay 
w as cut a s  was his rank (to Captain) and it was not until November of 1916 that sniping w as officially 
recognized as a  “provisional establishment’. S e e  p a g e  76.
4 Adrian Gilbert; Sniper. (New York, 1994). p.48.
5 Ibid.. p. 13. Hesketh-Prichard w as moved to a variety of units in the BEF before returning to the 
Third Army. S e e  p ages 13-17 for further details of this rotation.
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com petitive sh o o tin g  experience  a n d  a n  overall desire  to  co n tin u e  th e  use. a n d  
m a in te n a n c e  o f te le sco p ic  s ig h ts . 6 A n o th er m em o from  th e  1st C an ad ian  
D ivision, d a te d  2 7 th  N ovem ber. 1915. w as equally  su p p o rtiv e , d esp ite  th e  
p re sen ce  o f a  n u m b e r  o f sk illed  c ra c k sh o ts  w ith  te le sco p ic -s ig h ted  rifles in 
th e  D ivision. ?
T ow ard th e  e n d  o f  1915. a fte r e s tab lish in g  a  sn ip in g  a n d  observation  
co u rse  for officers in  th e  T hird  Arm y. H esk e th -P rich ard  w as a tta c h e d  to th e  
F irs t A rm y for th e  s a m e  p u rp o se . T he in ten tio n  of th e se  c o u rs e s  w as to  
in s t r u c t  p o te n tia l  s n ip in g  o ffice rs  w ho  w ould  th e n  ta k e  th e  a c q u ire d  
know ledge b a ck  to  th e ir  u n its  a n d  e d u c a te  the  s h a rp sh o o te rs  in  th e ir  ow n 
b a tta lio n . Som e u n its , like th e  XI C orps, co n tin u ed  H esk e th -P rich ard 's  work 
w ith th e ir  ow n sh o rt c o u rse s  c o n sis tin g  o f five o r m ore officers a n d  u p  to 20  
m en. T hese  "Corpxs Schools" even tua lly  con trib u ted  to  th e  c rea tio n  of th e  F irst 
Arm y S chool o f S co u tin g . O b serv a tio n  a n d  S nip ing  (8) d u rin g  th e  su m m er of
1916.
Located on  a  p la te a u  in  th e  P as de Calais region, the  F irst A rm y S.O .S. 
fo und  its  c lo se s t n e ig h b o u r to  be th e  village of L inghem . H esk e th -P rich ard  
an d  h is  co lleague L ieu ten an t G ray  (from th e  S co ttish  Rifles) se t u p  th e  school 
w ith a  c o n s ta n tly  c h an g in g  s ta ff  o f in s tru c to rs . It w as difficult to  re ta in  the  
sam e  s ta f f  m em b ers  on  a  ro u tin e  b a s is  a s  m any  in s tru c to rs  w ere forced to  
leave th e  sch o o l w h en  th e ir  u n its  w ere ass ig n ed  to  new  a re a s . T h is  activit\-. 
a fte r all. w as  co n sid e red  “unofficial" u n til 2 4 th  Novem ber. 1916 w h en  the W ar 
Office fina lly  a ck n o w led g ed  sn ip in g  a s  a n  e s ta b lis h e d  c o m p o n en t m  th e  
B ritish  Army. N evertheless, am ong  th e se  in s tru c to rs  a t th e  F irst A rm y S.O .S. 
w ere tw o C a n a d ia n s ; th e  first a  S c o u tin g  Officer from  th e  3 1 s t B n. by th e  
n am e  o f L ieut. W .B. C u rtis  a n d  th e  seco n d , a  Sgt. F o s te r w h o se  language 
sk ills  w ere in flu en tia l in  th e  in s tru c tio n  o f som e P o rtu g u ese  u n its  a tten d in g
6 NAC. RG 9 III 03/4021/49/2 . “2nd Army to 1st Canadian Division. 12/22/1915“. 
7n a C. RG 9 111 C3/4021/49/2. “1st Cdn. Div. School for Snipers 11/27/1915".
8 Noted hereafter a s First Army S.O .S.
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th e  school. 9 At S eco n d  Arm y S n ip ing  School, fo u r o f th e  five in s tru c to rs  w ere 
C an a d ia n . A m o n g  th e m  w as M aj. N.A.D. A rm stro n g  o f th e  16th  B a tta lio n  
w h o se  ex p e rtise  in  p rec is io n  sh o o tin g  cam e from  h is  h u n t in g  e x p e rien c e s  in  
B ritish  C o lum bia . His know ledge of rifles a n d  sn ip ing  m a d e  th e  S eco n d  A rm y 
S n ip in g  S ch o o l o n e  of th e  m o s t efficient schoo ls  in  F ran ce  a n d  F lan d e rs , lo
The c o u rs e  a t th e  F irst A rm y S.O .S. la s te d  17 d a y s  a n d  w as in te n d e d  
to  in s tru c t o fficers  a n d  N .C .O .’s  w ho  w ould la te r  in s tru c t th e ir  ow n u n i ts .  It 
w as  a  re q u ire m e n t th a t  th e se  s tu d e n ts  a lread y  be good s h o ts  a n d  th o se  th a t  
lack ed  the  ab ility  w ere  re tu rn e d  to  th e ir  u n it (though  th is  w a s  ra re ly  th e  case).
> I A m ong th e  s u b je c ts  a d d r e s s e d  a t th e  sch o o l w e re  th e  c a r e  a n d  
m a in te n a n c e  o f  f irea rm s , p ro p e r  u se  o f op en  a n d  te le sco p ic  s ig h ts , s h o o tin g  
a n d  ta rg e t p ra c tic e , tre n c h  ac tiv itie s , o b se rv a tio n  a n d  s c o u tin g , m o v em en t, 
a n d  cam oflauge. i2  The d e ta ils  o f th ese  a sp e c ts  of tra in in g  will be  a d d re s s e d  
la te r  w hen d is c u s s in g  th e  tra in in g  program . A no ther is s u e  th a t  fa c to red  in to  
th e  F irst A rm y S .O .S . c u rr ic u lu m  w as p h y s ic a l ex erc ise  w h ic h  th e  B r itish  
so lved  by in s ta ll in g  football fie lds. Also in c lu d ed  w ere ro u tin e  m a rc h e s  a n d  
ju - j itsu  tra in ing .
In its  in c ip ien ce , the  C a n a d ia n  co n tin g en t w as a s s ig n e d  to th e  B ritish
A rm y and  th u s ,  th e ir  in s tru c tio n  a t  the First A rm y S.O .S . c am e  a longside  th e ir
B ritish  c o u n te rp a r ts .  The C a n a d ia n  re sp o n se  to  sn ip in g  w a s  im m e n se  a n d
H e sk e th -P ric h a rd  c red ited  th em  for the ir sk ill a n d  desire  fo r th is  fine a r t:
There is  n o  d o u b t th a t a s  a  sn iper, s c o u t o r in te lligence officer, th e  
C an a d ia n  sh o w s th e  g re a te s t initiative, a n d  d u rin g  th e  long period , 
well o v e r a  y ea r , w hich  th e y  rem ained  in  th e  Army, o u r  schoo l w a s
9 For a  brief time a  Capt. T.B. Barrie of the Canadian Highléinders also assisted  the staff while on loan 
from the 4th Canadian Division. He first visited the school a s  a student and later won two M.C. s  for his 
work. S e e  Hesketh-Prichard. p.86.
10 NAC. R G 24/1883A /26. Sniping & Marksmanship. ‘Correspondence: Sniping and Scouting  
Sch ools’. Second Army Sniping School w a s formed shortly before First Army S  O S. in D ecem ber of 
1915 at M ont-des-Cats. B ased on Armstong’s papers (NAC. MG30 E2). S econd  Army S .O .S . 
followed a similar curriculum though the course lasted only five days. We will s e e  more of Armstrong’s  
papers in subsequent chapters since his recollections are about sniping in the field a s  op p osed  to 
Hesketh-Prichard's which focus a great deal upon the First Army S O S
11 Ibid.. p .144.
12 NAC. RG9 III C 3/4021/49/2. Hesketh-Prichard: Chapter VII.
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v o lu n ta rily  v isited  t y  two C a n a d ia n s  for every o n e  B ritish e r. 13
S ev era l C a n a d ia n  o fficers a n d  N .C .O .s  a tte n d e d  th e  F ir s t  A rm y S .O .S . for 
in s tru c tio n . As the  w ar p ro g ressed  a n d . a s  sn ip in g  b ecam e  m o re  im p o rta n t.
schoo ls  w ere  e stab lish ed  th ro u g h o u t F ran ce  and  in  E n g lan d  a s  well. i4 C orps
S choo ls  developed  u b iq u ito u s ly  a lo n g  th e  W estern  F ro n t a n d  b u ilt u p o n  th e  
kn o w led g e  g a in ed  from  th e  F irst A rm y S .O .S . In  th e  field , th e  C a n a d ia n  
C orps e s ta b lis h e d  its  ow n sn ip e r sch o o ls  a t  B em es-en -A rto is . M ont d e s  C a ts  
e tc .. B ac k  in  E ng land . C a n a d ia n  m a rk s m e n  w ere  tra in e d  a t  th e  S ch o o l of 
M u sk e try  in  H ythe. a n d  a t  B ra m s h o t t  w hile in  C a n a d a , a  s c h o o l w a s  
e s ta b l i s h e d  in  G age to w n . New B ru n sw ic k . T h e s e  In s t i tu t io n s  w o u ld  
ev en tu a lly  tu rn  ou t som e o f  th e  b est A llied sn ipers.
O n e  o f th e  f irs t C a n a d ia n  s n ip in g  sch o o ls  to  d ev e lo p  w a s  a t  th e  
C a n a d ia n  C orps School a t  B em es-en -A rto is  in S e p te m b e r. 1916. A sn ip in g  
w ing w a s  a d d ed  w hich  w a s  to  be b illited  an d  a d m in is te re d  by  th e  In fa n try  
S choo l b u t  ta u g h t by s n ip in g  in s t ru c to r s .  The s ta f f  c o n s is te d  o f a  C h ie f 
S n ip in g  In s tru c to r  (C ap ta in ) a n d  a n  A ss is ta n t (L ieu ten a n t) , a n  A rm o u re r  
S e rg e a n t a n d  two N.C.O. s . 1= A fter o b ta in in g  a  p lo t o f  la n d  from  th e  I\^ 
Im p eria l C o rp s  who h a d  o ccu p ied  it p rev iously , th e  C o rp s  S choo l b u ilt  th e  
sn ip ing  w ing  from  the re m n a n ts  left b e h in d  by th e  B ritish  forces. T h o u g h  th e  
su rro u n d in g  te rra in  w as ap p ro p ria te  fo r m a p  read ing , o b se rv a tio n  a n d  ta c tic a l 
ex erc ises, th e  condition  o f th e  ta rg e t ra n g e s  w as below  s ta n d a rd : ta rg e ts  w ere 
poorly c o n s tru c te d  a n d  th e  b u t ts  caved  in  d u ring  w et w e a th e r. So  fau lty  w ere 
th e  r a n g e s  th a t  the  firs t c la s s  o f s tu d e n t s  w as p u t  to  w ork  re b u ild in g  new  
e m p la ce m e n ts  d ue  to a  la ck  o f F a tig u e  M en. This ac tiv ity , how ever, c a m e  to  
a n  a b ru p t  en d  w hen C orps C o m m an d er. G enera l S ir  J u l ia n  Byng. to u re d  th e  
a rea . D isp leased  by th e  fac t th a t  sk illed  m a rk sm en  w ere do ing  h eavy  la b o u r
13 Hesketh-Prichard: Sniping p.75.
14 ian Skennerton: The British Sniper. (London, 1984). p.39.
15 NAC, RG24/1840/G.A.Q. 10-37, “Canadian Corps Scouting.Sniping and Observation School". 
As the school grew the staff w as increased to two m ore officers, o n e  Chief Sniping Instructor (Major), 
one C.Q.M.S., four Sergeants, an Armourer Staff Sergeant and two Fatigue Men.
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in te n d e d  for F a tig u e  M en, h e  o rd e re d  th e  w o rk e rs  to  s to p  a n d  co n tin u e  w ith 
th e ir  tra in ing . A fter viewing a  p ro p o se d  p lan  to  reb u ild  the  ra n g e s . Byng h a d  
a  c o n s tru c tio n  crew  com ple ting  th e  re n o v a tio n s  w ith in  ten  d a y s . AH of th e  
re q u ire d  fix tu res  a n d  su p p lie s  w ere  a llo c a te d  a n d  th e  n u m b e r  o f ta rg e ts  
in c re a se d  from  10 to  25 . e ac h  w ith  p ro p e r a n d  s tu rd y  e m p la ce m e n ts . 16 A 
100 y a rd  range w as  groom ed for s h o r t  sh o o tin g  while a  500 y a rd  ran g e  w as 
em ployed for d is ta n c e  p rac tice . T he  co u rse  w a s  fo u r w eeks long  a n d  open to  
only a  h an d fu l o f officers a n d  o th e r  ra n k s , a lth o u g h  a s  th e  w a r p rog ressed , 
th e  n u m b e r  o f a t te n d a n ts  in c re a s e d . It w as  c le a r  from  th e  s t a r t  th a t  th e  
o b jec tiv e  o f th is  s c h o o l w as to  f u r th e r  th e  sk ill o f a lre a d y  ex ce p tio n a l 
m a rk s m e n . T he se le c tio n  o f  s u c h  in d iv id u a ls  w as  th e  f ir s t  s te p  m th e  
developm ent o f a  new  sn iper.
n
C hoosing  th e  ind iv idua ls  fo r sn ip in g  sch o o l w as ra th e r  e lem en ta ry  in  
th e  beg inn ing . M any b a tta lio n s  w ere  re q u e s te d  to  se n d  a  g iven  n u m b e r o f 
N .C.O. s an d  o th e r  ra n k s  b a se d  o n  th e ir  sh o o tin g  ab ility  a n d  p o te n tia l to  
becom e sm p ers . O ften  a  m em o a rriv e d  from  D ivision H e a d q u a rte rs  lis ting  a  
re s tr ic te d  n u m b e r o f v a ca n c ie s  fo r officers a n d  o th e r  ra n k s . N am es were 
s u b m itte d  by a  g iven  d ead lin e  a n d  th o se  s e le c te d  w ere given th e  req u ired  
leave. S tu d e n ts  w ere in s tru c te d  to  b rin g  w ith  th e m  th e ir  ow n s ig h ted  rifle 
a n d  a n y  o th e r  te le sc o p ic  s ig h te d  rifles  u s e d  in  th e ir  b a tta lio n , i? T he  
re m a in d e r  of th e ir  k it in c luded  a  n o tebook , g ro u n d  sh ee t, b la n k e ts  and  a n  
ad d itio n a l 100 ro u n d s  o f sm all a rm s  am m u m tio n  (S.A.A.) over a n d  above the ir 
s ta n d a rd  issu e , is M eeting  a t  a  c e r ta in  c h e c k p o in t, s tu d e n ts  w ould  be 
tra n s p o r te d  to  a  p a r t ic u la r  s c h o o l (eg. B em es-en -A rto is ) w h ere  in s tru c tio n
16 Ibid. The butts on th ese  ranges were constructed with the finest quality and despite being fired at 
regularly for two consecutive years, not o n ce w as it necessary to repair or rebuild them.
17 Specially sighted rifles were in demand at hom e and abroad at this time and sniping schools could 
not provide a  standard supply of weapons to teach with. Moreover, due to the variety of not only rifles 
at the front but sights a s  well, it w as important that the student bring the weapon that he knew and 
would u se long after the course w as over. S e e  NAC, RG9 III 03/4057/35/3. ‘1 st Division to 2nd Inf. 
B de.’ .
18 NAC. RG9 III C3/4031/8/26, ‘1st Division HQ to 1st, 2nd, 3rd Inf. Bde., 04/02/1918".
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co m m en ced .
T he first few d a y s  of th e  sch o o l d e te rm in ed  w ho lacked  th e  ability  a n d  
on ly  th e  tru ly  p ro fic ien t c o n tin u e d  on . R eq u ired  sk ills  for th e  p ro sp ec tiv e  
s n ip e r  in c lu d ed  p a tie n c e , a  know ledge o f th e  c o u n try , good m a rk s m a n s h ip , 
s e lf  re lia n c e , in te llig e n c e  a n d  c u n n in g  a n d  good  m a p  re a d in g  sk ills , is 
F u r th e rm o re , e d u c a te d  m a rk sm e n  w ere d esirab le , p a rtic u la rly  th o s e  w ith  a n  
ab ility  to  read  a n d  w rite , th o u g h  m o n ito rin g  s u c h  sk ills  w as a t tim es  difficult. 
N o m in a l ro les a n d  sc o re s  from  b a tta l io n s  rev ea l th e  tru e  q u a litie s  of th e  
sn ip e r . A nom inal ro le  from th e  3 rd  (Toronto) B n ., d a te d  10 O cto b er. 1915 
in d ic a te s  th a t  th o se  w ith  excep tio n a l sh o o tin g  ab ility  a n d  a d e q u a te  lea rn in g  
sk ills  u su a lly  developed  in to  p ro fic ien t sn ip e rs . T h o se  ind iv idua ls  in te re s te d  
in  o th e r  a sp e c ts  o f  in telligence (eg. ru n n in g  o r p a tr o llin g) or th o se  ex h ib iting  
n e rv o u s n e s s  o r la c k in g  co n fid en ce  w ere  o ften  t r a n s fe re d  o u t to  a n o th e r  
co m p an y . O f 39  s tu d e n ts  in th e  sc o u t a n d  sn ip in g  u n it of th e  3 rd  B n.. 11 
w ere d ism is se d  a s  u n su ita b le  fo r sn ip in g  d u tie s . 20  S hoo ting  co m p e titio n s  
d u rin g  tra in in g  a lso  w eeded  o u t u n w o rth y  m a rk sm e n . The g ra d in g  scale a t  
sn ip in g  schoo l ran g ed  from  “indifferent" to  “fair" to  “very  fair" to  “good" to  “very  
good": th o s e  sco rin g  “indifferent" in  sh o o tin g  w ere d ism issed . F o r exam ple. 
Pte. A. FolkcU’d of th e  5 th  Bn., a t te n d in g  th e  19th  c la s s  a t  2n d  A rm y School o f 
S n ip in g , sco red  excep tiona lly  h ig h  in  th e  sn ip e rsc o p e  ca tag o ry  b u t  ra n k e d  
“in d iffe ren t"  on sh o o tin g  ab ility . H is s n a p  sh o o tin g  sk ills , p a r tic u la r ly  a t  
m oving  ob jec ts , w ere  poor, a n d  th u s ,  it w as  c o n c lu d e d  th a t  he  “w ould  n o t 
m ak e  a  good sm per."  21
O n e  of th e  m o s t im p o rtan t re q u ire m e n ts  for a tte n d in g  sn ip in g  school 
w as ex p erience  from  th e  firont. It w as  n o t th e  in te n tio n  to  tra in  th e  ra n k  a n d  
file, th u s  new  re c ru its  a n d  th o se  j u s t  a rriv in g  from  o v e rsea s  w ere excluded  
from  th e  selection  p ro c e ss . T ra in in g  w as in te n d e d  to  te s t  one’s  g iven  ab ility
19 NAC, RG9 III 03/3867/107/2. “Notes on Sniping from the 3rd Cavalry Division".
20 NAC. RG9 III C3/4041/17/8. “3rd (Toronto) Battalion Scouts and Snipers. 10/10/1915”
21 NAC, RG9 ill C3/4057/35/3, “1st Division HQ to 1st, 2nd, 3rd Inf.Bde., 05/24/1915".
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ra th e r  t h a n  tra in  th e  in ex p erien ced  in d iv id u a l. 22  T h o se  w ho w e re  se le c te d  
were ty p ica lly  ta k e n  from  th e  b a t ta lio n 's  In te lligence  S ec tio n  w h ic h  h a n d le d  
m a tte r s  o f  in te llig e n c e , sn ip in g , s c o u t in g  a n d  o b s e rv a tio n . It w a s  a lso  
p referred  th a t  officers se le c ted  for a  c o u rse  be in te re s te d  in  o b ta in in g  th e  title  
of B a tta lio n  In telligence Officer o r B a tta lio n  S co u t O fficer.
K now ledge o n  th e  u s e  of te le sco p ic -s ig h ted  rifles  w as a lso  a  necessiiy  .
As sn ip in g  schoo ls  c a m e  in to  being, th e  quality  o f r e g is tr a n ts  v a rie d . In  early
1916, m e m o s  from  1st D ivision H e a d q u a r te rs  re v e a le d  a  d is p le a s u re  w ith
som e o f th e  s tu d e n ts  en ro lled  a t th e  schoo l.
T he  A rm y C o m m a n d e r is a n x io u s  th a t m ore c a re  sh o u ld  be  ta k e n  in 
th e  se lec tio n  o f  O fficers an d  m e n  de ta iled  to  a t te n d  th e  sch o o l. The 
p re s e n t  c la s s  c o n ta in s  m an y  m e n  w ho h a d  n e v e r  p rev io u s ly  u se d  
te le sc o p ic  s ig h ts  a n d  a  n u m b e r  o f th e se  m e n  w ere, in  a d d it io n , 
ind ifferen t s h o ts .  23
One o f th e  re a so n s  w hy  P te . F o lkard  sc o re d  so  p o o rly  o n  h is  sh o o tin g  sk ills  
was b e c a u s e  he  w as  in ex p erien ced  w ith  th e  te le sco p ic  sigh t. He “c la im ed  to 
have b e en  m  p o sse ss io n  o f a  te lescopic s ig h ted  rifle fo r s ix  m o n th s  y e t h a d  no  
idea how  to  a d ju s t it for elevation." 24 L acking su ffic ien t know ledge to  s e t th e  
sigh t p ro p e rly , h is  a c c u ra c y  w as th u s  a lte red . 1st D iv ision  HQ d id  m ak e  a n  
effort to  re m e d y  th is  s i tu a tio n  by re q u e s tin g  a  l is t  o f  sn ip e rs  (th o se  w ith  
fo rm al t r a in in g  a n d  th o s e  w ithou t), a n d  a  lis t o f  te le s c o p ic -s ig h te d  rifles  
belonging to  th a t d iv is ion . It sh o u ld  b e  n o ted , how ev er, th a t  p ro b le m s  su c h  
a s  th e s e  w ere  n o t e n ti r e ly  c o m m o n p la c e  in  th e  C a n a d ia n  C o rp s . T he  
o p p o rtu n ity  for s n ip in g  a t t r a c te d  so m e  of C a n a d a 's  b ig -gam e h u n te r s  w ho. 
with p rev io u s  ex p erien ce  m  te lescopic s ig h ts  an d  s ta lk in g , w ere p ra c tia lly  se lf­
tra in ed  s n ip e rs  t y  th e  tim e  they  re a c h e d  th e  front. 25 in  fact, m a n y  h u n te rs .
22 NAC. RG24/1840/G.A.Q. 10-37, “Cdn. Corps Scouting, Sniping and Observation Sch ool”.
23 NAC, RG9 III C 3/4057/35/3, “1st Division HQ to 2nd Inf. Bde., 12/01/1916".
24 NAC, RG9 III C 3/4057/35/3, “1st Division HQ to  1st, 2nd, 3rd Inf. Bde., 05/15/1916". Another 
example is cited in this docum ent regarding a  Pte. W.E. Rogers of th e 4th Bn. He had been sent to 
the school with a  R oss rifle fitted for a  W inchester telescopic sight but with no sight attached to it. 
Due to the make-up of this particular telescopic sight, the open sight w a s  removed and thus the rifle 
was rendered u se le ss  for any aspect of training.
25 Gilbert; Sniper, p.59.
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p o a ch e rs  a n d  com petitve  riflem en  w ere so u g h t fo r sn ip ing  schoo ls . In itially , it 
w as  difficult to  find  “q u a lity  m a rk sm en "  a s  th e y  w ere o ften  p ro tec ted  by th e ir  
b a tta lio n  officers. 26  C ra c k sh o ts  w ere  a n  a s s e t  to  an y  u n it a n d  re lin q u ish in g  
th e m  for schoo l w as  n o t a lw ays easy . As sn ip in g  co n tin u ed  to  tak e  o n  a  m ore  
o rg an ized  form , “free in g  u p "  s h a rp s h o o te rs  fo r sn ip in g  sch o o l b ecam e  le s s  
p ro b lem atic . As la te r  c h a p te rs  will show . C an a d ia n  sn ip e rs  w ere am o n g  th e  
b e s t m a rk sm e n  o n  th e  W este rn  F ro n t.
m
T he tra in in g  p ro g ra m  o r  sy llab u s  o f th e  sch o o ls  is  w h a t u ltim a te ly  
re fin ed  th e  sk ills  o f th e  a lre a d y  p ro fic ien t sh o o te r . L e c tu re s  a n d  p ra c tic e  
w o rk  (ie. ra n g e  firing) w ere  th e  tw o  b asic  c o m p o n e n ts  o f  sn ip m g  sc h o o ls . 
D u rm g  a  fou r w eek  c o u rse , le c tu re s  averaged  o ne  p er w eek d ay  for th e  f irs t 
tw o w eeks, th o u g h  occasio n ally  o ne  o r two d ay s  w ere re se rv ed  exclusively  for 
field p rac tice . C lassw ork  m c lu d ed  a ll a sp ec ts  o f sn ip m g  a n d  m telligence: m a p  
re a d m g  a n d  d raw m g . u s m g  a ir  p h o to g ra p h s , s ig n a lling, n ig h t m o v em en t, 
in fo rm atio n  a n d  re p o rts , p a tro l fo rm ations e tc . 27 The tim e m  w hich  le c tu re s  
took  p lace varied  by th e  d a y s ’ activ ities  and  th e  ro u tm e  p h y sica l exercises th a t  
cam e  a longside  th e  tra in m g . In  m o s t cases, a  fm al exam  w ould  be ta k e n  a t 
th e  en d  o f th e  c o u rse . T h is m e a s u re  w as first ad o p ted  by  H e sk e th -P ric h a rd  
a t  F irs t A rm y S .O .S . to  g e t a n  u n d e rs ta n d m g  o f how  m u c h  th e  s tu d e n t s  
le a rn ed  from  th e  co u rse . By h is  recollection th e  m a rk s  w ere im pressive: “th e  
le a s t su c c e ss fu l m e m b e r...o b ta m e d  seventy-five o f  a  h u n d re d  m arks". 28  in  
th e  C a n a d ia n  C orps, m ore  specifically . 56 s tu d e n ts  o u t o f 65  sco red  b e tw een  
"fa ir a n d  “good" o n  th e  “G e n e ra l Knowledge" co m p o n en t o f th e  c o u rse . 29 
M oreover, one  s tu d e n t  s e t  a  sch o o l record  w ith  h is  sco re  m  th e  “very good" 
ran k m g .
26 Ibid.. p.66.
27 NAC, RG9 III 03/4206/9 /3 , ‘Divisional Scout and Sniper Training School - Syllabus of training for 
Battalion Sniper Scouts".
28 Hesketh-Prichard: Sniping, p.78. T h ese  exam s continued through the course of the war until the 
school closed  down after the Armistice.
29 NAC, RG9 III C3/4064/15/3, “1st Division to 2nd Inf. Bde., 08/12/17".
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Field p ra c tice  c o m p rised  th e  m a jo rity  o f the  c o u rs e  w ork . C are  a n d  
c lean in g  o f th e  rifle w as th e  f irs t le sso n  s tu d e n ts  learn ed  a s  a  h ighly  polished  
b o re  e n su re d  th e  m a x im u m  piotential of th e  w eapon. In s tru c to r s  a d d re sse d  
com m on p ro b lem s w ith rifles th a t  could  be con tro lled  by  th e ir  u s e rs . An oily 
b a rre l, for ex am p le , p u t a  c e r ta in  degree o f  re s is ta n c e  o n  th e  b u lle t a n d  its  
d ire c tio n  c o u ld  b e  sw ayed . L ikew ise, a n  oily b re e c h  p ro m o te d  “seizing" 
th e re b y  c o n tr ib u tin g  to  a  b lo w -b ack  th a t  re s u lte d  in  a  lo s s  o f pow er a n d  
accu racy . A lso, a fte r a  s e r ie s  of te s ts  a t  F irs t Army S .O .S .. th e  id ea  of fixmg 
th e  b ay o n e t to  th e  rifle w a s  d is c a rd e d  b e c a u s e  th e  a d d itio n a l w eigh t o n  th e  
e n d  of th e  b a rre l  a lte red  th e  sh o t. 30 A w aren ess  of p ro b le m s  s u c h  a s  th e se  
e n su re d  th a t  th e  prospective  sn ip e r  w ould m ak e  lasting  u s e  o f  h is  eq u ipm en t. 
O th e r  is su e s  th a t  s tu d e n ts  w ere  m ade aw are  o f were p ro p e r  h o ld  o f th e  rifle, 
d iffe re n c e s  in  th e  m a k e s  o f  a m m u n itio n , a n d  th e  e ffe c t w h ich  w a rp ed  
w oodw ork h a d  on  a  rifle’s a c c u ra c y . M etallic dep o sits  a n d  e ro s io n  w ere two 
com m on  u n av o id ab le  p ro b lem s. S tu d e n ts  w ere, n e v e rth e le ss , m ad e  aw are of 
th e se  o b s tac le s , p a rticu la rly  th e  la tte r  since  th e  life of th e  b a rre l d ep en d ed  on 
th e  degree o f ero sion .
W hile sh o o tin g  c o n tm u e d  to  be th e  c ritica l exercise m  th e  m ak m g  of a  
s n ip e r , a t te n t io n  w as p a id  to  th e  care  a n d  u se  of o p tic a l  s ig h ts , u se  of 
e q u ip m e n t, m o v em en t /  s ta lk in g , a n d  e s ta b lis h m g  s n ip e r  a n d  o b se rv a tio n  
p o s ts . M ost o f  th e  tim e s p e n t  a t  S .O .S . sch o o l w as on  th e  ra n g e  b u t  w hen  
aw aitm g  th e ir  respec tive  tu r n s ,  s tu d e n ts  w ou ld  be m s tru c te d  on  a  varie ty  of 
o th e r  f e a tu re s  s u c h  a s  th e  u s e  o f a rm o u r-p ie rc m g  a m m u n it io n  (A.P.A.). 
sk e tc h in g , ta k m g  b e a rm g s . a n d  m a p -re a d in g . It w a s  re q u ire d  th a t  all 
s tu d e n ts  b rm g  w ith  th em  a n  o p en -s ig h ted  a n d  te le sco p ic -s ig h ted  rifle. The 
fo rm er w as u s e d  d u rm g  th e  f irs t e ight d ay s  to  prove th a t  th e  m d iv ldua l could 
s h o o t a c c u ra te ly . T h is e x e rc is e  w as c a lled  “G roupm g" w h e re b y  a  m a n 's  
a ccu racy  w as  m e a su re d  by  th e  n u m b e r of s h o ts  he  p u t m to  a  g iven g ro u p  (eg. 
th re e  m ch  g ro u p  p e r  100 y d s .) . T h is p ro c e ss  d e te rm m ed  h is  cap ab flity  a t  a
30 Hesketh-Prichard; Sniping, p.223-224.
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s h o r t  d is ta n c e  a n d  h is  a cc u ra cy  w ould  t h u s  ta p e r  off w ith  in c re ase d  d is ta n c e . 
By a d d re s s in g  th e  sh o o te r 's  flaw s (eg. p o in t o f a im . t r igge r re le a s e  e tc .) 
co rrec tio n s  cou ld  be m ade a n d  a c c u ra cy  im proved.
O nly  a fte r hav ing  im p re sse d  th e  tra in e rs  w ith h is  p re lim inary  sh o o tin g  
w ould  th e  s tu d e n t  g rad u a te  to  a  te lesco p ic -sig h ted  rifle. T he  rea so n s  fo r s u c h  
a  ru le  w ere two-fold: first, a  rifle is  ap t to  becom e less  a c c u ra te  th e  m o re  it is 
fired , a n d  i ts  v e rac ity  cou ld  n o t be  w asted ; second , p u t t in g  a  specia lized  rifle 
in  th e  h a n d s  of a n  incapab le  so ld ie r w as b o th  a  w aste  o f  tim e  an d  re so u rc e s . 
3* O n  a  m in ia tu re  ra n g e  (ap p ro x . 1 0 0  y d s .)  s tu d e n t s  w ou ld  p ra c t ic e  
sn a p sh o o tin g  a n d  firing u p o n  buUseye a n d  loop-hole ta rg e ts . G roup ing  w ould  
iden tify  sh o o tin g  e rro rs  a n d  la te r, p ra c tic e  w ould  c o n tin u e  on  d u m m y  h e a d s  
a n d  o th e r  ap p lica tio n s . 32 At F irs t A rm y S .O .S ., H e sk e th -P ric h a rd  a n d  h is  
s ta f f  m ad e  a n  effort to  ta k e  s tu d e n ts  o u t o n  th e  ran g e  a n d  show  th e m  th e ir  
ta rg e t sco re s  r a th e r  th a n  h av e  th e m  s ig n a lled  back . S u c h  a  m e asu re , it w as 
believed, w as  th e  b e s t way to  m ak e  a  s n ip e r  aw are  o f h is  re s u lts . The la rg e r, 
o p en  ra n g e s  (approx . 2 0 0 -600  yds.) w ere re se rv ed  for u s e  o f  optical s ig h ts  on  
ta rg e ts  a n d  ap p lica tio n s . F irin g  a t  th e  m o s t  d is ta n t ta irg e ts  (5 0 0 -600  y d s .)  
w as ev en tu a lly  d isco n tin u ed  b e c a u se  th e  c h a n c e s  o f h it t in g  a  G erm an  h e a d  at 
a  d is ta n c e  o f 6 0 0  y a rd s  w ith  a n y  d e g re e  o f w ind  w a s  h ig h ly  u n lik e ly . 
M oreover, c o n tin u a l p rac tice  a t  s u c h  a  d is ta n c e  w ould  on ly  w ear d o w n  th e  
b a rre l a n d  m inim ize the  rifle's p recision .
S in ce  a  sn ip e r 's  b e s t w ork  w as o f te n  done a t t im e s  o f d u sk  o r  d a rk , 
n ig h t f ir in g  b e c a m e  a  p a r t  o f  th e  s c h o o ls ' c u r r ic u lu m . A fter a ll. th e  
s u p e rs ti t io n  th a t  frow ned u p o n  ligh ting  th re e  c ig are ttes  w ith  th e  sam e m a tc h  
cam e  from  th e  tre n c h e s  o f th e  G rea t W ar. T he s trik e  o f  th e  m a tc h  a t  n ig h t 
a t t r a c te d  th e  sn ip e r 's  a tte n tio n , th e  s e c o n d  c igare tte  a llow ed  h im  to  a im  a n d  
th e  th ird  c u lm in a te d  in  th e  delivery  o f th e  b u lle t. T h is s e g m e n t of t ra in in g  
w a s  o ften  re se rv e d  for only  th e  m o s t sk ille d  m a rk sm e n . At th e  C a n a d ia n
31 Ibid., p. 145, 150.
32 S om e sch oo ls resorted to using tins on  a  stick in p lace of proper applications due to a  lack of 
resources during the war. S e e  Hesketh-Prichard p. 149.
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C o rp s  sch o o l in  A ld e rsh o t, fo r ex am p le , only  fo u r  sn ip e rs  p e r  c la s s  w ere
elig ib le  to  p ra c tic e  n ig h t firing. T he following is  a n  exerp t from  L ieu t. J .S .
C a m e ro n ’s  (44 th  B n .) n o te s  from  th e  C E F s  sn ip ing  sch o o l in April, 1916:
T he firing to o k  p lace  from  a  t r e n c h  a t th e  2 0 0  y a rd s  firing  po in t. 
L ights w ere f la sh e d  in  th e  E. tre n c h e s  re p re se n tin g  a  m a n  lig h tin g  a  
c igare tte . A fram e  h o u se  w ith  a  door, w indow s a n d  lo o p -h o les  w as 
c re a te d  b e h in d  th e  E . tre n c h . A figure in  th e  doorw ay w ith  th e  
lig h ts  on  re p re s e n te d  a n  officer com ing in  a f te r  m ak in g  h is  ro u n d s  
a n d  f la sh in g  a n  e lec tric  to rch . F igu res r e p re s e n t  m en  h a m m e r in g  
p o s ts  a n d  w h e n  fire is  o p en ed  o n  th em  th e y  r u n  to e i th e r  flank . 
T h e n  f ig u re s  o f  m e n  a p p e a r  above th e  E . p a ra p e t  m a n n in g  th e  
tre n c h , a n d  m a c h in e  g u n s  a t em p lacem en ts  o p en  fire, (rep re sen te d  
in  E. t re n c h  b y  t in  can). At e a c h  s tage  o f th e  firing Very lig h ts  a re  
s e n t  u p  a n d  k e e p  a  s te a d y  light. By th e ir  a id  it w as q u ite  e a s y  to 
ge t a  good s ig h t, b u t  one  cou ld  g e t no  in d ic a tio n  of w here  a  b u lle t 
s t ru c k  a n d  a  m a n  w ou ld  h av e  to  know  h is  rifle well to  d o  good 
sh oo tm g  a t  n ig h t w ith  it. 33
At th e  sn ip in g  w in g  o f th e  C an a d ia n  C orps School, sc o re s  in n ig h t firing  were 
im p re ss iv e . In o n e  in s ta n c e , sev era l buU seyes a n d  In n e r  rings w e re  h it even 
w h e n  th e  tcirget r in g s  b e ca m e  invisib le  to  the  n a k e d  eye. 34 L ieu t. H arriso n  
(2 6 th  B n .) a n d  S g t. M o rris  (2 8 th  B n .) show ed  e x c e p tio n a l sk ill  in  th e ir  
s h o o tin g  ability', th e  la t te r  b e in g  c o n sid e re d  th e  “b e s t  all ro u n d  s h o t  in  th e  
c la s s ”. N ight firin g  w a s  a lso  s im u la ted  in  the  d a y tim e  via th e  u s e  o f  “n ig h t 
g la s s e s “. D esigned  by  M ajor C rum  of th e  King’s R oyal Rifles, th e s e  goggles 
h a d  d a rk e n e d  le n s e s  to  im ita te  th e  effect of n igh t. T h is  p ro ced u re  provided  
o ffice rs  a s  well a s  o th e r  ra n k s  w ith  a n  u n d e rs ta n d in g  o f th e  m o v e m e n ts  a  
s n ip e r  m u s t  m ak e  In  th e  d a rk .
E d u c a tin g  s tu d e n t s  o n  th e  c a re  a n d  u s e  o f  s ig h ts  w a s  e q u a lly  
im p o r ta n t .  B ased  o n  H e sk e th -P ric h a rd ’s  ex p erien ce , th e  lim ited  n u m b e r  o f 
r if le s  w ith  te le sc o p ic  s ig h ts  w as in  th e  w rong  h a n d s  a t t im e s  a n d  w as 
r e n d e re d  u se le s s . O n ly  th o se  riflem en  w ho p o s s e s s e d  prior s h o o tin g  sk ills 
c o u ld  m a k e  good u s e  o f  a  te le sco p ic -s ig h ted  rifle. F o r exam ple, P te . H.W. 
M cB ride  o f th e  2 1 s t  B n ., o b se rv ed  a  p a ir  of snip>ers sh o o tin g  a t  G e rm a n
33 Royal Winnipeg R ifles M useum (RWRM, hereafter), ‘S yn o p sis  of Notes by Lieut. J. Scott 
Cameron. 44th Bn. CEF on Sniping Course Aldershot. March 21st to April 1st. 1916 and Report of 
Sam e”, p.3.
34 NAC. RG9 III C3/4114/46/2 . “2nd Division to 4th. 5th. 6th Inf. Bde.. 06/16/1917".
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ta rg e ts  n e a r  M essines Ridge in S e p te m b e r, 1915. U sin g  Short-M agazine-Lee- 
Enfield rif les  (SMLE) m o u n te d  w ith  “S tan ley -L o n d o n ” optic  s ig h ts , th e  p a ir  
co n tin u ed  to  Are u p o n  ta rg e ts  2 0 0 0  y a rd s  aw ay. W h en  q u estio n ed  on  th e ir  
actions, th e  two re sp o n d e d  th a t th e y  w ere  u n d e r  o rd e rs . M cBride concluded , 
as  w ould a n y  o th e r m a rk sm a n , th a t  firing  a t  su c h  a  d is ta n c e  w as b o th  a  w aste  
of tim e a n d  am m u n itio n , no t to m e n tio n  th e  life o f th e  barrel. 35 in s tru c to rs  
were q u ick  to  identify  th a t  a  telescop ic  s ig h t w ould n o t  tu rn  a  b a d  sh o t in to  a  
good one . A bu lle t’s  a cc u ra cy  is j u s t  a s  eq u a l w h e th e r  th e  rifle h a s  a n  optic 
sight o r a n  open  one; th e  lenses o n  a n  op tic  s ig h t m ere ly  provide a  c lea re r 
defin ition  o f  th e  ta rg e t. 36 S tu d e n ts  w ere  given in s tru c tio n  on  th e  d ifferent 
ty p es  o f  o p tic a l s ig h ts  (eg. W arner & S w asey , A ldis, Periscopic P rism ) a n d  
how to  a d ju s t  an d  k e e p  th em  c lean . H ow ever, e m p h a s is  was p laced  on  th e  
optic s ig h t w hich th e  ind iv idual b ro u g h t w ith  him  to  th e  school.
In s tru c tio n  w as . a t tim es, d ifficu lt d u e  to th e  p lacem en ts  o f s ig h ts  on 
the  rifles. W hereas m o s t rifles to d ay  h av e  scopes m o u n te d  on th e  to p  cen te r 
of the  b a rre l, the  m ajo rity  of B ritish  a n d  C an ad ian  serv ice  rifles w ere m o un ted  
on th e  le ft. This w a s  p ro b lem a tic  fo r a  v a rie ty  o f  re a so n s , th e  firs t a n d  
forem ost b e in g  th a t  it w a s  im possib le  to  see  th ro u g h  th e  loophole p la te . 3? 
Telescopic s ig h ts  m o u n te d  to p -cen te r b ecam e  m ore freq u en t a s  th e  w ar went 
on. b u t th e y  were still o u tn u m b ered  by  th e  left-side sco p e s . Efforts to  change 
them  p e rm an en tly  to a  top -cen ter m o u n t w ould  have b e en  too tim e consum ing  
since m a n y  a rm o u rie s  w ere  already e q u ip p ed  for le ft-s id e  p roduction . Sn ipers 
w ho p re fe rre d  to  u s e  th e  left eye fo r v iew ing p o s e d  a n o th e r  p ro b lem  for 
in s tru c to r s  a n d  le ft-m o u n te d  te le sc o p ic  s ig h ts . H a n d lin g  o f th e  rifle w as
35 Herbert W. McBride: A Rifleman Went To War. (Mt. Ida.AK, 1987). p.79-80. McBride was a  US 
Army Captain who joined the CEF in 1914 when the war broke out. He w as a  skilled marksman in his 
native country, attending several shooting competitions, including Bisiey. When the US entered the 
war in 1917, he left his Canadian outfit to join his fellow countrymen in battle.
36 RWRM, “Synopsis of N otes...’ , p.1.
37 The reasons for the left mount sights have never been fully clarified. Hesketh-Prichard discounts 
it a s  an error from an individual in the War O ffice who knew little about telescopic sights. S e e  
Hesketh-Prichard, p. 145-147. Contrary to Hesketh-Prichard’s  opinion, it is possib le that left- 
mounted sights were used to allow the rifleman to u se  his open sights a s  well.
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therefo re  a w k w a rd  a n d  a im in g  m ade d ifficu lt. N ev erth e le ss , th e  q u a lity  o f 
in s tru c tio n  n e v e r  w av ered  h i light of th e s e  co m p lica tio n s . The m a jo rity  of 
s tu d e n ts  s c o re d  well on  th e ir  ta rg e ts . The 19 th  c lass  a t  S e c o n d  Army S n ip in g  
School (May 14 -19 , 1916), for In s tan ce , sh o w ed  th re e  o u t  o f  four s tu d e n ts  
ra n k e d  "Good" o n  th e ir  sh o o tin g  ability, o n e  s te p  below  th e  h ig h e s t p o ss ib le  
ra n k . 38 At th e  9 th  S n ip in g  a n d  S c o u tin g  C ourse  a t  th e  C a n a d ia n  C o rp s  
S choo l (A u g u st, 1917) s ix  o u t of 65 s tu d e n t s  ra n k e d  In  th e  "very good" 
catagory  - a  sch o o l record . 39 In s tru c to rs  w ere Im p ressed  w ith  th is  s ta t is t ic  
b ecau se  th e  m u s k e try  te s t  w a s  a  difficult o n e  th a t a t te m p te d  to  m a in ta in  a  
h igh  s ta n d a rd  In  m a rk sm a n sh ip . **0 S tu d e n ts  who exce lled  In th is  c a te g o ry  
w ere u su a lly  p e rm a n e n tly  fitted  w ith a  te le sc o p lc -s lg h ted  rifle liefore th e y  
re tu rn e d  to  th e  F ro n t. S co res  from  the C an a d ia n  C orps’ S n ip in g  S chools w ere 
generally  Im p ress iv e , th e  h ig h e s t belonging to  a  Cpl. Roy o f th e  3 1 s t B n . a t  
98.7%  (2 3 3 /2 3 6  ta rg e ts), -n Moreover, th e  overall co m b in ed  average sco re  of 
th e  top fou r m a rk s m e n  from  all 17 c lasses  to ta led  60.7% . O n  a  g en era l level, 
a t  F irst A rm y S .O .S ., H esk e th -P rich ard  su rm izes  th a t fo r ev ery  100 s tu d e n ts  
a tten d in g  th e  schoo l, som e 7 5  re tu rn ed  a s  “q u ite  u sefu l sh o ts ."  42
M aking  a n  a c c u ra te  sh o t was m u c h  m ore th a n  s im p ly  a im in g  a n d  
pu lling  th e  t r igge r. M other n a tu re  alw ays te s te d  a  sn ip e r’s  ab ility  w ith  a  g u s t 
o f w ind. E ven  th e  s lig h te s t b reeze  could m a k e  a  sh o t go aw ry . T h u s, It w as  
n ecessa ry  to  te a c h  th e  sn ip e r to  ad ap t to  w in d  cond itions. T hough  a  difficult 
le s so n  to  te a c h ,  m a n y  In s tru c to r s  fo u n d  th e  b e s t m e th o d  In le t t in g  th e  
s tu d e n ts  sh o o t for th em selv es . A p relim in ary  lesson  w ou ld  ta k e  p lace o n  th e  
ran g e  w here a n  In s tru c to r  w ou ld  fire a  s h o t a t  a  ta rg e t w ith  s tu d e n ts  look ing  
on  via te le sco p es . D u s t w ou ld  ap p ea r o n  th e  region s t ru c k  a n d  th ro u g h  th e  
co u rse  of c o n tin u e d  p rac tice , s tu d e n ts  w ou ld  a d ju s t th e ir  a im  to  a c c o u n t for
38 NAC. RG9 III 03 /4057 /35 /3 , "1st Division HQ to 1st, 2nd, 3rd Inf. Bde., 05/24/1916".
39 NAC. RG9 III C 3/4064/15/3, "1st Division to 2nd Inf. Bde., 08/12/1917". p.1.
40 Ibid.. p.1.
41 NAC. RG24/18 8 3 A/26, "Canadian Corps Observation, Scouting and Sniping School, Record of 4  
Best Shots in Each C lass, November 1916 to November 1918".
42 Hesketh-Prichard : Sniping, p. 150-151 .
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th e  w ind. At F irs t A rm y S .O .S ., th e  s ta f f  a llow ed  for s ix  d iffe ren t s tre n g th s  o f 
w ind; gen tle , m o d e ra te , f re sh , s tro n g , v e ry  s tro n g , a n d  g a le . 43 S tu d e n ts  
w ere  te s te d  a t  a ll  levels o f  s t r e n g th  fo r Im p ro v in g  a c c u ra c y .  P ra c tic a l  
exerc ises  su c h  a s  th e se  fu r th e r  e n h a n c e d  th e  sn ip e r 's  sk ills  In th e  field.
IV
O nce th e  b a s ic  sk ills w ere  co nveyed  to  s tu d e n ts ,  o th e r  exerc ises  In 
sn ip in g  co m m en ced . The a c c e sso rie s  a  s n ip e r  u se d  in  h is  w o rk  in c lu d ed  a  
so ft, c lo se fittln g  c a p , a  lu m in o u s  c o m p a s s  a n d  w a tc h , fie ld  g la s se s  o r 
te lescope, a n  e n tre n c h in g  tool, a  6" m a p  o f th e  a rea , a  m a sk  a n d  a  se t o f w ire 
c u tte rs . The so ft c a p s  were req u ired  a s  th e  firm , b rim m ed  c a p s  often gave a 
sn ip e r’s  h ead  aw ay , p a rticu la rly  w h en  s u n h g h t w ould  reflec t off It. M oreover, 
m a n y  cap s  w ere a d o rn e d  w ith  c a p  b ad g es , rev ealin g  th e  so ld ie r’s reg im en t; 
th e se  a lso  a t t r a c te d  th e  s u n ’s  ra y s . A la te r  c h a p te r  will d is c u s s  the  ro le o f 
c a p s  a n d  badges In tren ch  sn ip in g  a n d  in te lligence.
Special a tte n tio n  w as given to  th e  c a re  o f te lesco p es  a t  sn ip in g  schoo l. 
T e lescopes w ere m a in ly  u se d  by  sc o u ts  b u t  a  sn ip e r’s d u tie s  d u a lly  in c lu d ed  
o b se rv a tio n . K now n a s  a  “s ta lk in g  te lesco p e" , th e se  v is io n  e n h a n c in g  to o ls  
w ere u se d  by sn ip e rs  on  re c o n n a is sa n c e  m is s io n s  o r for ro u tin e  o b servation . 
T hey  varied  in shap>e a n d  size b u t  w ere c ritic a l to  the  In te lligence  Unit of a n y  
b a tta lio n . Dally ac tiv itie s  o f th e  G e rm a n  Une w ere o b se rv e d  th is  w ay a n d  
m a n y  a  sn ip er u s e d  th em  w h en  w orking  w ith  a  com panion . C are  a n d  c lean ing  
w as  th e  first le s so n  in  h an d lin g  th e se  in s tru m e n ts  a s  a n y  d a m a g e  to th e  so ft 
le n s  in side  w ould  re n d e r  th e m  u s e le s s . L en ses  th a t  co lle c ted  deb ris , w h ich  
freq u en tly  h a p p e n e d  given th e  c o n d itio n s  o n  th e  W este rn  F ro n t, were to  b e  
c lea n e d  carefu lly  w ith  a  le a th e r  ch am o is  o r like m ate ria l. A tten tio n  to d e ta il 
w a s  critical he re  b e c a u se  m a n y  o f th e  te le sc o p e s ’ len se s  w ere  s c ra tc h e d  from  
u s in g  a  soiled c lo th  o r the  w rong  m a te ria l. 44 T he le n se s  co u ld  be rem oved  
for fu r th e r  c lean in g  b u t  again , a tte n tio n  to  d e ta il  w ould m a k e  th e  difference in
43 Ibid.. p. 160.
44 Ibid.. p.240. In Appendix C. Hesketh-Prichard estim ates that over 50  per cent of the te lescop es in 
u se  were damaged in this way.
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th e  te lescope’s  effectiveness. T he le n se s  w ere  n o t to  be to u c h e d  by fin g ertip s  
o r  th u m b s  a n d  th e re  w as  a n  e m p h a s is  to  k e e p  th em  d ry . W ith th e  o fte n  
d a m p  co n d itio n s  In th e  t r e n c h e s . It w a s  e a s y  fo r c o n d e n sa tio n  to b u ild  u p  
In s id e  th e  te le sc o p e . To a v o id  e x c e s s iv e  c o n ta c t  w ith  d ir ty  o r  m o is t  
co n d itio n s , s n ip e r s  w ere re q u ire d  to  c a r ry  te le sc o p es  In th e i r  c a se s  a n d  o n  
th e ir  person . Following th e se  In s tru c tio n s  u s u a lly  e n su re d  th e  longevdty o f th e  
equipm ent.
L earn in g  how  to  u s e  th e  te le sco p e  w a s  th e  nex t le s so n , for It w a s  fa r  
m ore com plex  th a n  sim ply  look ing  th ro u g h  th e  view  finder. M ost te le sco p es  
cam e with a  s u n  sh ad e  to  co v er th e  u p p e r  h a lf  o f  th e  cy linder. It w as c ritic a l 
to  em ploy th is  fea tu re  a s  th e  m e ta l o r g lo s sy  p a r ts  o f the  te lescope  a t tra c te d  
su n lig h t, a n d  s u b se q u e n tly , a n  en em y  s n ip e r ’s  bu lle t. 45 E x ten s io n  s u n  
sh a d e s  w ere a lso  reco m m en d ed , esp ec ia lly  for b lock ing  th e  s u n  w hen It w as  
above or r is in g  b e h in d  e n em y  lin es . U s in g  a  r e s t  for th e  In s tru m e n t w a s  
p referab le  a s  It avoided  ex cessiv e  m o v em en t o r Jerk ing  by th e  opera to r, a n d  It 
k ep t the  field o f view s tea d y . M ag n ifica tio n  w a s  b e s t u s e d  a t  a  low pow er, 
d u e  to  th e  w e a th e r  c o n d itio n s  in  F ra n c e ; c h a n g in g  w e a th e r  often  led  to  a  
ch an g e  in  v isib ility . F u r th e rm o re , n ig h t v iew ing  w as m u c h  c lea re r on  a  low 
pow er. In s tru c to r s  e m p h a s iz e d  th e  u s e  o f  p e r ip h e ra l v is io n  w hen  lo o k in g  
th ro u g h  th e  view  finder s in ce  it w as m o re  a p t  to  c a tc h  s u d d e n  m ovem en ts  In 
th e  enem y line . Lastly, th e  b e s t  tim es fo r u s in g  th e  s ta lk in g  te lescope w ere  
d u s k  a n d  d a w n  a n d  a f te r  r a in  s h o w e rs . A fre s h  s p r in k le  of r a in  w a s  
p a rticu la rly  v a lu ab le  b e c a u se  It revealed  g a p s  in  b a rb ed  w ire  an d  fo o tp a th s  
from  enem y p a tro ls .
The a b il i ty  to  m a s t e r  m o v e m e n t a n d  s ta lk in g  w a s  c ritic a l fo r  a  
su c c e ss fu l s n ip e r .  S tu d e n ts  le a rn ed  q u ic k ly  th a t  fa ilu re  to  be p a tien t a n d  
p rec ise  cou ld  h a v e  deadty  c o n se q u e n c e s . S u d d e n  m o v em en ts , e ither b y  th e  
sn ip e r  or by so m e th in g  In h is  s u r ro u n d in g s , co u ld  nullify h o u rs  of w ork a n d
45 Ibid.. p.242.
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in s ta n t ly  re s u lt  in  d e a th . 46 S u c c e s s fu l  s ta lk in g  Invo lved  a  s e r ie s  o f
p ro c e d u re s  th a t re q u ire d  th e  ind iv id u a l to  locate th e  object, ju d g e  Its d is tan ce
a n d  s tu d y  the  g ro u n d  to  be covered. S po ttin g  a  d is tinc tive  fe a tu re , som etim es
two, w a s  en co u rag ed  for m a in ta in in g  d irection . T he s tu d y  of w in d s  an d  light
c o n d it io n s  w a s  c r i t ic a l  d u e  to  c o n s ta n t ly  c h a n g in g  w e a th e r  p a t te r n s .
F o r tu n a te ly , • a  s n ip e r  co u ld  fin d  so m e  p ro te c tiv e  com fort In  th e  u se  o f
cam ouflage  w hich  co n tin u ed  to  In c rease  In imp>ortance a fte r 1916. 47 Though
th e  F re n c h  h a d  m a s te re d  cam o u flag e , it w as u s e d  o n  a  la rg e  s c a le  by th e
B ritish  a t  the  S p ec ia l W orks P a rk . T he key  fu n c tio n  of th is  d e p a r tm e n t w as
to p ro d u c e  pro tective  covering for g u n s  a n d  tre n c h  p o s ts  b u t a lso  to  a ss is t th e
snlp>er by  m ak ing  c a n v a s  g re a tco a ts  p a in te d  in  e a r th  to n es  fo r co n cea lm en t.
H oods a n d  /o r  p ro tec tiv e  co lou ring  w ou ld  a s s is t  in  d isg u isin g  th e  h ead  a n d
spec ia lly  p a in ted  gloves w ould  h id e  th e  h a n d s . H e sk e th -P ric h a rd  In d ica tes
th a t d e m o n s tra tio n s  in  cam ouflage in te re s ted  m a n y  a  s tu d e n t. T he following
is a n  Incident th a t  o ccu rred  d u rin g  tra in in g  a t F irs t A rm y S.O .S .:
O ften  th e  w hole  c la ss  a rriv ed  w ith in  tw en ty  y a rd s  o f a  m a n  lying 
w ith in  full view  w ithou t b e in g  ab le  to  sp o t h im . On o ne  o ccasslo n  
d u rin g  a  b ig  d em o n stra tio n , one o f th e  s ta f f  w a s  lying o u t in  a  coat 
o f th e  co lou r a n d  co n to u r o f san d b a g s  on  a  to p  o f a  tre n c h , a n d  the 
w hole p a r ty  o f s ta f f  o fficers (was] all ro u n d  h im  w ith o u t hav ing  
sp o tted  h is  w h e reab o u ts . W hen  1 po in ted  h im  o u t a  fo reign  officer 
w h o  w as p re s e n t ,  a n d  w ho  ev id en tly  d id  n o t u n d e r s ta n d  m e. 
th o u g h t 1 w as  referring  to  a n  object a  little fu r th e r  on, a n d  In o rder 
to  see it b e tte r  he  ac tually  leaped  on  to the  cam ouflaged  m an ! 48
How ever, cam ouflage h a d  its  lim its  a s  It w as a lw ay s su sc e p tib le  to  ch an g in g  
co n d itio n s  a t th e  fro n t. Applying su rro u n d in g  v eg e ta tio n  to th e  cam ouflaged  
body a n d  h e ad  c o u ld  tem p o ra rily  so lve th is  p ro b lem . (The p ic tu re s  on th e  
following page will give th e  re a d e r  a n  Idea of th e  effectiveness o f cam ouflage 
In vegetation.) To m ove forw ard a  sn ip e r  w as g iven two op tions: first, h a n d s  
s tre tc h e d  out a n d  m oving  In a  sn ak e -lik e  fashion; th e  second, b y  p u lling the
46 RWRM. “Synopsis of Notes..." p.2-3.
4 7 Gilbert; Sniper, p.76.
48 Hesketh-Prichard: Sniping, p. 157.
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body fo rw ard  w ith  th e  e lbow s in a  “g ra s sh o p p e r  s ty le .” 49 At a ll tim es  sn ip e rs  
w ere to  avo id  s u d d e n  je rk s  an d  s h o u ld  th ey  s lip , ly ing  m o tio n le ss  w a s  th e  
sa fes t re ac tio n . T ail g ra s s  a n d  v eg e ta tio n  w as p a r te d  from  th e  ro o ts  a n d  the  
b e st m ov em en t w as m a d e  w hen cloud  cover d rifted  o v e rh ead . S ta lk in g  and  
m o v em en t w ere p ra c tic e d  In flag s te a lin g  c o m p e titio n s , s ta lk in g  th ro u g h  th e  
sen try  lin es  a n d  p it t in g  sec tio n s  o f s ta lk e rs  a g a in s t e a c h  o th e r. M ovem ent 
did  h av e  som e s e t-b a c k s  a s  the  w ar p ro g ressed . T h e  th re a t  o f  gas  following 
th e  in c id e n t a t Y pres In  1915 re q u ire d  th a t  all s o ld ie rs  b e  p re p a re d  to  w ear 
gas m a s k s  a n d  re s p ira to rs . C um bersom e a cc e sso rie s  s u c h  a s  th e se  obviously  
in te rfe re d  w ith  th e  s m o o th  m ovem en t o f the  h id d e n  sn ip e r . In  fac t, even 
th o se  s n ip e r s  w ho re m a in e d  b e h in d  t re n c h  lin e s  a v o id ed  e x e rc is in g  th e ir  
p rac tice  w h en  on g a s  a le r t  b ecau se  th e  goggles o n  th e  m a s k s  In te rfered  w ith 
p rec ise  v ision .
In  add ition  to  th e  c lassroom s a n d  firing ra n g e s  a t  s n ip e r  schoo ls, th e re  
were tra in in g  g ro u n d s  th a t  m im icked  th e  g en era l c o n d itio n s  on  th e  W estern  
F ro n t. T h is  a p p a r a tu s  se rv ed  a  th re e -fo ld  p u rp o s e  o f  t ra in in g  for sn ip in g , 
o b se rv a tio n , an d  s c o u tin g . G enerally  speak in g , m a n y  s n ip e r s  p e rfo rm ed  all 
th ree  ta s k s  b u t th e  f ir s t  tw o were p a ra m o u n t a s  m a n y  b a tta lio n s  c a rried  w ith  
th e m  a  u n i t  of s n ip e r s  a n d  a  la rg e r  u n it  o f s c o u ts .  52 N e v e rth e le ss , 
a t te n d a n ts  o f the  sch o o l u su a lly  received  a  w e ll-ro u n d ed  e d u ca tio n  In a ll th ree  
a re a s . T he tra in in g  g ro u n d s  were m a d e  u p  of tw o o p p o s in g  tre n c h e s  w ith  a 
rep lica  n o  m a n ’s la n d  In  betw een . F irs t A rm y S .O .S . contlnueiU y u p d a te d  the  
la tte r  fe a tu re , em p lo y in g  artlfica l G e rm a n  bod ies, fo r In s ta n c e , to m a k e  the 
te rra m  m ore  rea lis tic  a n d  to  en co u rag e  s tu d e n ts  to  e x tra c t  In fo rm ation  from
49 RWRM, “Synopsis of N otes...” p.3.
50 Ibid., p.3.
51 Ibid., p.3.
52 The number of snipers and scout per battalion varied. For instance, in August of 1916, the 20th 
Bn. carried four snipers in their unit while the 2 1 st Bn. had four fully trained and 60 partially trained 
snipers. S e e  NAC. RG9 III 03 /4111/39/3 , (any battalion correspondence to the 4th Inf. Bde.).
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th em . 53 C ra ters, b a rb e d  w ire a n d  d eb ris  w as  a lso  ad d ed  to  th e  region. T he 
d ifferences in th e  tre n c h e s  w ere  im m edia te ly  s tr ik in g . Som e o f th e  tre n c h e s  
w ere  Iden tical to  th e  e a r lie r  c o n s tru c tio n s  th e  A llies u tilized . T h ese  w ere  
p e rfe c tly  h n ed  w ith  levelled  s a n d b a g s  t h a t  re v e a le d  lo o p h o le s  a n d  th e  
everyday  activities o f th e  o c c u p a n ts . M ovem ent b e h in d  th e se  lin e s  w as easlfy  
d e tec ta b le  for th e  enem y  b e c a u s e  th e  co n to u rs  o f th e  h u m a n  bod y  an d  h e a d  
s to o d  o u t ag ain st th e  even  parap>et. The o p p o sin g  tre n c h , re p re se n tin g  th a t  o f 
a  G e rm an  line, w as en tire ly  d iffe ren t. S a n d b a g s  w ere a t odd  an g les , p a in te d  
a  v a rie ty  of co lours a n d  s tre w n  a b o u t them  w as  w ire, sc rap  m e ta l, c o rru g a ted  
Iron, em p ty  b arre ls , a n d  a n y  o th e r  deb ris  th a t  co u ld  be sp a re d . This e rra tic  
fo rm atio n  concealed  th e  o c c u p ie rs  a s  well a s  th e  loop-ho les a n d  sn ip e r  p o s ts  
th a t  sa tu ra te d  th e  G erm an  Unes. 54
E ven ts  p lay ed  o u t b e h in d  th e  G e rm a n  t r e n c h  w ere Id e n tic a l to  th e  
ro u tin e  h ap p en in g s  a t  the  fron t. S tu d e n ts  te s te d  th e ir  observ a tio n  skills w hile 
s ta f f  m em b ers  im ita te d  G e rm a n s  b e h in d  th e  lin e , d igg ing  t r e n c h  m o r ta r  
s ta n d s , o r open ing  loop-ho les. A ny ac tio n  b e h in d  th e  line w as  reco rd ed  a n d  
s tu d e n ts  were g rad ed  on  th e ir  r e s u l ts .  S n ip e rs  a lso  jo ined  in  th e  exercise  by  
p u ttin g  th e ir  sh o o tin g  ab ility  to  w ork  from b e h in d  th e  G erm an  tre n c h . The 
sn lp er(s) w ould hav e  a  se lec tio n  o f loop-holes to  sh o o t from  a n d  a fte r h av in g  
d o n e  so , th e  o b s e rv e rs  w ere  le ft to  d e te rm in e  from  w h ic h  lo o p -h o le  it 
o rig in a ted . 55 F iring  from  lo o p -h o les  an d  s n ip e r  p o s ts  w as a lso  a n  e s se n tia l 
p a r t  o f th e  tra in in g  p ro g ram  b u t b e c a u se  it w as  so  com m onplace  in  the  tre n c h  
w a rfa re  betw een  1 9 1 4 -1 9 1 7 , I ts  ex p lan a tio n  c o m e s  In th e  n e x t c h a p te r  o n  
t r e n c h  w arfare . T ra in in g  In p a tro U ln g  w as a ls o  ex ecu ted  In  th e s e  m o d e l 
tre n c h e s . S tu d e n ts  le a rn ed  q u lck fy  th e  p ro p e r a n d  Im proper w ay s o f leav ing  
a n d  re tu m m g  to  tre n c h e s . T h is  exercise  w a s  e q u a lly  c ritica l to  sn ip in g  a s
53 Hesketh-Prichard; Sniping, p. 152-153. Scouts were encouraged to search bodies in No Man’s  
Land a s  som e might contain valuable docum ents, personal papers, unit identification etc. that would 
a ssist in intelligence.
54 The Allies would take a  p age from the G erm ans in this regard a s  many Allied trenches began to 
resem ble th ose of the enem y.
55 Hesketh-Prichard: Sniping, p.156.
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m any  sn ip e rs  w o u ld  leave th e  tre n c h e s  to  sea rc h  o u t sn ip e r p o s ts .  P a tro ls  
w ould p rac tice  in  th e  d ay  (via n igh t g la sse s) and  a t  n ig h t, com peting  w ith  each  
o th e r for th e  a m o u n t o f in fo rm ation  g a in e d  and  d is ta n c e  covered. 56  Tra in in g  
sm p ers  In a re a s  s u c h  a s  th e se  w o u ld  give th em  th e  a d e q u a te  know ledge to 
co n trib u te  to  th e  In te lligence  Unit In th e i r  ba tta lion . As a  fu r th e r  c h a p te r  will 
show, sn ip in g  w ent h a n d - in -h a n d  w ith  Intelligence.
V
B eyond  all th e  p ra c tic a l tra in in g , the s n ip e r ’s  final te s t  lay  in  the  
sn ip in g  c o m p e titio n s  t h a t  o c c u rre d  re g u la r ly  in  th e  B EF a n d  C E F . The 
com petitions varied  in  n a tu re  d ep en d in g  o n  the schoo l b u t u su a lly  com bined  
sh o o tin g  w ith  o b s e rv a tio n . B e c a u se  sn ip in g  sc h o o ls  w ere a ls o  tr a in in g  
g ro u n d s  for s c o u ts ,  o b se rv a tio n  a n d  re c o n n a is s a n c e  b e ca m e  p a r t  o f th e  
com petitions a s  well. 5? S c o u ts  w ere re q u ire d  to  s k e tc h  a  ce rta in  fe a tu re  (eg. 
a v illage) a n d  a t t a c h  c o rre sp o n d in g  re p o rts . D u rin g  a  te s t  o f  d ay tim e  
re c o n n a issan c e  sk ills , s n ip e r s  w ould  h a v e  the  p le a su re  o f  p lay ing  th e  enem y 
beh ind  tre n c h  Unes w h e n  a  p a tro l w as o u t. If the  la tte r  offered a n y  o p p o rtu n e  
target, th e  sn ip e rs  (tw o to  fo u r in  n u m b e r)  w ould fire b la n k s  a t  th e  exposed  
scou ts . 58 A s im ila r p ro c e d u re  w ould b e  carried  o u t a t  n ight u n d e r  th e  cover 
of d a rk n e s s  s ince  It w a s  a t  th is  tim e t h a t  p a tro ls  w ere m o st active . In  th e se  
“m ovem ent ex erc ises" , s n ip e rs  cou ld  a lso  be te s te d  for e s ta b lish in g  sn ip in g  
and  o b se rv a tio n  p o s ts  a n d , like o b se rv e rs , th ey  d id  so  In d a y lig h t a n d  a t 
n ight. At th e  C a n a d ia n  C orps S n ip ing  S chool in F e m e s  (1917), s n ip e r s  were 
req u ired  to  do  re c o n a ls s a n c e  re p o rts  a n d  sk e tc h e s  o f  th e ir  o b se rv a tio n s  a s  
well a s  co n cea l th e m se lv e s  from  the  ju d g e s .
T h o u g h  th e  s h o o tin g  c o m p e titio n s  were o p e n  to  a ll s tu d e n t s  a t  th e  
sch o o ls , th e re  w ere  o th e r  c o n te s ts  t h a t  w ere sp ec ific  to  th e  m a rk s m a n . 
S tu d e n ts  w ou ld  be d iv id ed  In to  tw o c la s s e s  a n d  u n i t s  a t  th e  sc h o o l cou ld
56 Ibid.. p. 153.
57 For a  com plete list of shooting competitions at Canadian Corps schools consult NAC. RG9 III 
C3/4064/15/3 and NAC. RG9 III D3/5048-5049. “War Diary of Canadian School of Musketry".
58 NAC. RG9 III 03 /4128 /16 /10 . “6th Canadian Infantry Brigade. Brigade Scouting and Sniping 
Competition. 20 /06 /1916”.
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e n te r  fo u r c o m p e tito rs  from  e a c h  c la ss . In  th re e  of th e  f ir s t  fo u r m a tc h e s , 
s tu d e n ts  p ra c tic e d  sn a p sh o o tin g  from  th e  ly ing  position . T he fo u r th  m a tch , 
a lso  In th e  ly ing  position , w a s  fo r rap id  firing . T he firs t tw o  m a tc h e s  w ere 
c o n d u c te d  a t  a  d is tan ce  of 2 0 0  y a rd s , sh o o tin g  firs t a t  a  ta rg e t  o f  a  kneeling  
fig u re  (s ix  s e c o n d s  e x p o su re ) , th e n  a t  a  c o v e red  f ig u re  (fo u r s e c o n d s  
exposu re). 59 M atch  th ree  w o u ld  com e from  a  d is ta n ce  o f  3 0 0  y a rd s  w ith  a  
s ix  seco n d  ex p o su re  for th e  ta rg e t. In m a tc h  fou r, ra p id  fire w as  te s te d  a t 
3 0 0  y a rd s  a s  s tu d e n ts  b e g a n  w ith  a  lo a d e d  rifle a n d  fo u r  r o u n d s  in  th e  
m ag az in e  b e fo re  th e  ta rg e t a p p e a re d , so R e lo ad in g  c o n tin u e d  In  five ro u n d  
in c re m e n ts  u n til  a  to ta l of 15 ro u n d s  w as fired . All o f th is  w as done  over a 
o n e  m in u te  tim e sp a n . The b e s t  a ggreg a te  s c o re s  from  e a c h  c la s s  in  th e  four 
m a tc h e s  w ould  m ake  u p  a  fifth  ro u n d  th a t w o u ld  u ltim ate ly  decide  th e  w inner. 
P rizes cam e  in  th e  form  of 100 fran c s  d iv ided  am o n g  th e  w in n e rs  firom e ach  
m atch .
M atch  s ix  w as ty p ica lly  re se rv ed  fo r th e  b e st m a rk s m e n . S h o o tin g  
from  a  d is ta n c e  o f 200  y a rd s  a n y  rifle, w ith  o r  w ith o u t a  s ig h t, cou ld  be u sed . 
O p en  to  all ra n k s  euid lim ited to  tw o Ind iv iduals p e r  um t. th e  co m p etitio n  h ad  
tw o p ra c tic e  ro u n d s . The f ir s t  ta rg e t c a m e  In th e  fo rm  o f a  h e a d  th a t  
re p e a te d ly  a p p e a re d  a n y w h ere  a lo n g  a  4 0  y a r d  fro n t a t  a  th re e  sec o n d  
in te rva l: e x p o su re  o f the  ta rg e t w as four s e c o n d s  per in te rv a l. A to ta l o f five 
ro u n d s  w as fired, each  h it sc o r in g  four p o in ts  fo r a  p o ss ib le  to ta l  o f 20 . In 
th e  seco n d  p ra c tic e , th e  ta rg e t w as  a  w a lk in g  m a n . ex p o sed  fo r a  12 y a rd  
w alk  a t  a  p a ce  o f 2 1 /2  m p h . S ix  ro u n d s  w ere  fired  in  s e ts  of tw o w h en  th e  
ta rg e t a p p ea re d , each  h it eq u a llin g  four p o in ts  o u t  o f a  p o ss ib le  24 . 6i The 
h ig h e s t In a  to ta l score  of 4 4  w o u ld  d e te rm in e  th e  w lrm er w ho w o u ld  w in  a  
c u p  a n d  a  c a s h  prize. L /C p l. H. N orw est, a n  ex cep tio n a l N ative C a n a d ia n  
s n ip e r  from  th e  5 0 th  B n., w as  a  fina list in  th is  co m p etitio n  m  A u g u st, 1917
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th o u g h  th e  ou tcom e a g a in s t  h is  co m p etito r r e m a in s  u n d o c u m e n te d . 62  There 
is  a  re c o rd  o f B a tta lio n  sco res  fro m  th e  1 s t D iv is io n  In 1 9 1 8 : o u t o f a
p o ss ib le  8 0 0  p o in ts , th e  1st Bn. s c o re d  6 0 8 , th e  2 n d  Bn. h a d  5 9 8 , the  3 rd  
B n. g a th e re d  562 a n d  th e  4 th  Bn. to ta lle d  5 4 8 . 63
B eyond  th e  s p ir i t  o f c o m p e titio n , th e s e  sh o o tin g  c o n te s ts  serv ed  to  
Im p ro v e  th e  s n ip e r ’s sp e e d  In h is  f ir in g . H e s k e th -P r ic h a rd  n o tic e d  a 
s ig n if ic a n t Im p ro v em en t In th e  s p e e d  o f  h is  m e n ’s  s h o o tin g  a b ility  a f te r  
c o n tin u a l p rac tice . 64 He also  en co u rag e d  th e  c o m p e titio n s  a t sn ip in g  school, 
a t  t im e s  p i t t in g  o f f ic e rs  a g a in s t  o th e r  r a n k s  o r “C a n a d ia n s  a n d  
C o lo n ia ls ...a g a in s t...th e  Im perials." 65 The c o m p e titio n s  h ad  th e  tre m e n d o u s  
effect o f  b u ild in g  co n fidence  in th e  s tu d e n t  b e fo re  h e  re tu rn e d  to  h is  reg u la r 
u n it. W hen  th e  four w eek  cou rses cam e  to  a  c lo se , a  firm  m a jo rity  p o sse ssed  
th e  n e c e s s a ry  sk ills to  e s ta b lish  th e m se lv e s  a m o n g  th e  b e s t s n ip e r s  on th e  
W es te rn  F ron t.
In  su m . e s ta b lis h in g  a  s n ip e r  t r a in in g  s c h o o l a p p e a re d  to  be th e  
a n sw e r  to  en d in g  th e  G erm an  d o m in a n c e  of sn ip in g . It w as n o t  u n til  1915 
th a t  th e  AUies finally  acknow ledged  th e  G e rm a n  su p e r io r ity  a n d  it w as over 
th e  c o u rse  o f th e  following year th a t  p re p a ra t io n s  w ere  m ade to  m a tc h  them . 
S n ip in g  a t  th is  s tag e  o f th e  w ar w as  sp o rad ic , u n o rg a n iz e d  a n d  u s u a lly  the job  
o f a  sk illed  sh o t In th e  b a tta lio n . H e s k e th -P r ic h a rd  ch an g ed  th a t  w ith  th e  
F irs t A rm y S .O .S . H is f irs t sn ip in g  e s ta b lis h m e n t sym bolized  a  n u c le u s  th a t 
m a d e  s n ip in g  a n  o rg an ized  fea tu re  o f w a rfa re  in  th e  B ritish  a n d  C an a d ia n  
fo rces. F rom  F irst A rm y S.O .S . c am e  n u m e ro u s  o rgan ized  “C o rp s  Schools" 
th a t  c o n tin u e d  th e  te a c h in g s  of H e sk e th -P r ic h a rd  a n d  h is  s taff. P u ttin g  th e
62 NAC. RG9 III 03 /4217/7/15. “10th Inf. Bde. to 44th. 46th. 47th. 50th Bn. & Capt. G.A. Speer. MG. 
08/11/17".
63 NAC. RG9 III C 3/4031 /25 /3 . “R esults of Sniping C om petition. July 9. 1 9 1 8  From Capt. 
Montgomery. 1st Cdn. Inf. Bde." The points scored, how ever, only represent 1/8 of the entire 
competition scores.
64 Hesketh-Prichard: Sniping, p. 149.
65 Ibid.. p. 149.
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sp ec ia lly  s ig h te d  rifles in  th e  p ro p e r  h a n d s  w a s  th e  first p r io r ity  a n d  th e  
schoo ls’ c u rr ic u lu m  e n su re d  th a t  m o st, if  n o t all. s tu d e n ts  cou ld  o p e ra te  an d  
m a in ta in  a  te le sc o p ic -s ig h te d  rifle. S h o o tin g  w a s  p ra c tice d  to  a n  e n d le ss  
d e g re e  a n d  th e  f u n d a m e n ta l s  o f  s n ip in g  (le . u s e  o f  e q u ip m e n t ,  
m o v e m e n t/s ta lk in g  etc.) followed. All o f  th e se  sk ills  cu lm ina ted  In th e  rou tine  
rifle an d  sn ip in g  co m p etitio n s  th a t  m e a su re d  a  sm p e r s en h an ced  sk ill before 
h e  re tu rn e d  to  th e  field.
B ey o n d  m a s te r in g  te r r a in ,  tim in g , m o v e m e n t a n d  tech n o lo g y , th e  
sn ip e r  offically  b ecam e a n  o rg an ized  u n i t  In  th e  a rm y . The t ru ly  m o d em  
sm p er fo und  h is  see d s  p la n te d  In th e  G rea t W ar. 66 W hile sm p in g  d id  occu r 
on  a n  sem l-o rgan lzed  level In  th e  A m erican  Civil W ar. th e  G reat W ar saw  h is  
sk ills  refined  a n d  officially e s ta b lis h e d  in  th e  m ilita ry  helra rchy . S in ce  1918. 
sm p in g  h a s  s e e n  little  c h a n g e  In te rm s  o f p ra c tic e . A p e ru sa l th ro u g h  th e  
C an ad ian  A rm y’s  S m per T ra in in g  M anual will sh o w  th a t  th e  fu n d am en ta ls  have 
rem a in ed  a n d  on ly  th e  tech n o lo g y  h a s  c h an g e d . 67 R egard less, th e  m odern  
sn ip e r h ad  fo u n d  h is  orig ins in  th e  fields o f F ran ce  a n d  F landers. 1914-1918. 
B ack  on th e  b a ttle fie ld , th e s e  tra in e d  sn ip e rs  w ere finally p u t to  w ork  in the  
tren ch es  w h ere  th e ir  im p o rtan c e  w ould  re a c h  a  reco rd  high.
66 Gilbert; Sniper, p .83.
67 S e e  the Canadian Army’s  Sniper Training Manual, CFP 309  [5]. Ministry of National Defence.
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C h ap te r IV 
Sniping in  Trench Warfare, 1915-1917
U pon com pletion  o f h is  tra in ing , a  sn ip e r  re tu rn e d  to  h is u n it in  the  
field w h e re  h e  p u t h is  re f in e d  sk ills  to  w ork . B efo re  d is c u s s in g  th e  
com plex ities  o f sn ip in g  in  tre n c h  w arfa re , how ever, th e  d ifference b e tw een  
sn ip ers  m u s t  first be c larified . T hough th e re  w ere no  “sn ip in g  un its"  p e r  se. 
th e re  w as a  d is tin c tio n  b e tw een  the  b a tta lio n  a n d  com p an y  sn iper.
P rio r to  sn ip ing  b eco m in g  a n  official p a r t  o f th e  m ilita ry  h e ira rch y . the  
o rg an iza tio n  o f s c o u ts  a n d  sn ip e rs  v aried  by  in d h id u a l  b a tta lio n . S n ip in g  
s c h o o ls  b e g a n  to  a p p e a r  in  n u m b e rs  by  1916. a n d  C a n a d ia n  C o rp s  
H e a d q u a rte rs  (CCHQ) w a s  very  in te re s te d  in  th e  o rg an iza tio n  of s c o u ts  a n d  
sn ip e rs  in  p a r t ic u la r  u n i ts .  By th e  sp rin g  o f 1916. th e i r  co m p o sitio n  w as 
loosely s c a tte re d , som e b a tta h o n s  em ploying fou r p e r u n it , o th e rs  u s in g  eight 
o r m ore. • As p rev iously  d is c u s s e d  in  C h a p te r  III . a  n u m b e r  of c ra c k sh o ts  
a tte n d e d  sn ip in g  schoo ls  to  im prove th e ir  sh o o tin g  ab ih ty . However, s co re s  
a n d  im p ro v em en ts  v aried  w ith  each  so ld ier, th u s  p u ttin g  th e m  to u s e  in  th e
1 NAC. RG9 III C 3/4057/35/3. “Headquarters. 2nd Inf. Bde. to O.C. 5th. 7th, 8th. 10th Bn. s, 
03/06/1916". Also. NAC. RG 9 III C 3 /4069 /11/6. “O.C. 19th Bn. to Staff Capt., 4th Inf. Bde., 
07/24/1916".
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tr e n c h e s  d ep en d ed  on  th e ir  degree  o f  sk ill. Those sc o r in g  excep tionally  h igh 
a t  S .O .S . sc h o o ls  w e re  g e n e ra l ly  f i t te d  w ith  te le s c o p ic - s ig h te d  rifles  
im m e d ia te ly  a n d  th e  o th e r s  w ere e q u ip p e d  a s  th e s e  rifles b e c a m e  m ore 
availab le . By early  1917. th o se  h ig h ly  sk illed  sn ip e rs  w ith  te lescop ic-sigh ted  
rifles w ere  sh ifted  from  th e ir  u n it to  B a tta lio n  H e a d q u a rte rs  w here  th e y  were 
em ployed  u n d e r  th e  S c o u t Officer. 2 Labelled a s  a  "sp ec ia list sec tion", th ese  
eUte s n ip e r s , u su a lly  fo u r  p e r  b a t ta l io n ,  jo in ed  th e  s c o u t  s e c tio n , w h ich  
m o n ito re d  en em y  lin e s  a n d  c o n d u c te d  re c o n n a is s a n c e  p a tro ls  w h e n  in  th e  
Une. G iven th e  title “B atta lio n  S n ip e rs" , th e y  typically w orked  a long  th e  en tire  
b a tta lio n  fron tage  w ith  sp ec ia l o b se rv a tio n  d u tie s  (ie. specific  s tro n g p o tn ts . 
re a rw a rd  lin es , troop  m o v em en t e tc .)  a n d  ev en tu a lly  re tu rn e d  to  th e ir  u n it 
w h en  it w as rem oved  from  th e  lin e . T he rem a in in g  sn ip e rs , u s u a l ly  less 
sk ille d , s ta y e d  w ith  th e i r  u n it  a s  “C o m p a n y  S n ip e rs "  w o rk in g  in  p a irs . 
T h o u g h  th e  n u m b e rs  o f c o m p an y  s n ip e r s  varied  p e r  b a tta lio n , a n  average  
figure  w as  16: eight s n ip e r s  a n d  e ig h t o b se rv ers  w h o  co u ld  e x ch a n g e  th e ir  
d u tie s  to  give each  o th e r  a d eq u a te  r e s t .  3 These s n ip e r s  w orked from  d u sk  
u n til  d aw n  from  the  co n fin es  of th e  s e c tio n  of tren ch  th e ir  C om pany  occupied .
At la st, w ith  tra in e d  sn ip e rs  in  th e  field, th e se  m a rk sm e n  b e g an  the ir 
a s c e n d a n c y  over the  e n em y  sm p ers  th a t  h a d  h a ra s s e d  th e m  for th e  p rev ious 
y e a r  a n d  one half. H ow ever, sn ip in g  w as  m ore th a n  s im p ly  sig h tin g  a  ta rg e t 
a n d  p u llin g  th e  trigger: sn ip in g  w a s  a  sc ien ce  u n to  i ts e lf  th a t  re q u ire d  a 
v a r ie ty  o f ta s k s  to  e n s u re  s u c c e s s . W hile in  the  t r e n c h e s  o f th e  W este rn  
F ro n t th e  sm p e r fulfilled a  n u m b e r  o f  d u tie s  to  ach ieve  th is  end . F ir s t  and  
fo rem o st, th e  sm p er h a d  to  se lec t c a re fu lly  h is  firearm  a n d  te le sco p ic  sigh t. 
A m ong th e  o th e r p ro c e d u re s  w as th e  s e t-u p  of sm p e r a n d  o b serv a tio n  p o s ts  
w h ere  h e  w ould  perform  h is  skill. In  ad d itio n , the  s n ip e r  w as a lso  n e e d e d  for
2 NAC. RG9 III 03 /4069/11/6 , “2nd Division HQ to 4th, 5th, 6th Inf. Bde & 2nd Cdn. Pioneers, 
02/20 /1917" .
3 NAC, RG9 III C3/4135/22/4, “N otes of a  C on feren ce of Scout and Sniper Officers. 06/02/1917"  
pg 3 -4  S e e  a lso  NAC, RG9 III C 3 /4069/11 /6 , O.C. 19th Bn. to Staff Captain, 4th Inf. Bde., 
0 7/24 /1916”. The Scout Section often con sisted  of on e Lance Sergeant, one Corporal, two Lance 
Corporals (aka Patrol Leaders), 18 Privates and four Bn. Snipers with t/s rifles.
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lo c a tin g  a n d  d e ac tiv a tin g  e n em y  sn ip e rs  v ia  o b se rv a tio n  a n d  u se  o f p ro p s . 
B ey o n d  t h e s e  r e s p o n s ib i l i t ie s  w as a  s n ip e r ’s  c o m m itm e n t to  B a t ta l io n  
In te lh g e n c e . n o t only  a s  a  m a rk s m a n  b u t  a s  a n  o b se rv e r  w ho o b ta in e d  
va lu ab le  in fo rm atio n  a b o u t th e  enem y. F u r th e r , a n  ex am in a tio n  of th e  face ts  
o f sn ip in g  in  tre n c h  w arfare  will yield th e  co n c lu s io n  th a t  th is  activity re q u ire d  
m u c h  m ore  th a n  sim ply p o in tin g  a rifle a n d  firing  u p o n  a  ta rg e t.
I
S e le c tm g  a n  a c c u ra te  firearm  w a s  o n e  o f th e  f irs t p ro c e d u re s  for a 
s m p e r  b e fo re  e n te r in g  th e  tre n c h e s . S in c e  a ll rif les  h a n d le d  a n d  fired  
d ifferen tly , it w as c ritica l th a t  a  sn ip er c h o o se  one  th a t  su ite d  his n e e d s . A 
v a rie ty  o f r if le s  a p p e a re d  o n  th e  b a ttle f ie ld s  o f th e  G rea t W ar: th e  F re n c h  
w ere k n o w n  for th e  Lebel. th e  G e rm an s  w ere  e q u ip p ed  w ith  th e  G ew her. th e  
B ritish  w ith  th e  S h o rt M agazine  Lee E n fie ld  (SMLE) a n d  th e  C a n a d ia n s  w ith  
th e  R oss M ark  III. 4 The R o ss , while c o n s id e re d  a  cap ab le  ta rg e t rifle, w as 
n o t fit for servnce in  the  c o n d itio n s  on th e  W es te rn  F ro n t. In  com p ariso n  w ith  
th e  SM LE. it w as  m u c h  lo n g e r  in  le n g th : w h e re  th e  SM LE m e a s u re d  4 4 .6  
in c h e s , th e  R o ss  to ta lled  5 0 .6  - the  b a r re l  a lo n e  a m o u n tin g  to 2 /3  o f  th e  
m e a s u re m e n t .  T his c o m p ara tiv e ly  lo n g  f irea rm  w a s  c u m b e rso m e  in  th e  
n a rro w  tre n c h e s  a n d  its t ip  a n d  bayonet w ere  o ften  ex p o sed  over the  p a ra p e t 
w h en  th e  rifle w as carried  u p rig h t. It w e ig h ed  sligh tly  m ore  (9.875 lb s ., over 
a  p o u n d  m o re  th a n  the SM LE) an d  its  m ag az in e  cap ac ity  w as  lim ited to  five 
ro u n d s  ( th e re  w ere 10 in  th e  Enfield). 5 T h a t th e  R oss on ly  held  five ro u n d s  
p e r  m a g az in e  m e an t th a t  th e  o p e ra to r w a s  re q u ire d  to  re lo ad  m u c h  m ore  
qu ick ly  a n d  u n d e r  in te n se  b a tt le  co n d itio n s  - th e  d ifference betw een  life a n d  
d e a th .
D e sp ite  its  p ecu lia ritie s , the  R oss w a s  k n o w n  m o st for the  p ro b lem  of 
jam m in g . I s su e d  to  the  F ir s t  a n d  S eco n d  D ivisions a t  V alcartier. p re lim in a ry  
te s t s  w ith  th e  R oss rev ea led  th a t  it w as  s u sc e p tib le  to  h e a tin g  up . j a m m ing
 4------------: “Rifles of the Great War”. War Machine. No. 86. n.d. p. 1702-1703, 1707,1712.
5 Ibid., p. 1703, 1707.
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a n d . in  so m e  c a se s , p ro p e llin g  th e  b u lle t c a s in g  b a ck  in to  th e  fire r’s  face
(a .k .a . "blow back"). 6 O n th e  W estern  F ro n t th e  tre n c h  cond itions in ten s ified
th e  ja m m in g  prob lem , p a r tic u la r ly  th e  m u d  a n d  d irt th a t  c h a ra c te r iz e d  th e
battlefield . As one C an ad ian  so ld ier recalls.
The R o ss  (was] a  s tra ig h t p u s h  a n d  p u ll, th e  h e ad  o f th e  bolt is o n  a  
sp r in g  a n d  w hen it is  hom e It tu rn s  h a lf  way a n d  th e  lugs o n  th e  
side o f  th e  head  tu r n  in  to  grooves w h ic h  are  h i th e  b reech . If y o u  
d o n 't h a v e  th a t c lean  a n d  the  lugs d o n 't  go in  p roperly , well th e n  if 
it 's  o n ly  h a lf  c lo se d ...a n d  you  fire it. w ell th e  sh e ll sw ells. The b a se  
of th e  sh e ll will sw ell a n d  you  can ’t  ge t it ou t. T h a t’s  w here the  ja m s  
com e in . 7
R eports  b e g an  filtering in  to  C an a d ia n  C orps H e ad q u a rte rs  th a t  the  R o ss  w as 
se izm g  u p  u n d e r  ra p id  fire  c o n d itio n s  b y  M ay 1916 . s in  one  r e p o r t ,  
m em b ers  o f th e  P rin cess  P a tr ic ia ’s C a n a d ia n  Light In fa n tiy  were u s in g  th e  
p re s su re  o f th e ir  boots to  try  a n d  open th e  bo lt. As th e  n u m b e r  of m s ta n c e s  
m o u n te d , m e m b e rs  of th e  S e c o n d  a n d  T h ird  D h dsions b eg an  to  re -a rm  
them selves w ith  SMLE’s fo u n d  o n  th e  battle fie ld . Following brigade, b a tta lio n  
a n d  co m p an y  level inv estig a tio n s  of the  is su e , th e  R oss w as co n sid ered  un fit 
a s  a  service rifle since it la ck e d  th e  m en’s  confidence . 9 By Ju ly . 1916 . th e  
C an ad ian  C o rp s  w as being re -a rm e d  with SM LE’s.
D esp ite  th ese  com p lica tio n s, the  R oss w'as never fully w ithdraw n from  
active  se rv ice . S ir  C h a rle s  R oss, fo u n d er o f  th e  R oss Rifle C om pany , h a d  
c ra f te d  a  h ig h ly  a c c u ra te  f ire a rm  th a t  w a s  ju s t  n o t su ita b le  fo r  th e  
"ruggedness" o f tren ch  w arfa re . A ccuracy w a s  h is  key m otive in  d esign ing  th e  
rifle - th e  f irs t p ro to type  a p p e a r in g  in  1896 - a s  “he c o n c e n tra te d  o n  ite m s  
s u c h  a s  b a r re ls  a n d  s ig h tin g  sy stem s."  lo T he  Ross M ark  Ill’s p re d e c e sso rs  
e a rn ed  a d m ira tio n  a t the  B isiey shoo ting  co m p etitio n s  p rio r to  the  w ar. O n  th e
6 Bill Rawling: Surviving Trench Warfare. (Toronto. 1992) p. 13. The R oss w as nevertheless retained 
a s  a  service weapon because the War Office stressed the importance of using the bayonet in combat.
7 NAC, RG41/11/CBC In Flanders Fields, “Interview with L R . Fennel. 27th Bn.", p.8.
8 NAC, RG9 III C 3/4197/1/3, “Canadian Corps HQ to 3rd Division, 05/02/1916".
9 NAC, RG24/1883A/ROSS Rifle, 1916, “D. Haig, Commander-in-Chief, British Armies in France to 
War Office, 05/28/1916", “War O ffice to the High C om m issioner for th e Dominion of C anada. 
0 6 /0 3 /1 9 1 6 ”.
1 0 ------------; “Rifles of the Great War”, p. 1702
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battle fie ld , a n d  w h en  fitted  w ith  a  te lescopic s ig h t, th e  R o ss  em erged  a s  a n  
efficient sn ip in g  rifle. Since k eep in g  it c lean  w a s  a  n e ce ss ity , sn ip e rs  - w hose  
trigger-pu lling  w as in te rm itten t - cou ld  afford th e  n e ce ssa ry  tim e  a n d  care  th e  
R oss req u ired . M oreover, s in ce  sn ip ers  w orked  in d ep en d en tly , th ey  did  n o t 
have to  rely o n  it a s  m u ch  a s  th e  regu lar in fa n try m a n  a n d  in s ta n c e s  of ra p id  
fire w ere few a n d  fa r betw een. A lthough th e  C a n a d ia n s  w ere  being  re -a rm ed  
w ith SMLE’s. m a rk sm e n  in  th e  C orps p referred  th e  R oss o v e r th e  Lee-Enfield, 
one ind iv idual n o tin g  th a t he “co u ld n ’t hit th e  in s id e  o f a  b a m ’’ w ith  the  la tte r. 
' 1 T he R oss, o n  th e  o th er h a n d , found  a  g re a t deal o f a d m ira tio n . H erbert 
M cBride sa id  o f  its  accu racy , “u p  to  600 y a rd s .. . i t  e q u a lle d  or excelled a n y  
rifle I h a d  o r h av e  since  fired - th e  Springfield n o t ex cep ted .“ 12
The te lescop ic  sight even tually  m ade it to  th e  tre n c h  lin es  o f France by  
1916. As a  p rev io u s  ch ap te r h a s  a lready show n , th e  u se  o f th e se  accesso rie s  
w as o ften  m in im ized  by th e  u s e r s ’ lack  o f know ledge a b o u t  th e  s c o p e s ’ 
opera tion . M oreover, it w as he ld  th a t  som e sn ip e rs  sim ply  d id  no t ap p rec ia te  
th e  v a lu e  o f a  te lesco p ic  s ig h t, th e reb y  le ad in g  to  th e ir  m is u s e . S n ip e r  
sch o o ls , how ever, prov ided  official in s tru c tio n  o n  how  to  u s e  th e se  dev ices 
a n d  th e ir  va lue  in c reased  d ram atically , so well, in  fact, th a t  C .O .’s gave s tro n g  
s u p p o r t  for th e i r  u se . e m p h a s iz in g  th a t  th e y  w'ere e s s e n t ia l  to  g a in in g  
sup erio rity  over th e  enem y. >4 Telescopic s ig h ts  w ere no t v a lu e d  so m u ch  for 
im proving  a c c u ra c y  b u t for e n h a n c in g  p o te n tia l ta rg e ts  t h a t  w ere norm ally  
m issed  w h en  u s in g  open  s ig h ts , is Three le n se s , th e  o c u la r , inverting  a n d  
objective, h a d  th e  culm inative effect of sh a rp en in g  the  im age in  one focal poin t 
know n a s  th e  re ticu le . The re ticu le , or "c ro ssh a irs“. en ab led  th e  sn ip er to a im  
a t h is  ta rg e t p rec ise ly  w ithin th e  lenses. The d iag ram  below  lis ts  th e  v a rio u s
11 NAC. “Interview LR . Fennel”, p.9. The SMLE muzzle som etim es had a  habit of “whipping" to on e  
side, sending the bullet off course. The SMLE's predecessor, the P. 14, shared similar problems as  
the R oss but also found praise among British snipers. S e e  “Rifles of the Great War', p. 1703.
12 Herbert McBride: A Rifleman Went to War. (Mt. Ida, AK, 1987). p.214.
13 NAC, RG24/1883A/26. Sniping and Marksmanship, “T elescopic Sights, 1st Division to Canadian 
Corps HQ. 03/29/1916".
14 Ibid.
1 5 NAC, MG30 E2/V.1, N A D  Armstrong Papers, “ Chapter XIII -T elescopic Sights”, p.1
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types o f re ticu les: th e  first, th ird  a n d  fifth w ere u sed  \ jy  sn ip e rs  a t  th e  front.
-sh a p e d  Aperture Ptn H eadD o u b le  C ross H airs
Source \A C . M C 30 E2. \  A D A rm stro n g  Papers. 'C h a p te r  XIIT - T elescopic S ig h ts '
The m ag n ifica tion  o f th e se  in s tru m e n ts  v a ried , b u t th e y  a ll sh a re d  th e  sam e 
effect o f  p rovid ing  a  c le a re r  object, esp ec ia lly  in  the  ea rly  m orn in g  o r a t d usk . 
Thus, in  tre n c h  w a rfa re  th ey  w ere e s s e n tia l  to  a  sn ip e r 's  w ork.
D ue to th e ir  fragility , te le sc o p ic  s ig h ts  w ere n e v e r  is su e d  a s  T rench  
S tores; m a n y  w ere is s u e d  from  O rd n a n c e  a n d  w ent d irec tly  to  sn ip e r  schools 
for is su e . O th e r m a rk s m e n  p u rc h a s e d  th e ir  sco p es  p riva te ly . The following 
were th e  fo u r m o st co m m o n  te lesco p ic  s ig h ts  is su e d  to  C an a d ia n  a n d  B ritish  
tro o p s: W arn er & S w asey . P e risc o p ic  P rism , A ldis a n d  W in ch e s te r . For
C an a d ia n  troops, th e  W arn er & S w a se y  w as th e  first sco p e  is su e d  a longside  
the  ill-fated  Ross M ark  III. M uch like th e  firea rm  it acco m p an ied , th e  W arner 
& S w asey  h a d  its  fa ir  sh a re  o f p ro b le m s  a n d . like th e  R o ss  by th e  g en era l 
infantr}'. w as c o n d em n e d  by sn ip e rs  la te r  in  th e  w ar. T he m ain  p rob lem  vdth 
th is  te lescop ic  s ig h t w a s  th a t it c o u ld  n ev er be kep t p ro p e rly  a d ju s te d , or. in 
sn iper tem in o lo g \\ it n e v e r “held  its  zero". The recoil o f  th e  sho t co n sis ten tly  
se t th e  elevation  off. th u s  m ak ing  it “p rac tica lly  im possib le  for two sh o ts  to  be 
fired a t exactly  th e  s a m e  point." M oreover, th e  la te ra l a d ju s tm e n t h a d  to be 
rese t every  tim e th e  sco p e  w as re m o u n te d  to  th e  rifle, th u s  req u irin g  it to  be 
regu larly  “re -zeroed .“ Like o th e r le ft-m o u n ted  te lescop ic  s igh ts, th e  W arner 
a n d  S w a se y 's  h a b it  o f  u n b a la n c in g  th e  rifle to  th e  le ft w as c o rre c te d  by 
secu rin g  a  ru b b e r  b a n d  a ro u n d  th e  s ig h t a n d  th e  s to ck  o f  th e  rifle. However.
16 NAC. RG9 111 03 /4143 /8 /1 . “Report on Warner & S w asey  Sights, Scout Officer 31st Bn. to O.C. 
31 St Bn., 06/13/1917". S e e  also, NAC. RG9 III C 3/4104/16/2, “4th Inf. Bde. to 2nd Division, 
06/14/1917"
17 NAC. Armstrong Papers. “Telescopic Sights", p.2-3
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th is  w as m ore fo r k eep in g  a n  ev en  d is tr ib u tio n  o f  w eight a n d  only  m in im ally  
h e lp ed  keep  th e  sco p e  p ro p e rly  a d ju s ted . By 1917. th e  W a rn e r  & S w a se y  
h a d  been rep laced  t y  o n e  o f th e  o th e r  th ree  co m m o n  te le sco p ic  sigh ts.
The P eriscop ic  P rism  freq u en ted  th e  W este rn  F ro n t fo r a  great p o rtio n  
o f th e  w ar. th o u g h  le s s  so  fo r th e  C a n a d ia n  C orps. L ike th e  W a rn e r  & 
Sw asey. it w as  left m o u n te d  a n d  w as b a la n c e d  in  th e  s a m e  m an n er . It too  
h a d  im p erfec tio n s , n a m e ly  th e  m o u n tin g s . T h e  c o n s is te n t reco il of th e  rifle 
ten d ed  to loosen  th e  sc rew s  h o ld in g  the sco p e  in  p lace, th e re b y  c o n trib u tin g  
to  inaccuracy , is in  a d d itio n , th e  c a p s ta n  sc rew s  th a t  co n tro lle d  the  la te ra l  
a d ju s tm e n t w ere  p ro n e  to  s tr ip p in g , r e n d e r in g  th e  a d ju s tm e n t  u s e le s s .  
P roper care  a n d  h an d lin g , how ever, u sually  re su lte d  in  a n  e x ten d e d  sh e lf  life.
The A ldis. on  th e  o th e r  h a n d , did freq u e n t the  r a n k s  o f th e  C a n a d ia n  
C orps. G enera lly  sp e a k in g , th e  Aldis w on h ig h e r  p ra ise  o v e r th e  la t te r  tw o 
te lescopic s ig h ts  b o th  for a c c u ra c y  an d  m a in te n an c e , is T h e  u n iq u e n e s s  o f 
th e  Aldis w as th a t  it c o u ld  be  m o u n te d  c e n tra lly  o r to  th e  left, th u s  it w a s  
a d ap ta b le  to a  n u m b e r  o f  rifles  a n d  a n u m b e r  of m o u n tin g s . T hough  th e  
c e n tra l m o u n t d id  n o t a llow  th e  m a rk s m a n  to  u se  h is  o p e n  s ig h ts , it w a s  
nevertheless  o ne  o f th e  p re fe rre d  choice of sn ip e rs . 20
The W in c h e s te r  s ig h t  w o n  th e  h ig h e s t  a cc la im  a m o n g  C a n a d ia n  
s n ip e rs  p r im a rily  b e c a u s e  it w o rk ed  w ell w ith  th e  R o ss  M ark  111. T he  
W inchester firs t m ad e  i ts  a p p e a ra n c e  on th e  fro n t in 1916. in itia lly  m o u n te d  
(to the  left) on  SM LE’s. 21 i ts  in a u g u ra l p e rfo rm an ce  p ro v id ed  good r e s u l ts  
particu la rly  w ith  re g a rd  to  a c c u ra c y . The la te ra l  a d ju s tm e n t - a  loosen ing  o r 
tigh ten ing  of a  sc rew  for s h o ts  s tra y in g  left o r r ig h t - w as e a s y  to  opera te  a n d  
s n ip e rs  fav o u red  th is  s im p lic ity . 22 S h o r tly  th e re a f te r , a rm o u re rs  in  th e  
C an ad ian  C o rp s  b e g a n  m o u n tin g  th em  c e n tra lly  on th e  R o ss , m ak in g  th is
18 Ibid. p.3.
19 NAC. RG9 III 03 /4104/16/2 , “4th Inf. Bde. to 2nd Division, 06/14/1917".
20 NAC, Armstrong Papers, “T elescop ic Sights", p.3-4.
21 Ibid., p.4.
22 NAC, RG9 III C 3/4152/1/3, “N otes on Telescopic Sights and Rifles, 04/25/1916"
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co m b in a tio n  th e  m o st p o p u la r am ong  C an ad ian  sh a rp sh o o te rs . U n ique  to  th is  
scope w as its  a p p e a ra n c e  for it w as m u c h  longer a n d  slim m er th a n  th e  o ther 
th re e  te lesco p ic  s ig h ts . W here th e  len g th  of th e  A ldis a n d  P e risco p ic  Prism  
ra n g e d  from  10.8 to  12.25 inches respectively , th e  W in ch este r m e a s u re d  16 
in ch es . 23 M oreover, i ts  weight w as con sid erab ly  lig h te r and  its  m agn ifica tion  
h igher. S e t-b ack s  in c lu d ed  loosened m o u n tin g  sc rew s  an d  a  h a b it  o f slid ing 
fo rw ard  a fte r  th e  recoil (which w as su b se q u e n tfy  p u lled  b ack  a f te r  th e  shot). 
N ev erth e le ss . C a n a d ia n  m a rk sm en , w ho re ta in e d  a  R oss for th e i r  sn ip in g  
d u tie s , h e ld  th e  W in ch es te r in  th e  h ig h es t re g a rd  c la im ing  th a t  it  w a s  m ost 
su ita b le  for “p ra c tic a l w ork .” 24 in  op en  w arfa re , it rem a in ed  a s  th e  m ost 
serv iceab le  sigh t in  th e  field, particu la rly  for its q u ick  a n d  easy  a d ju s tm e n t.
U sing  G e rm a n  te lescop ic  s ig h ts  o n  th e  R o ss  o r SMLE w a s  a  ra rity  
s in ce  th e s e  sco p e s  w ere  in freq u e n tly  c a p tu r e d  in ta c t .  T h o se  th a t  w ere 
sa lv ag ed  w ere qu ick ly  s e n t to th e  C orps S n ip in g  S choo l for re p a ir . As th e  
Allies so o n  learn ed , th e  G erm ans m ade  a  varie ty  o f m o u n tin g s  fo r th e ir  sigh ts 
m ak in g  it difficult to  in te rch an g e  th em . M oreover, m a n y  G erm an  s ig h ts  were 
in co m p a tab le  w ith  A lhed a rm s a n d  w ere only u s e d  w h en  sigh t a n d  rifle were 
a cq u ired  together. 25
M any sn ip e rs  in  th e  C a n a d a  C o rp s , p a r tic u la r ly  C o m p an y  sn ip e rs , 
w en t fo r som e tim e w ith o u t a  te le sco p ic  s ig h t o n  th e ir  rifle, d u e  to  th e ir  
lim ited  availability . As th e  w ar p ro g ressed , how ever, m ore s n ip e rs  w ere able 
to u tilize th em . After be in g  fitted w ith  rifle a n d  s ig h t, th e  c ra ck sh o t w as ready 
to perfo rm  h is deadly  a rt.
n
O nce th e  D ivisional C om m anders realized  th e  effect th a t  sn ip in g  in  the  
t re n c h e s  h a d . th ey  w ere eager to  p u t  th e m  to  w ork . As early  a s  N ovem ber. 
1915 th e  G en era l O fficers  of C o m m an d  (G .O .C .) w ere is s u in g  o rd e rs  to
23 Ian Skennerton; The British Sniper. (London. 1984). p.57.
24 NAG, RG9 III 03/4143/8 /1 , “Report on Warner & S w asey  Sights, Scout Officer 3 1 st Bn. to O.C. 
31st Bn.. 06 /13 /1917’.
25 NAC, Armstrong Papers, “Telescopic Sights’, p.5.
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B rigade a n d  B atta lion  H e a d q u a r te rs  to  em ploy th e m  im m ediately . 26  The
o rd ers  w ere th en  ch an n e lled  on  to  ind iv idual u n its  en co u rag in g  th em  to  take
ad v an tag e  o f G erm an erro r:
If y o u r sn ip ers  a re  n o t a lre a d y  doing so, w ill y o u  p lease  tu rn  th e m  
o u t a t  daw n, a s  o p p o rtu n itie s  for sn ip in g  a t  th a t  tim e of d ay  a re  
very  good. The enem y o ften  ex p o ses  h im se lf m ore  carelessly  in  th e  
h a l f  ligh t th a n  h e  w ould  la te r  in  th e  d a y . G ood re s u lts  w ere  
o b ta in e d  by so m e  of th e  B a t ta h o n s  in  th e  o th e r  B rig ad es  by  
following th is  p rac tice . 27
T h u s  it is  c lea r th a t sn ip in g  w as e s s e n tia l  to t re n c h  w arfare . E m ploying  the  
sn ip er, how ever, h ad  yet to  be reso lved . While every  so ld ier found som e form 
of p ro tec tio n  an d  concealm en t b e h in d  th e  p a ra p e t, it w as  th e  sn ip e r w h o  h ad  
to  m ak e  co n cea lm en t go th e  d is ta n c e . O bviously, look ing  over th e  p a ra p e t 
inv ited  a  G erm an  sn ip e r 's  bu lle t so  th e  C an ad ian  m a rk s m a n  h ad  to  find  o th e r 
a lte rn a tiv e s  for sn ip ing  from  th e  tre n c h e s . T h u s , th e  fron t line o b serv a tio n  
an d  sn ip e r post em erged a s  a  fea red  fea tu re  of th e  tre n c h  line.
As th e  earlie r c h a p te r  on  tra in in g  in d ic a te d , th e  first se t o f Allied 
tre n c h  lines w as very un ifo rm  w ith  poorly  co n cea led  loopholes a n d  sn ip in g  
p o s ts . By la te  1916. th e  Allies w ere w ork ing  h a rd  to  ch an g e  th e  look of the 
p a ra p e t a n d  b e tte r h ide th e se  s tra teg ic  locations. A dopting  the  sam e m eth o d s 
u s e d  by th e  enem y. A llied p a ra p e ts  so o n  b e ca m e  d e co ra te d  w ith  v a rio u s  
form s of m e ta l and  ru b b ish  to b e tte r  d isgu ise  th e  tre n c h s ' in h a b ita n ts  a s  well 
a s  sn ip in g  a n d  observ a tio n  p o s ts . F ro n t line p o s ts  c a rrie d  th e  ad v an ta g e  of 
be ing  c lo ses t to the enem y’s lines: how ever, due to  th is  c lo seness, th e  field of 
view  w as o ften  Limited. M oreover, fro n t Une p o s ts  c a rrie d  th e  ad d ed  r is k  of 
be ing  d iscovered  since th e  enem y u su a lly  h ad  th e  fro n t lines well observed . 28 
T h ese  p o s ts , due  to  th e ir  lim its, w ere  o ften  u s e d  fo r h a ra s s in g  th e  enem y: 
re a rw ard  p o s ts  carried  th e  g rea te r effect o f c au s in g  ca su a ltie s .
T he f irs t s te p  in  e s ta b lis h in g  s n ip e r  a n d  o b se rv a tio n  p o s ts  w as
26 NAC. RG9 III C3/4140/10/13, “2nd Division to 6th Inf. Bde.. 11/15/1915”.
27 NAC. RG9 ill C3/4135/22/4. “6th Inf. Bde. to 27th. 28th. 29th. 31st Bn. s. 05/05/1916“
28 NAC. MG30 E2/V.1, N A D. Armstrong Papers. “Chapter XV - Snipers' Posts. Observation Posts. 
Loopholes and Hides”, p. 1.
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location . In  th e  fron t lin e  th e re  w ere th re e  com m on p la c e s  to e re c t a  p o st: 
th e  p a ra p e t { including th e  a re a  d irec tly  in  fro n t of th e  tre n c h )  . th e  p a ra d o s  
a n d  a  trav e rse  (a sm aller, an g led  tre n c h , so m etim es u s e d  for com m unication). 
T he firs t tw o o f th e se  w ere  m o st f re q u e n tly  u se d , th e  la tte r  ty p ica lly  in 
em ergency  s i tu a t io n s  (eg. a  enem y ra id ). P o s ts  in  th e  p a ra d o s  w ere  m ore 
favourable  b e c a u se  th ey  offered  a  w ider field o f  view a n d  w ere no t so  easily  
d e tec ted . M oreover, th e  sm o k e  or “g a s"  d isch a rg e  t h a t  a  rifle le t o ff  w as 
m ask ed  by  th e  ris in g  sm o k e  a n d  m ist th a t  typically  p e rm e a te d  th e  in s id e  of 
th e  tren ch es . In  any  of th e se  p o sitions, it w as  im p o rtan t to  co n sid er f irs t the  
field of view, th e  cover from  fire a n d  th e  cover from view . 29 To avoid  being  
d iscovered , sn ip in g  p o s ts  w ere alw ays p la c e d  a t  an  a n g le  so  fire c am e  from  
th e  flank a n d  n o t from  th e  cen te r. C h o o s in g  th e  l a t t e r  c o u rte d  d is a s te r ,  
u sually  in th e  form  of m a ch in e -g u n  fire o r  “w hiz-bang 's". P o s ts  were s c a tte re d  
th ro u g h o u t th e  tre n c h lin e . som e active, o th e rs  for a t t r a c t in g  enem y sn ip e rs ' 
b u lle ts . A lw ays c o n s tru c te d  a t  n ig h t, s n ip e r  an d  o b se rv a tio n  p o s ts  w ere 
u su a lly  b u ilt by  en g in ee r w ork ing  p a r tie s  th o u g h  so m e sn ip e rs  p re fe rre d  to 
m ak e  th e ir  ow n. 30 T h e se  fron t line p o s itio n s , as  w ith  a n y  sn ip in g  p o s ts , 
w ere “ou t o f b o u n d s"  for a ll o th e r  in fa n try  a n d  th e  re a so n  for th is  w as c le a r  - 
th e  m ore sec re tiv e  th e  p o s itio n , the  b e t te r  concea led  it re m a in ed . H ow ever, 
a s  new  u n its  e n te red  fo rw ard  tren ch  lin e s , a  lis t of sn ip in g  p o s ts  w as s e n t  to 
B attalion  a n d  B rigade H e ad q u a rte rs  for th e  fre sh  sm p ers  to  occupy. 31
The s ta n d a r d  fe a tu re  o f fron t lin e  p o s ts  w as th e  “loophole  p la te " . 
M ade of iro n , th e  loophole  p la te  w as o f te n  b u lle t p ro o f  if  se t a t  a n  an g le . 
T ho u g h  rifles  from  th e  G re a t W ar w e re  n o t a s  h ig h -p o w e re d  a s  to d a y 's  
firearm s, a  b u lle t s till h a d  th e  d e v a s ta tin g  effect of p e n e tra tin g  9 -1 4  in c h e s  
in to  b rickw ork  (cem ent a n d  lim e m o rta r). 18 in ch es  in to  s a n d b a g s  a n d  4 1 /2
29 Ibid.. p.1.
20 ibid.. p.4. McBride preferred th e build his own p o sts  simply b eca u se  h e  knew it would b e  done 
right. S ee  McBride. A Rifleman. p .3 0 l .
31 NAC. RG9 III C 3/4135/22/4. 6th Inf. Bde. to 27th. 28th. 29th. 31st Bn. s . 05/03/1916”. and NAC. 
RG9 III C3/4069/11/6. ‘6th Inf. Bde. to 4th Inf. Bde., 04/21/1916".
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feet in to  th e  e a r th . 32 T h u s , it w as e s se n tia l  th a t  loophole  p la te s  be as  
s tu rd y  a s  po ssib le . O n ce  sn ip in g  co m m an d ed  a  s tro n g e r  role in  th e  w ar. 
loopho le  p la te s  w ere is s u e d  regu larly  from  T ren ch  S to re s . U n fo rtu n a te ly , 
th ey  w ere u su a lly  cu t w ith  a n  oval opening  in th e  c e n te r  th a t h in d e re d  vdewing 
from  a te le sco p ic -s ig h ted  rifle. In 1916. a  C an a d ia n  officer a t S eco n d  Army 
S n ip in g  S choo l c re a te d  a  “kidney" loophole p la te  w h ich  a c c o u n te d  for left- 
m o u n te d  te lescopic s ig h ts  th o u g h  the  s ta n d a rd  p la te  co n tin u ed  to  be  th e  m ain 
o n e  is su e d . E lsew h ere , m o d ifica tio n s  w ere m ad e, w h en  n e c e s s a iy . a t the  
fro n t. A n o th e r co m p lica tio n  w ith  p la te s  w as th e ir  co lour: m o s t w ere b lack  
a n d  th e re fo re  m ore e a s ily  d e tec ta b le  in  day ligh t. 33 T h is w a s  av e rted , 
how ever, by  e n ca s in g  th e  loophole p la te  in  a  s a n d b a g  an d  c u t t in g  ou t the  
firing hole. To conceal th e  p la te , “dum m y san d b ag s"  w ere sew n o n to  the  plate 
before it w as w edged in to  th e  p a rap e t. (See diagram )
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S o u rc -  N'.AC M G 30 E2 v 1 \  .A D .A rm strong P apers "C h ap te r .XV ■ S nipers P osts O bservation  P o sts  Loopholes and 
H ides " p 4
A dditiona l p la te s , know n  a s  “w ing p la tes"  w ere so m e tim es  a d d e d  to  expand
32 NAC. RG9 111 C3/4143/8/1. Lecture Given at N.C.O. s  School of Instruction, 2nd Army' p.2-3
33 Ibid.. p 4
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the field o f  xdew. A fter p ro p e r p lacem en t an d  a d ay 's  w o rth  of w eathering , the 
plate w as u sually  fit for service.
P lac ing  the p la te  in  the  line cam e in  a  v a rie ty  of form s, so m e created  
by the  A llies, o th e rs  ta k e n  from th e  G erm an s. S om e w ere p laced  a long  the 
top line o f san d b ag s, o th e rs  u tilized com m on ob jec ts  s u c h  a s  a n  old  boot, hat 
or tin  c a n  from  w hich to  shoot from . F iring from p ip es  in se rted  in th e  tops of 
s a n d  b a g s  or from  th e  o p e n in g s  in  ru m  ja r s  w e re  o th e r  w ay s o f u s in g  
loopholes. P erhaps one  o f the  m ore in te re stin g  p o s ts  in  th e  front line  w as the 
"m ouse t r a p  loophole" w h ich  h ad  a  w ooden  lid th a t  o p en ed  a n d  c lo sed  \*ia a 
string. D isgu ising  th e  lid w as do n e  by driving n a ils  th ro u g h  th e  bo ttom  sn 
tha t the  exposed  sp ik es  w ould  drive in to  th e  e a r th  a n d  lift w ith  it w h en  the  lid 
opened. 34 Posts like th is  one w ere d u g  directly  in to  th e  e a r th  u n d e rn e a th  
the tre n c h  wall w ith th e  loophole s i tu a te d  am id st th e  c lu tte r  o f th e  forw ard 
parapet a n d  su rro u n d in g  te rra in . (See diagram .)
S o u rr f  NAC M C 30 E2 v 1 N A D  .A rm strong P apers. ‘’C h a p te r  XV • S n ip e rs ' P o s ts  O bservation  P o sts  Loopholes and 
Hides p 7
34 NAC MG30 E2A/1. N A D. Armstrong Papers. “Chapter XV - Snipers' Posts. Observation Posts 
Loopholes and Hides" p 7 Details of these various posts are described in this chapter
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P o s ts  s u c h  a s  th e s e  h a d  tw o d is tin c tiv e  fe a tu re s :  a  c u r ta in  a n d  a  d o u b le  
p la te . The c u r ta in  w as im p o rta n t for k eep ing  re a rw a rd  light from  exposing  
th e  hole in  the p la te  a n d  w as p la c e d  a t th e  e n tra n c e  o f th e  p o s t. The doub le  
p la te  w as an  ad d ed  fea tu re  th a t  c o u ld  be o pened  a n d  closed a t  will. It offered 
th e  s n ip e r  a  w id e r field  o f fire  b u t  w as c u m b e rso m e  a n d . if  n o t p laced  
properly , tended  to  sh ift an d  m in im ize  th e  view. 35
The b est sn ip in g  o p p o rtu n itie s  cam e from  th e  re a r  lin es  w h ich  offered 
a  view  o f the  en tire  B atta lion  fro n tag e . S n ip in g  a n d  o b se rv a tio n  p o s ts  w ere 
o ften  in  th e  open, s u c h  a s  a  field , th o u g h  c o n c e a le d  p o s ts  (eg. in  bu ild ings, 
w ooded a reas  etc.) w ere ju s t  a s  co m m o n . J u s t  a s  in  th e  front lin e s , rea rw ard  
p o s ts  w ere n u m e ro u s  a n d  w ere o c cu p ie d  a t v a ry in g  in te rv a ls  to  avoid t>eing 
d isc o v e re d  by e n e m y  o b se rv e rs . T he a d v a n ta g e  of b e in g  in  th e  re a r , 
how ever, w as th a t  it w as far m ore  difficult for a  G e rm a n  to  d e te c t a  rea r p o s t 
b e ca u se  o f its d is ta n ce . 36
O nce p o s ts  w ere  e s ta b lish e d , k eep ing  th e m  h id d en  w a s  n ex t on th e  
a g e n d a . S ince th e  Allied lin e s  w ere  ju s t  a s  f re q u e n tly  o b s e r \ ’^ ed a s  th e  
G e rm a n  line, p o s ts  w ere  occup ied  a n d  em p tied  a t  n ig h t. F u r th e rm o re , w hen  
no t in  u se . a rolled u p  sa n d b a g  o r  p iece of s tu ffin g  (also knowm a s  a "gag") 
w as in se r te d  in  th e  loophole I ts e lf  to  b lock  o u t a n y  light. T h e re  w ere a lso  
m an y  fac to rs to c o n sid e r w hen firing  from  sn ip e r  a n d  o b serv a tio n  p o s ts . The 
g a s  d isch a rg e  from  rifles, m e n tio n e d  ea r lie r , c o u ld  o ften  g ive a  sn ip e r 's  
lo catio n  away. T his g a s  w as m o s t o ften  visible in  co ld  o r d a m p  w e a th e r a n d  
u s u a lly  w hen  th e  m uzzle  w as c lo se  to  th e  g ro u n d , so  it w a s  ad v ised  th a t  
sn ip e rs  be aw are o f cond itions b efo re  firing. L e ttin g  off a  sh o t a lso  ten d ed  to  
s t i r  u p  d u s t  a n d  s u r ro u n d in g  v e g e ta tio n  w h ic h  o ften  re v e a le d  a  sn ip e r 's  
locatio n . To solve th is , sn ip e rs  w ere  in s tru c te d  to  w et dow n th e  a re a  a n d  
p a r t  th e  v eg e ta tio n  a p p ro p ria te ly . 37 D isg u is in g  th e  fla sh  o f  th e  m uzzle.
35 Ibid., p. 15.
36 McBride: A Rifleman. p.311.
37 NAC. RG9 III 03/4143/8/1. “Lecture Given At N.C.O.'s School of Instruction. S econ d  Army", p.5.
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p a r t ic u la r ly  a t  n ig h t ,  w a s  b e s t  d o n e  b y  sh o o tin g  from  a  w o o d en  b o x  o r 
th ro u g h  a  pipe p la ce d  in s id e  th e  p o s t o r s im p ly  by exposing  less th a n  h a lf  th e  
b a rre l th ro u g h  th e  loophole . 38 A n o th e r fa c to r  th a t h a d  to  be c o n s id e re d  w as 
the  g la re  o r flash  o f a  te le sco p e 's  len s  by th e  s u n . S n ip ers  a n d  o b se rv e rs  h a d  
to  be  a w a re  c o n s ta n tly  o f  th e  s u n ’s  p o s itio n  to  avoid b e in g  d isco v e re d  th is  
way. Likew ise, p o lish e d  b a rre ls  w ere  s h ro u d e d  and  sh in y  o rn a m e n ta tio n , like 
b ra s s  b u tto n s  o r c a p  b ad g es , w ere  rem oved  from  un ifo rm s. The e n em y  h a d  a  
hab it o f ran d o m ly  firin g  a t  th e  fro n t Une to  u n co v er AUied loophole p la te s : a  
m eta llic* “ringing" w h e n  th e  b u lle t s t ru c k  typ ica lly  gave it aw ay. T h e  AUies 
solved th is  prob lem  b y  a t ta c h in g  w ooden b o a rd s  to the  fron t o f th e  iro n  p la te , 
th e reb y  a b so rb in g  th e  b u lle t a n d  d o w n p lay in g  th e  so u n d . 39 P o s ts  th a t  w ere  
d iscovered  w ere a b a n d o n e d  a n d /o r  d ism a n tle d  a ltogether. G erm an  o b s e n 'e rs  
were ju s t  a s  s c ru tin o u s  a n d  o n  m a n y  a n  o ccas io n . G e rm an  sn ip e rs  b o u n c e d  
b u lle ts  off loophole  p la te s  a s  a  re m in d e r  to  th e  AUies th a t  th ey  w ere  b e in g  
w atch ed . 40
B a se d  o n  th e  av ailab le  d o c u m e n ta tio n , certa in  a re a s  w ere c o n s id e re d  
u n su ita b le  for e stab U sh in g  a  p o s t. In s tru c to rs  from sn ip in g  schools, in c lu d in g  
H esk e th -P rich ard . d id  n o t a lw ays adv ise  th e ir  s tu d e n ts  to  occupy  b u ild in g s  or 
trees. R em oving a  b rick  from  a n y  s t ru c tu re  provided a  q u ick  a n d  e ffo rtle ss  
sn ip in g  p o s t, b u t th e re  w a s  a lw ays th e  d a n g e r  o f it be ing  a lread y  o c cu p ie d  by 
the  e n em y , no t to  m e n tio n  th a t  s u c h  s t r u c tu r e s  w ere freq u e n t ta rg e ts  for 
shelling . H o u ses  w ere  su ita b le  fo r th e  o c c a s io n a l sh o t b u t  c o n s is te n t firing  
from s u c h  a  place a lso  a t tra c te d  tre n c h  m o r ta r  o r artiUery sheU s. T rees , on  
the  o th e r  h a n d , d id  offer s n ip e rs  a  h e ig h te n e d  field of view b u t  m ore o fte n  left 
th em  v u ln e ra b le  to  e n em y  o b se rv e rs  p a r tic u la r ly  u n d e r  c h a n g in g  lig h t a n d  
w ea th e r co n d itio n s . G e rm a n  s n ip e r s  w ere k n o w n  to have  o ccup ied  tr e e s  a n d  
the p h o to  on  the  following page  rev eals  th e  d a n g e rs  of th is  p rac tice .
38 NAC, RG9 III 03 /3867/107/2 , “N otes on Sniping Collected by the 3rd Cavalry Division", p.4.
39 Hesketh-Prichard: Sniping, p.66.
40 NAC, RG9 III C3/4143/8/1 , “Lecture Given", p.3.
41 ibid.. p.3. Also. Hesketh-Prichard: Snip ing, p.95.
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O nce th e  post w as  e s ta b lish e d  a n d  secu red , it w a s  occupied  t y  a  sn ip e r a n d
a n  observer. T h e se  two ty p e s  o f so ld ie r w ere  genera lly  g ro u p e d  to g e th e r
b e c a u se  th ey  te n d e d  to  w ork  in  p a irs  w h e n  in  th e  front o r  re serv e  lin es .
th o u g h  the  la tte r  w a s  m ore freq u en tly  th e  c ase . S n ip ing  an d  observation  w as
th e n  carried  o u t from  th e se  p o s titio n s . th e  s n ip e r  a n d  o b se rv e r - tra in e d  in
each  o ther's  skill a lre ad y  - ex ch an g ed  du ties  a t  re g u la r  in tervals, u sually  every
20 m in u tes . 42 W orking  in p a irs  ca rried  th e  a d v a n ta g e s  o f confidence, m ore
th o ro u g h  o b se rv a tio n  a n d  th e  ab ility  o f o n e  to  h e lp  the  o th e r  if he w as
w ounded . For o th e rs  still, th e re  w ere ad d ed  b en efits :
The g rea t b e n e fit to th e  p a ir , to  m y m in d , is  th a t  it b re a k s  th e  
m onotony o f long  h o u rs  s p e n t aw ay from  o th e r  troops a n d  gives two 
k in d red  s p ir its  th e  c o n s ta n t o p p o rtu n ity  to  ta lk  abou t th e ir  com m on 
in te re s ts  - in  add ition  to  o th e r  topics. 43
In ad d itio n , w o rk in g  in  p a irs  k e p t e y e -s tra in  a t  a  m in im u m . However, 
w o rk in g  a lo n e  w a s  fa v o u re d  b y  so m e  s n ip e r s  s in ce  m o v e m e n t a n d  
concea lm en t, in no  m a n 's  la n d  for exam ple, w as  m ore decep tive  alone th a n  
w ith  tw o. T h is a s p e c t  of s n ip in g  will be d is c u s s e d  in th e  n e x t c h a p te r . 
G enera lly  sp ea k in g , th e  two m a n  sy s te m  w as m o s t com m only  u se d  in th e  
C an ad ian  C orps. At b a tta lio n  level, four p a irs  o f s n ip e r /o b se rv e r  team s w ere 
a ss ig n ed  to th e  b a tta lio n  fron tage , occupy ing  p o s ts  anyw here  from  20 0 -8 0 0  
y a rd s  o f the  fron t lin e . 44 C o m p an y  sn ip e rs  a n d  observers  m a d e  u se  of th e ir  
ow,Ti p o s ts  in th e  fro n t lines, so m e tim es  w ork ing  in  p a irs , so m etim es alone. 
D uring  th e  p re lim in a ry  o b serv a tio n  - th a t  p e rio d  o f tim e w h en  th e  post w as 
first occup ied  - b o th  th e  s n ip e r  a n d  h is  m a te  w ou ld  c h a r t o u t d istinc tive  
fea tu re s  along th e  en em y  front a n d  p lace  th em  o n  a  m ap . 45 F req u en t s tu d y  
of th e  m a p  a n d  c o n s ta n t  s tu d y  o f th e  e n e m y  lin e  e n a b le d  th e  team  to  
m em orize the  p a ra p e t  an d  n o te  a n y  c h an g e s  a n d  a n y  p o te n tia l ta rg e ts . To 
e n su re  c o n s is te n t rep o rtin g , th e  s n ip e r  a n d  o b se rv e r  team  w ere  reg u la rly
42 NAC, RG9 III C3/3867/107/2, “Hints and Tips for Snipers", p.4.
43 McBride: A Rifleman, p .305.
44 NAC, RG9 III C 3/4069/11/6, “Memorandum Relating to the Establishment. Organiztion and Duties 
of Scout Sections, 4th Canadian Infantry Bde., 07/24/1916". p.2.
45 Ian Skennerton: The British Sniper. (London, 1984). p.84.
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p o s te d  in  th e  s a m e  a re a , e ith e r a t  “S ta n d  To" o r  “S ta n d  Down" - d ep en d in g ., 
o f co u rse , on  th e ir  sh ift. 46
N ev erth e less , w h en  w orking  in  p a irs  th e  o b se rv e r s c a n n e d  th e  en em y  
line  w ith  a  p a ir  o f  field  g la sse s  o r  te lesco p e  s e a rc h in g  for ta rg e ts .  A t th e  
s a m e  tim e  th e  s n ip e r ,  w ith  h is  te le sc o p ic -s ig h te d  rifle, fo llow ed th e  sam e  
v iew ing  p a th  a s  h is  c o u n te rp a r t  a n d  fired  u p o n  a  sp ec if ie d  ta rg e t  w h en  
iden tified  t y  th e  o b se rv e r. 47 W hen  th e  o b serv er sp o tte d  a  p o te n tia l ta rg e t he  
gave th e  sn ip e r  a  la n d  / p a ra p e t fe a tu re  (eg. a  b lu e  co lo u red  s a n d b a g  o r piece 
o f c o rru g a te d  iron) to  a im  a t a n d  th e n  a  m e a su re d  d is ta n c e  (eg. th re e  fee t to  
th e  left o r s ix  in c h e s  above). O nce th e  sn ip e r h a d  h is  s ig h t fixed, h e  p u lled  
th e  tr ig g e r if  h e  th o u g h t th e  h it w a s  m o d e ra te ly  p o ss ib le . O f c o u rs e , th e  
e x p o su re  o f a  ta rg e t u su a lly  la s te d  on ly  a  few s e c o n d s . If a  h it w as m ad e , it 
w as  d o c u m e n te d  in  th e  daily  sn ip in g  a n d  o b se rv a tio n  re p o rt. 48 C onfirm ing 
k ills  w as n o t a lw ay s  a n  easy  ta s k  s in ce  th e  s n ip e r  lo s t s ig h t o f th e  fa llen  
so ld ie r b eh in d  th e  p a ra p e t. However, one  sn ip e r  in  th e  B ritish  E x p ed itio n a ry  
Force (BEF). Pte. E.A. C larke of th e  1st and  2 n d  N o rth a n ts  R egim ent, offered 
so m e  so lace for u n c o n firm ed  h its : "“Never be b lu ffed  if a  sn ip e r  sw a n k s  how  
m a n y  he  h a s  killed. We knew  it w as a lm ost im p o ssib le  to  m iss  b u t u n le s s  th e  
enem y  is sh o t in  th e  open  a n d  lies for quite  a  w hile  y ou  w ou ld  n o t be certa in ."  
49 M cB ride, o n  th e  o th e r  h a n d , fig u red  th a t th e  o b se rv e r w a s  th e  la s t  voice 
o n  th e  m a tte r :  t h a t  h e  h a d  a la rg e  te le sco p e  o r  field  g la s s e s  a n d  th u s  a 
m agn ified  view, e n a b le d  h im  to  co n firm  th e  h it. so An in te lligence  su m m a ry  
from  th e  3 rd  D h d sio n . ( J a n u a ry  1 st to  J u n e  3 0 th . 1917). in d ic a te s  th a t  
C a n a d ia n  m a rk s m e n  a cc o u n te d  for 3 0 7  of the  e n e m y  in  o b serv ed  h its , s i it 
s h o u ld  be  n o te d  th a t  th is  su m m a ry  co n ta in ed  a  la rg e  p ro p o rtio n  o f “c la im ed
46 NAC, RG9 III 03 /4069 /11 /6 , “Memorandum p i.
47Hesketh-Prichard. Sniping. p .1 1 4 -ll5 .
48 Ibid., 99.
49 Imperial War Museum (IWM hereafter). Sniper on the Western Front. E.A. Clarke. Sniper, 1st & 2nd 
Northants Regiment, p.7.
50 McBride; A Rifleman, p.310.
51 NAC. RG9 III C3/4146/7/1. “3rd Division Sum maries of Intelligence. 01 /01/1917 to 06/30/1917”
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h its"  th a t  w ere  never a s s ig n e d  a  n u m b e r . T hus, th e  n u m b e r  o f h i ts  exceeds 
th e  to ta l l is te d  above.
A sk illed  sn ip e r c o u ld  easily  g a in  n o to rie ty  b a s e d  on  th e  n u m b e r  of
kills for w h ic h  he  w as c re d ited . N ative C an a d ia n s , w h o  en lis ted  In th e  CEF
volun tarity . w ere  am ong th e  m o s t fea red  sn ip e rs  on  th e  W estern  F ro n t:
M an y  o f th e  In d ia n  so ld ie rs  w e re  h u n te r s  in  civil life a n d  in  
c o n se q u e n ce  w ere ex p e rt m a rk sm e n . As a  r e s u lt  o f th is  ex p erien ce  
th e y  w ere  able to  r e n d e r  ex ce llen t service a s  s n ip e rs  a t th e  fro n t 
a n d  in  th is  b ra n c h  o f  figh ting  th e y  w ere u n ex ce lled . It is  c la im ed  
th a t  th e  In d ian s  d id  m u c h  to w a rd  d em o ra liz in g  th e  en tire  e n em y  
sy s te m  o f sn ip ing . T hey  d isp lay ed  e x tra o rd in a ry  p a tien ce  a n d  self- 
co n tro l w hen  en g ag ed  in  th is  w ork  a n d  would s it  h o u r  a fte r h o u r  a t 
a  v a n ta g e  poin t w a itin g  th e  a p p e a ra n c e  of th e  e n e m y  a t h is  s n ip in g  
p o s t .  T h e  In d ia n  s n ip e r s  r e c o r d e d  th e i r  p ro w e ss  b y  th e  
p ic tu re sq u e  m e th o d  o f  n o tc h in g  th e ir  rifles for ev ery  o b serv ed  h it. 
T h ree  fa m o u s  In d ia n  sn ip e rs  o f th e  8 th  B a tta lio n . M cD onald , a n  
Iro q u o is : Riel, a  g ra n d s o n  o f th e  fam o u s  re b e l, Louis Riel: a n d  
B a U a n ty n e . a  W e s te rn  In d ia n , h a d  40. 3 8 . a n d  58  n o tc h e s  
respective ly , on  th e ir  g u n s . 52
N am es of m a n y  Native C a n a d ia n  sn ip e rs  fill th e  n o m in a l ro les  in th e  C EF: Pte. 
Rod C am ero n . Pte. J o s e p h  D elaro n d e  a n d  Cpl. T h o m a s  G odchere  w ere  all 
excellen t m a rk s m e n  from  th e  5 2 n d  B n.. 53 A nother sn ip e r , killed in  a c tio n  in 
April. 1915 . w a s  Lt. C a m e ro n  B ran t, d e sc e n d a n t of th e  g rea t C h ie f J o s e p h  
B ra n t, from  B ran tfo rd , ON. 54 T hose s n ip e r s  w ith e x c e p tio n a l^  h ig h  sco re s  
in c lu d ed  C pl. J o h n so n  P a u d a s h . w ho w o rk ed  a longside  M cBride in  th e  21 st 
B n., w ith 8 8  k ills an d  L /C p l. H enry  L ouis N orw est (5 0 th  Bn.) w ho ta llied  115 
observ ed  h its . Cpl. F ran c is  P eg ah m ag ab o w . a rg u ab ly  th e  best s n ip e r  in  the  
fie ld , w as  c re d ite d  w ith  3 7 6  k ills  d u r in g  h is  to u r .  55 P eg ah m ag ab o w 's  
sh o o tin g  sk ill a n d  h e ro ism  e a rn e d  him  th e  M ilitary M ed a l and  tw o b a r s  for 
b rav ery  - a n  h o n o u r  s h a re d  b y  only  39  o th e rs  in th e  C E F . 56 in  to ta l ,  m ore
52 CANADA. Department of Indian Affairs, Annual Report - for the year ending March 31, 1919. 
Sessional Paper No.27, (Ottawa, 1920). p.27.
5 3 -------------- “Canadian Indians and World War One", The Tommorrow File, (vol.1, no.3, November
30/1983). p.22.
54 NAC, MG30 E43, “Cameron Brant Testimonial, 08/01/1915” and NAC, Military S ervice Record - 
Cameron D. Brant.
55 CANADA. Dept, of Indian Affairs, p. 15 and NAC. Military Service Record - Francis Pegahmagabow.
56 CANADA. Veterans Affairs. Native Soldiers. Foreign Battlefields. (Ottawa. 19931. p. 10-11
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t h a n  4 0 0 0  N ative C a n a d ia n s  se rv ed  in  th e  C E F  m an y  o f w hom  found  th e ir  
b e s t  ro les a s  sn ip e rs .
m
W hile a  c a re le s s  in d iv id u a l w as th e  m o re  c o m m o n  v ictim  o f a 
c ra c k s h o t ,  th e ir  m o s t im p o r ta n t p rey  w as th e  G erm an  sn ip e r . As a lre a d y  
in d ic a te d . G e rm a n s  w ere  s u p e r io r  sn ip e rs  in  th e  early  y e a r s  of th e  w ar. 
H ow ever, b y  1917 . th e  A llies w ere  q u ick ly  o u t-p e rfo rm in g  th e  e n em y  in  
sh a rp sh o o ttn g , a n d  su b d u in g  th e  G erm an  sn ip e r w as the c ritica l factor in  th is  
tu rn -a ro u n d . However, d e ac tiv a tin g  th e  en em y  s n ip e r  req u ired  locating  h im  
a n d  th is  w as  d o n e  by  a t t r a c t in g  h is  fire. T he th ree  m e th o d s  by w h ic h  
C a n a d ia n s  lo ca ted  en em y  s n ip e r s  w ere: from  th e  d irec tion  o f the  e n e m y 's  
sh o t, inviting fire u p o n  a  loophole p la te , an d  u s in g  "dum m y h eads" .
At firs t, c ra c k s h o ts  re s o r te d  to  following th e  line o f th e  bu lle t from  
w h ere  it o rig inated . G erm an  sn ip e rs  w ould so m etim es shoot a t a n  active a re a  
o f  a  t r e n c h  o r  p e rh a p s  a t  a n  o b jec t to  te s t  th e  a c c u ra c y  o f  th e ir  s ig h ts . 
H e s k e th - P r ic h a r d  n o tic e d  a  n u m b e r  o f  b u lle th o le s  in  a  tre e  s tu m p , 
im m ed ia te ly  in d ica tin g  th e  d irec tio n  of fire. Follow ing th a t p a th , he fo u n d  a  
s e t  o f b u s h e s  th a t  w ere  im m e d ia te ly  m a rk e d  fo r o b se rv a tio n . W h en  
m o v em en t o c c u rre d  in  th e  b u s h , fo u r sn ip e rs  o p e n ed  fire a n d  silenced  th e  
e n e m y  sn ip e r 's  activ ity . 5? Low or w eak  p o in ts  in  th e  tre n c h lin e  w ere a lso  
c o m m o n  a re a s  u s e d  for ta rg e t  p ra c tic e . U n fo rtu n a te ly  for th e  G e rm a n , 
ev id en ce  s u c h  a s  th is  gave th e m  aw ay. S p o ttin g  th e  line o f fire, u su a lly  w ith  
th e  he lp  o f a  periscope, sn ip e rs  in  th e  C EF u su a lly  travelled b a ck  to a  re se rv e  
lin e  o r co m m u n ic a tio n  tre n c h  to  d eac tiv a te  th e  enem y. 58 A n o th e r w ay  o f 
fin d in g  th e  p a th w ay  of a  b u lle t w as to hold  u p  a n  object, a  tu rn ip  or p a in te d  
b is c u i t  t in  for ex am p le , in v ite  th e  sh o t, a n d  see  th e  angle from  w hich  th e  
b u lle t  p a s s e d  th ro u g h . 59 T h o u g h  th is  m e th o d  w orked in itia lly . G e rm a n
57 Hesketh-Prichard: Sniping, p .52-53. To ob serve the direction of the bullet’s  path. H esketh- 
Prichard wore a  sandbag over his head and slowly peeked over the parapet.
58 NAC, RG9 III 03/4143/8/1 , “Lecture Given", p.5-6. In the event that an angle of view w as altered, 
snipers were encouraged, if the opportunity lent itself, to ricochet bullets off of concrete walls.
59 NAC, RG9 III C 3/4143/8/1, “Additional Notes by an Officer of the 1st Canadian Division".
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s n ip e r s  soon  le a rn e d  to  avoid  s u c h  p e tty  ta rg e ts .  The “tex tb o o k "  m eth o d  
req u ired  exposing  a  ta rge t a t tw o flank ing  p o in ts  a n d  p inpo in ting  th e  sn iper a t 
th e  a p e x  of th e  "triang le" . H ow ever, like  m a n y  o rd e rs  i s s u e d  from  H igh 
C o m m an d , th is  s ty le  did n o t a lw ays w ork, p a r tic u la r ly  w h e n  th e  opposing  
tre n c h lin e s  w ere relatively  c lose  to  e a c h  o th e r. For. "w hen It co m es to close 
ra n g e  sniping, th e  sn ip e r Is prettv* a p t to be v ery  re s tr ic ted  a s  to  th e  arc  o f 
fire' over w hich h e  c a n  deliver h is  sh o ts ."  so
Since live ta rg e ts  w ere th e  p re fe rred  p re y  o f the  G erm an  m a rk sm an . 
C a n a d ia n  and  B ritish  sn ipers  b eg an  to  invite b u lle ts  by exposing th e  loopholes 
in  th e ir  sn iper p o s ts . As a lread y  Ind ica ted , so m e G erm an  m a rk sm e n  bounced  
b u lle ts  off a  p la te  p u rp o se ly , to  m a k e  th e  o c c u p a n t  aw are  o f  h is  exposed  
location . E ventually , the  Allies saw  th is  ac t a s  tool for Identifying th e  vicinity 
o f th e  enem y sn ip e r . S ince th e re  w ere a  n u m b e r  o f loophole p la te s  In the  line 
a t o n e  tim e, a  te a m  of s n ip e rs  o c cu p ied  f la n k in g  p o s itio n s  w hile  a  single 
c ra c k s h o t or o b se rv e r  w ould o p en  a  loophole to  en tice  a  b u lle t. S om etim es 
th e  la tte r  w ould ev en  let off a  n u m b e r  of sh o ts  to  a ttra c t som e a tte n tio n , si 
D oing  th is  on a  few  o ccasions p rov ided  th e  flan k in g  sn ip ers  e n o u g h  tim e to  
sp o t, aim  an d  sh o o t th e  enem y. As a n  a lte rn a tiv e  to  sn ip ing  from  th e  flank, 
so m e  m a rk sm e n  u s e d  “sn ip e r  h id es"  to  deU ver th e  fa ta l s h o t. The h ide  
c o n s is te d  of a  cam ouflaged  d u g o u t p laced  beyond  th e  p a rap e t a n d  beh ind  the  
b a rb e d  wire. W hile It w as u se fu l for su b d u in g  en em y  patro ls . It w as  Ideal for 
lo ca tin g  and  dow ning  a  G erm an  sn ip er. S2 O nce  th e  decoy w as  se t and  the  
e n e m y 's  sh o ts  fired , th e  sn ip e r  in  th e  h id e  lo c a te d  h is  m an  a n d  e lim in a ted  
him .
P erh ap s th e  m o s t effective te ch n iq u e  o f identify ing th e  lo ca tio n  of a n  
e n e m y  s h a r p s h o o te r  w as th ro u g h  th e  u s e  o f "dum m y h e a d s" . A no ther 
p ro d u c t of Special W orks Park, th e se  w ere p a p e r  m ach e  globes fa sh io n ed  Into 
th e  s h a p e  of th e  average  so ld ier's  h ead . The Idea  cam e from th e a tr ic a l p rops
60 McBride; A Rifleman, p .325.
61 Hesketh-Prichard: Sniping, p.44-45.
62 NAC, MG30 E2A/.1, N.A.D. Armstrong Papers, “Chapter XV - Sniper Posts...”, p. 14.
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in  L ondon  b u t by  1916 th e y  w ere s te a d ily  beco m in g  a  p a r t  of tre n c h  life in 
F ran ce  a n d  B elgium . 53 p la ce d  on a s t ic k  a n d  fram e b u ilt into th e  tre n c h  
wall, th e  h e a d s  w ere slowly ra ised  over th e  p a ra p e t. in \n tin g  a  sn ip er’s  b u lle t. 
If th e  d e s ired  re s u lt  w as o b ta in e d  an d  a  c le a n  h it m ad e , th e  o pera to r le t the  
h e ad  fall b ack  - to  im itate  th a t  o f a fallen so ld ie r. M om en ts  after, the  o p e ra to r 
p laced  a p e risco p e  e ith e r b e h in d  the h e a d  a n d  over th e  p a ra p e t, or p laced  it 
In fron t o f th e  h e ad  below  th e  p a ra p e t a n d  aligned  It w ith  the  bu lle t ho les . 
See the  d iag ram s below.
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TO FIND A GERMAN SNIPER
S o iirr -  \A C  RG9 U! 3 8 6 7  107 2 "H ints a n d  Tips For 5ntp<*rs"
A ligning th e  b u lle t holes In d ica ted  the  line  o f fire a n d . If a t  an  ap p ro x im a te  
d is ta n c e  o f 2 5 0  y a rd s  o r le ss . It a cc u ra te ly  lo cated  th e  en em y . 64 iM ien  the  
hostile  sn ip e r  did not engage th e  ra ised  h e a d , o p e ra to rs  re so rte d  to “w alk ing  
th e  dum m y" a lo n g  the  tren ch lin e . im ita ting  th a t  of a  so ld ie r o n  his ro u n d s . To
63 NAC. RG9 III C 3/4069 /11/6. "Second Army to Canadian Corps. 2nd Division and 4th inf. Bde 
05/18/1916'. Also. Hesketfi-Prictiard. Sniping, p . 10-11
64 NAC. MG30 E2/V.1. N.A.D Armstrong Papers. Chapter XIX - M iscellaneous . p 5 Also. NAC 
RG9 III C 3/3867/107/2. Hints and Tips . p 4-5 When necessary, a  seco n d  shot was encouraged  
this usually resulted in locating the sniper S ee  NAC. RG 9/4135/22/4, "6th Inf Bde to 27th 28th 
31st Bn s  05/30/1916"
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fu r th e r  e n h a n c e  th e  effect, so m e  soldiers re so rte d  to  p la c in g  a  c ig a re tte  in  the 
m o u th  o f  th e  p rop , sm o k in g  It th rough  a  tu b e  a t ta c h e d  from  inside  th e  head . 
U sed p r im a rily  to  p in p o in t G erm an  m a rk sm e n , d u m m y  h e a d s  c o u ld  a lso  be 
u sed  fo r  fooling th e  en em y  in to  th in k in g  th e re  w ere  tro o p  m o v em en ts  In the 
a rea . U sin g  S ikh  or G h u rk a  dum m y h e a d s  a lo n g  th e  p a ra p e t In d ic a ted  new  
troops in  th e  line  a n d  th u s  d is to rted  G erm an  In te lligence  sy stem s. 65
A n o th e r  p o p u la r  ta rg e t  for sn ip e rs  a n d  o b s e rv e r s  w as periscopjes. 
Once b o th  w arrin g  p a rtie s  realized  th a t  po p p in g  th e ir  h e a d s  over th e  p a rap e t 
w as a n  in v ita tio n  for a  s n ip e r 's  bu lle t, e a c h  s id e  b e g a n  u s in g  a  v a rie ty  of 
p e risco p es  to  a n  incred ib le  degree. 66 D esp ite  th is  b e in g  a  m ore c lever an d  
safer w a y  o f p eerin g  over th e  p a rap e t, th e y  still a t t r a c te d  a  sn ip er’s  a tten tio n . 
While It w a s  th e  Initial goal o f  B attalion Intelligence to  o b serve  the  en em y  lines 
tho ro u g h ly . It w as equally  Im p o rtan t to k eep  th e  e n e m y  from  o b serv in g  them . 
67 M an y  s n ip in g  re p o r ts  In c lu d ed  th e  n u m b e r  o f  p e r isc o p e s  s m a s h e d  by 
sn ip e rs . S om e C a n a d ia n  c ra c k sh o ts  so u g h t a  “d o u b le  h it"  w hen  sp o tt in g  a 
p e risco p e : by  low ering  th e  b a rre l six  in c h e s  from  th e  p e risco p e  th e  bu lle t 
often p e n e tr a te d  th e  s a n d b a g  a n d  h it the  u se r . 68 A n o th e r p o p u la r ta rg e t for 
sn ip ers , p a r tic u la r ly  a t n ig h t, w as G erm an  w ork ing  p a r t ie s  who a tte m p te d  to 
re c o n s tru c t b low n o u t t re n c h e s , build n ew  pillboxes, o r  d ig  new  tre n c h lin e s . 
T hat th e s e  Ind iv iduals  w ere o ften  exposed  In th e  o p e n  w h e n  doing  th e ir  work 
m ade th e m  w o rth y  c a n d id a te s  for a  s n ip e r’s b u lle t. 69 This p ra c tic e  w as 
often d em o ra liz in g  for th e  w o rk ers  while k eep in g  th e ir  ac tiv ity  a t a  m in im um . 
Lastly, th e  m o v em en t o f n e w  enem y tro o p s  In to  th e  line p ro v id ed  am ple  
o p p o rtu n ity  for th e  sn ip e r  to  Increase  h is  sco re . As o n e  sn ip e r in  th e  4 2 n d  
Bn. n o te d , "we got two o f th e m  th is w eek a n d  th e y ’ll b e  carefu l, b u t  a  fresh  
b a tta lio n  will so o n  relieve th e m  an d  one u n it n ev e r s e e m s  to  w a rn  th e  o th e r
65 Hesketh-Prichard: Sniping, p. 10-11.
66 NAC. RG 9 III 03 /4039/11/4 . T y p e s  of Periscope O bserved in U se  by the Enemy”. Periscopes 
were built into leaning duckboards. old buckets or placed on sticks and raised over the parapet.
67 NAC. RG9 III C 3/4069/11/6. T ren ch  Orders", p.3.
68 Col. J.A. Currie: The Red Watch. ((Toronto. 1916). p. 149.
69 NAC. RG9 III C 3/4135/22/4. “6th Inf. Bde. to 27th. 28th. 29th. 3 1 st Bn. s. 06 /06/1916”.
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about danger spots." 70
IV
S in ce  observation  w as su ch  a n  In teg ra l p a r t o f sn ip ing , the  s n ip e r  w as 
ab le to  c o n tr ib u te  a  w ealth , o f In fo rm a tio n  to  th e  In te lligence  U nit o f  th e ir  
b a tta lio n . The In telligence system  In th e  C a n a d a  C orps w as ra th e r  in tr ic a te  
an d  effective in  o b ta in in g  In fo rm atio n  a b o u t th e  en em y  a n d  th e ir  d e fe n ce s . 
In telligence m ateria l u s u a lly  cam e in  th e  form  o f o b serv a tio n , e ith e r from  the  
g ro u n d  o r th e  air. b u t m u c h  could  a lso  be le a rn e d  from  p a tro ls , r a id s  a n d  
rec o n n a issan c e  or from  c a p tu re d  so ld ie rs  a n d  d o c u m en ts . Like th e  ro o ts  o f a 
tree , th e  m a jo rity  o f In fo rm a tio n  s te m m e d  from  c o m p a n y  level in  e a c h  
batta lion . F rom  B attalion  H e ad q u a rte rs  th e  m a te ria l w ould be filtered th ro u g h  
B rigade H e a d q u a r te rs , th e n  to D iv ision  H e a d q u a r te rs  a n d  la s tly  to  th e  
C an ad ian  C o rp s  H e a d q u a rte rs . 7i in  ad d itio n , so u rc e s  o f In fo rm ation  cam e  
from th e  R oyal Air F orce  a n d  Its B alloon S ec tio n  a s  well a s  field a n d  h e a \y  
artillery. T he ch a rt on  th e  following p ag e  su m m arizes  th is  p rocess.
At B rigade level th e  Intelligence sec tio n  w as h e ad e d  by a  S ta ff C a p ta in  
of In telligence. Among h is  d u tie s  w ere tra in in g , a d m in is tra tio n  an d  d isc ip lin e  
o f th e  B rig a d e  In te llig en ce  S ec tio n , o b ta in in g , c o lla tin g  an d  fo rw a rd in g  
In fo rm a tio n , a n d  th e  s u p p ly  an d  is s u e  o f m a p s  a n d  a e ro p la n e  p h o to s . 
C o nducting  re c o n n a issan c e  m issions, tra in in g  w hen  In re s t, an d  c o n s tru c tio n  
of o b se rv a tio n  an d  s n ip in g  p o s ts  w ere  a lso  h is  re sp o n sib ility . W o rk in g  for 
him  w ere 12 elite o b se rv e rs , an  a e ro p la n e  p h o to  ex p ert, tw o d ra u g h ts m e n  
an d  a  c le rk . 72 This s e c tio n  of In te lligence s ta f f  oversaw  th e  su rv e illan ce  of 
the  en tire  b rigade  fron tage , conso lida ting  m a te ria l from  b a tta lio n  level.
T he m o st critica l so u rc e  of In te lligence cam e from  th e  front Une u n i ts  
w hich eng ag ed  enem y activ ity , th u s . B a tta lio n  Intelligence w as  m ost th o ro u g h . 
73 At B a tta lio n  H e a d q u a r te rs  the  In te lligence  O fficer o v e rsaw  all m a t te r s  o f
70 Will n. Bird: G hosts Have Warm Hands. (Toronto. 1968). p.29.
71 NAC. MG30 E2/V.1. N.A.D. Armstrong Papers. “Chapter 2  - Front Line Intelligence”, p. 1-3.
72 Major J.E. Hahn; The Intelligence Service Within the Canadian Corps. 1914-1918. (Toronto. 
1930). p.86.
73 NAC. MG30 E2A/.1; ibid.. p.2.
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su rv e illan ce  a n d  observation . U n d e r h is  ju r is d ic t io n  w as a  s c o u tin g  w ing o f 
11 m en . o b se rv a tio n  an d  sn ip in g  w ings c o n s is t in g  o f e ig h t m e n  e a c h  a n d  a  
d ra u g h ts m a n  w ith  aerop lane  p h o to  ex p erien ce . The to ta l s ta f f  o f  2 8  can  be  
su m m e d  u p  a s  follows:
1 Scout Officer 
1 Scout Sergeant 
1 Scout Corpoial 
8 Scouts
B atta lio n  H e ad q u a rte rs  
B atta lion  Intelligence Officer
8 Observers
 1-------
8 Snipers 1 D raughtsm an 
(trained as aero­
plane photo expert)
S o u rc e  NAC. M G 30 E2 v 1. N.A.D. A rm strong P ap ers . 'C h a p te r  H - F ro n t Line Intelligence" p .2
W h en  a rriv in g  a t  a  new  sec to r  In th e  line, a n  In te lligence  S e c tio n  received 
m o s t o f Its o rd e rs  from  the B a tta lio n  C o m m a n d e r . O nce th e s e  o rd e rs  w ere 
delivered , th e  In telligence O fficer d e ta iled  h is  m e n  w ho th e n  co m m en ced  s e t ­
u p  a n d  e x e c u tio n  o f g ro u n d  lev e l o b s e r v a t io n .  At th e  s a m e  tim e h e  
e s ta b l is h e d  c o n ta c t  w ith  th e  a rtlU e iy  fo r  a n y  p o s s ib le  s h e l l in g  n e e d s . 
C o m p le te  o b s e rv a tio n  of th e  e n e m y  lin e  w a s  th u s  th e  o b je c tiv e  of th e  
In te lligence  O fficer a n d  his staff. The S c o u t  S ec tio n  w as re sp o n s ib le  for 
n ig h tly  p a tro ls , o ften  ap p ro ach in g  w ith in  10-20  y a rd s  of th e  e n e m y 's  p a ra p e t. 
A rm ed w ith  g re n a d e s  and  a revolver, sc o u ts  s tu d ie d  th e  g ro u n d  co n d itio n s  In 
n o  m a n 's  la n d  a n d  la te r  s k e tc h e d  th e m  o n  p a p e r  from  m e m o ry . 75 T hey  
g a th e re d  in fo rm atio n  ab o u t en em y  w ire, l is te n e d  in  on  e n em y  c o n v e rsa tio n s  
a n d  to  c a p tu re  a  s e n try  or tw o w a s  n ev er o u t  o f th e  q u e s tio n . T h e ir  h a n d ­
w ritten  a n d  d raw n  inform ation  w a s  th e n  Is su e d  to  th e  In te lligence  Officer for 
c o n s o lid a t io n  w ith  o th e r  fo rm s  o f in te ll ig e n c e . B a t ta h o n  s n ip e r s  a n d  
o b se rv e rs , o n  th e  o th e r  h a n d , p e rfo rm e d  th e i r  w o rk  b o th  n ig h t  a n d  d ay
74 Hahn; Intelligence, p .71.
75 NAG. RG9 III C 3 /4069 /11/6. “Report on the O rganization and Duties of th e Scout Section  
Employed by the 20th Canadian Infantry Battalion. 05/23/1916". p.3.
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th o u g h  th e  la tte r  w as m o re  often th e  c a se . F rom  th e ir  daily  o b se rv a tio n  a n d  
s h a rp sh o o tin g . s n ip e rs  a n d  o b se rv e rs  a lso  d o c u m e n te d  th e ir  fin d in g s  a n d  
a d d e d  th e m  to  th e  in te llig en ce  s u m m a ry . The d ra u g h ts m a n , m ean w h ile , 
p re p a red  a  la rg e-sca le  tre n c h  m ap  th a t  lis te d  th e  in fo rm atio n  o b ta in ed  from  
th e  In telligence Unit.
T he  in telligence su m m ary  w as com piled  from  a  se ries  o f sm a ll re p o rts  
a n d  in d ic a te d  a  v a rie ty  o f  fac to rs a lo n g  th e  b a tta lio n  fron tage . Inc luded  in  
th e se  re p o r ts  were a rtille ry  activity, t re n c h  m o rta r  activ ity , m ach ine  -g u n s a n d  
sn ip ing , p a tro ls , m o v em en ts  and  th e  n a tu r e  o f enem y defences. 76 T his w as 
u p d a te d  o n  a  daily b a s is  a n d  sen t, w ith  th e  in telligence su m m ary , to  B atta lion  
H e ad q u a rte rs  for fu r th e r  scru tiny .
O n c e  B a t ta l io n  H e a d q u a r te r s  h a d  s u rv e y e d  th e  s u m m a ry  a n d  
e x tra c te d  th e  n e c e ssa ry  d e ta ils  to  fu r th e r  a s s is t  th e m  in  th e  line it w as  s e n t 
o n  to  B rig a d e  H e a d q u a r te rs . T h e re  it w a s  c o n so lid a te d  w ith  th e  o th e r  
b a tta lio n  in te lligence su m m a rie s  a n d  co m piled  in to  o n e  d iv isional su m m ary . 
C o m m a n d in g  a n d  In te llig e n c e  O ffice rs  a t  D h d sio n  H e a d q u a r te rs ,  a f te r  
rev iew ing  it th e m se lv e s , finally  s e n t  th e  d o c u m e n ts  to  C a n a d ia n  C o rp s  
H e a d q u a r te rs  w here a  la rg e r  sy n o p sis  w a s  developed . A dded to  th e se  files 
w ere th e  la rg e r  in te lligence su m m a rie s  from  th e  RAF a n d  artillery  u n its  a s  a  
whole.
S in ce  th e  s n ip e r  a n d  his p a r tn e r  s p e n t h o u rs  a t  a  tim e s tu d y in g  th e  
enem y line , th e ir  know ledge of the  fro n t ex ceeded  th a t  o f any  o th e r so ld ier. 
In  th e  ea r ly  y e a rs  of th e  w ar. sn ip in g  w a s  n o t a  p a r t  o f  th e  In telligence U nit 
sim ply b e c a u s e  it d id  n o t yet exist. E a rly  in te lligence re p o rts  from  1914 a n d  
1915 give n o  in d ic a t io n  o f s n ip in g  a c tiv ity , n o r  d o  th e y  in c lu d e  a n y  
in fo rm a tio n  th a t  m ay  h a v e  been  g a in e d  from  sn ip e rs . 7? B efore sn ip in g  
b ecam e  a  re g u la r  p a r t  o f  th e  m ilita ry  m a c h in e , s n ip e r s ’ o b se rv a tio n s  w ere
76 Hahn; Intelligence, p. 127-156.
77 NAC. RG9 III D3/4912AA/ar Diary - 1st Battalion. “1st Battalion Narrative of Operations. 26-27 April. 
1915 to 1st Cdn. Inf. Bde.. 0 4 /2 8 /1 9 1 5". A perusal of any of the earlier war diaries, after action 
reports and summaries will show that there w as little or no documented information from sniping
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ra re ly  c o n s id e re d  Im p o r ta n t .  P a r t o f th e  r e a s o n  for th is  w a s  a  la c k  o f
u n d e rs ta n d in g  from  h ig h er a u th o ritie s , accord ing  to  H erbert M cBride:
M any a  tim e  I h a v e  tu r n e d  in  a  re p o r t to  m y ow n S e c tio n  o r  
B atta lio n  officers - o n e  re g a rd in g  w hich th e y  fully recogn ized  th e  
a c c u ra c y  a n d  g re a t v a lu e . B u t w h en  fo rw a rd e d  to  th e  re a r  for 
c o n s id e ra t io n  o r a c t io n  by  h ig h e r c o m m a n d , th e  r e p o r t  w as 
poohooed a s  be ing  m ere ly  “som e soldier’s  im ag ina tion ’’. 78
W hen It w as finally  rea lized  th a t  th e  no tes  k e p t b y  a n  o b se rv e r a n d  s n ip e r  
w ere  in v a lu a b le , sn ip in g  te a m s  b e g an  to  c o n tr ib u te  s ig n ific a n tly  to  th e  
In telligence S ec tio n  an d . b y  la t e - 1916. B atta lion  sn ip e rs  took  th e ir  p lace in  
th e  In te lligence  h ie ra rc h y . G ra d u a lly , re fe re n c e s  to  sn ip in g  ac tiv ity  a n d  
observ^atlon o f enem y  line filte red  th e ir  way into Intelligence su m m arie s : first. 
J u s t  g e n e ra l n o ta t io n s  (eg ."en em y  sn ip in g  a c tiv ity  q u ie t, o u r s  active"). 
E ven tually  sn ip in g  re p o rts  Listed th e  activities o f  th e  enem y, reco rd ed  p a tro l 
m ovem ents a n d  c ited  n u m b e rs  o f kills by Individual sn ip ers . 79
W hile th e  sn ip e r  c o n tin u a lly  w atched  for h is  enem y c o u n te rp a r t ,  h e  
lea rn ed  all th e  d e ta ils  o f th e  en em y  line an d  w as ab le  to  spo t a n y  a lte ra tio n  in  
san d b ag s , loopholes, sap s . e tc . C h an g es  in h o u ses , tre e s  or a n y  o th e r  s im ila r 
s tru c tu re s  w ith in  1200 y a rd s  w ere a lso  no ted . A ny activity, n o  m a tte r  ho w  
m in iscu le  w as d ea lt w ith. At c lose  ran g es, sn ip e rs  typically  h a n d le d  m a tte rs  
th em selves; a t m o re  d is ta n t  location , they  o ften  ca lled  u p o n  th e  a rtille ry  to  
fin ish  the Job. T ake for In s ta n c e  th is  exam ple fo r H e sk e th -P ric h a rd  in  th e  
Som m e region  in  1916. A fter c o n s ta n tly  observ ing  a  ru in ed  s t ru c tu re  to  th e  
re a r  o f th e  e n em y  line, a n  officer n o ticed  a  s e t  o f five b ric k s  o n  a  b ro k e n  
beam .
N atu ra l en o u g h  - b u t n o t q u ite  so  n a tu ra l w h e n  the  nex t d a y  th e  five 
b ricks h a d  ch an g ed  th e ir  p o sitio n . On th e  f ir s t  day  fo u r h a d  been  
lying a lo n g  th e  b eam  a t  fu ll len g th  an d  on e  w a s  se t u p o n  Its end.
O n th e  sec o n d  d ay  a  se c o n d  h a d  ad o p ted  th e  erec t p o s itio n . Late 
in th e  a fte rn o o n ...th e  officer w ho h ad  o b se rv ed ...th e  five b ric k s  saw  
th ro u g h  h is  3 0 -pow er te le sco p e  a  G erm an  h a n d  m oving th e  b ricks 
and  th e  ligh t glint o f a  p a ir  o f G erm an  fie ld -g lasses levelled am ongst 
th em . T he  sec o n d  s h e ll  from  o u r g u n n e rs  rem oved  fo rev er th a t
78 McBride; A Rifleman, p .317.
79 NAC. RG9 III 03/4104/15/1  ."Intelligence Summaries (various), 4th Inf. Bde. to 2nd Division, late- 
1915-Jan. 1916".
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p o s t a t  B eau m o n t Ha m el, so
The b reak in g  u p  o f th e  G e rm an  o b serv a tio n  post th u s  h a d  a  cu m u la tiv e  effect 
of keeping  Allied activ ities secre tive . O ne o f  th e  m ore  im p o r ta n t co n trib u tio n s  
to in te llig e n c e  m a d e  by  s n ip e r s  w a s  lo c a tin g  a n d  d o c u m e n t in g  e n em y  
m ach in e-g u n  p o s ts . W hile sn ip e rs  a n d  p a tro ls  o ften  fo u g h t for co n tro l of no  
m an 's  la n d , it w as  th e  m a c h in e -g u n  th a t  d o m in a te d  it. A G e rm a n  pillbox, 
besides m e n ac in g  th e  tre n c h e s , rem a in ed  o n e  the  th e  b igge s t  o b s tac le s  in th e  
offensive - in  fact, th e  m ach in e-g u n  c o n trib u te d  su b s ta n tiv e ly  to  the  en o rm o u s  
c a su a lty  r a te s  from  th e  G re a t W ar. N ev erth e le ss , a  s n ip e r  w ho  lo c a te d  a  
G erm an  m a c h in e -g u n  e m p la c e m e n t h a d  It d o c u m e n te d  a n d  e v e n u ta lly  
e lim inated , if n o t by  h im se lf th e n  by a n  a rtille ry  sh e ll. A G erm an  m a p  of 80  
m a ch in e -g u n  p o s ts  w as fo u n d  on  a  b o d y  In no m a n 's  la n d  In 1916 a n d  o f 
those 80. 42  h a d  a lread y  b e en  identified  a n d  dealt w ith  t y  sn ip e rs  in  th e  line. 
81
F or sn ip e rs , c o n s ta n t  o b se rv a tio n  o f  enem y lin e s  b ro u g h t th e  a d d ed
value of m o n ito r in g  tro o p  m o v em en ts  in  a n d  o u t o f th e  fo rw ard  lin e s . All
enem y m ov em en t w as followed a n d  co m m o n  in m an y  in te llig en ce  su m m a rie s
were d e sc rip tio n s  like th is :
Iden tifica tio n . T h ree  m e n  seen , tw o o f w hom  w ere  w earin g  ro u n d  
grey  c a p s  w ith  b lu e  b a n d s , th e  o th e r  h a d  th e  a p p e a ra n c e  o f  an  
officer, h e  w ore a  h eav y  sq u a re  c u t  b lu e  tu n ic  a n d  ro u n d  p e a k e d  
c ap  o f th e  sty le  w orn  by  the  F ren ch . It w as o f b r ig h t b lack  m a te ria l 
w ith  gold trim m ings. 82
By c o n s is te n tly  observ ing  th e  c h a ra c te r is t ic s  of th e  e n e m y , th e  s n ip e r  - a n d  
th u s , h ig h e r co m m an d  - k n e w  w hen  fre sh  tro o p s w ere  b ro u g h t in to  th e  line, 
e ith e r for re lie f  o r  fo r a  b u ild  u p  in  th e  ev en t o f a  c o m in g  o ffensive . As 
G erm an  tro o p s  ro ta te d  In  a n d  o u t o f  th e  line , s n ip e r s ,  o b s e rv e rs  a n d  
intelligence b eg an  to  Identify  c e r ta in  In fan try  u n its  by  th e  co lo u rs  w o rn  by th e  
m en . C ap  b a d g es , for in s ta n c e , typ ica lly  id en tified  th e  u n it;  th u s ,  “a  H un
60 Hesketh-Prichard; Sniping, p. 121 -122.
81 Ibid., p. 119.
82 NAC. RG9 III C3/4104/15/2, “Summary of Intelligence - 4th Brigade. 02/03/1916"
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w e a rin g  a P ru s s ia n  co ck ad e  o r . . .a  h e lm et w ith  No. 119 on  th e  cover...w ere  
[m a tte rs ] of im p o rtan ce  a n d  so o n  sn ip e r-o b se rv e rs ...re a liz e d  th e  value o f th e  
a ll-im p o rtan t gam e o f id en tifica tio n ."  83 F u r th e r , e a c h  cap  b a d g e  u su a lly  h a d  
a  c o lo u r  on  it (eg. b lu e  a n d  w h ite  for B a v a r ia n s ,  b la c k  a n d  w hite  for 
P ru ss ia n s)  th a t  h e lp ed  in  th e  id en tifica tio n  p ro c e s s . B u t. a s  H esk e th -P rich a rd  
n o te d , th e se  fine  c o lo u red  l in e s  o n  a  c a p  b a d g e  w ere in d is tin g u ish a b le  a t  
m ore  th a n  150 y a rd s . 84
Since a r tille ry  s h e ll in g  w a s  alw ays a  h a z a rd  on  th e  W es te rn  F ro n t, 
s n ip e r s  were p u t  to  w ork s u rv e y in g  artillery'’ a c tiv ity . A sh e ll in g  of en em y  
lin es  w as  w a tch ed  th o ro u g h ly , b o th  for r e s u l ts  a n d  fo r a n  in d ic a tio n  of tro o p  
w ithdraw al. 85 in  th e  ev en t o f  a n  enem y sh e llin g , sn ip e rs  p e rfo rm ed  a  duty- 
k n o w n  a s  “b lind ing". Im m e d ia te ly  a fte r a n  e n e m y  b o m b a rd m e n t. G e rm a n  
o b se rv e rs  w ere ac tiv e  w ith  th e i r  p e risco p es , su rv e y in g  th e  d a m a g e . It w a s  
th e  sn ip e r’s re sp o n sib ility  to  d e s tro y  the  p e ris c o p e s  a n d  th e ir  o p e ra to rs  if th e  
o p p o rtu n ity  p re s e n te d  Itself. T h is  “blinding" o f  e n em y  o b serv a tio n  m inim ized 
th e  en em y  from  see in g  th e  e x te n t  o f the  d a m a g e  a n d  often  fo rced  G erm an  
o b se rv e rs  to ta k e  m ore r isk s  a n d  expose th e m se lv e s  for a  c le a re r  view.
T hus, th e  s n ip e r 's  c o m m itm e n t to  B a t ta l io n  In te llig en ce  w-as very-
c ru c ia l to o p e ra tio n s  in t r e n c h  w arfa re . T h ro u g h  th e ir  fro n t a n d  re a r  line
activ-lty-. they w ere ab le  to re n d e r  invaluab le  in fo rm a tio n  ab o u t th e  enem y.
As the  w a r w en t on  th e  s n ip e r s  p ro v id ed  a  m a s s  of d e ta il, m u ch  of 
w h ich  w a s  c o n firm e d  by- ra id s  a n d  id e n tif ic a t io n s  ta k e n  from  
p riso n e rs  o r from  th e  d e a d , a n d  very  little  co u ld  h a p p e n  n e a r  th e  
enem y 's fro n t lines w ith o u t o u r  In te lligence  b e in g  a t o n ce  aw are of 
it. 86
In su m . th e  ro le o f th e  s n ip e r  in  t r e n c h  w a rfa re  to o k  o n  ex p an d ed  
p ro p o r tio n s  a f te r  tra in in g  h a d  p ro v id ed  h im  w ith  th e  n e c e s s a ry  too ls to
83 Hesketh-Prichard; Sniping, p. 115.
84 Ibid.. p. 101.
85 NAC. RG9 ill 03/4069/11/6 . ‘Memorandum Relating to th e  Establishment. Organization and Duties 
of Scout Sections. 4th Canadian Infantry Bde.". p.1.
86 Hesketh-Prichard; Sniping, p .116.
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s u r p a s s  th e  e n e m y  in  s h a r p s h o o t in g .  In  t h e  t r e n c h  d e a d lo c k  th a t  
c h a rac te riz ed  th e  G re a t W ar b e tw ee n  1915 an d  1918 . sn ip in g  em erg ed  on a 
c o n s is te n t  level th a t  w a s  m a tc h e d  o n ly  by p a t r o ls  a n d  ra n d o m  a rtille ry  
shelling . Yet. sn ip in g  w a s  m u c h  m o re  th a n  h av in g  good rifle sk ills  : to  quote 
H erbert M cBride, “it is  a  com m on b u t  e rro n eo u s b e lie f th a t  the  on ly  n e ce ssa ry  
qualific a tio n  for a  s n ip e r  is to be a b le  to  shoo t a cc u ra te ly . As a  m a tte r  of fact 
th a t is  on ly  h a lf  o f it - p e rh a p s  le s s  th a n  half." 87 Indeed , sn ip in g  req u ired  
follow ing a  n u m b e r  o f  p ro c e d u re s  to  b e  effective. S e lec tin g  th e  p ro p e r 
e q u ip m en t w as th e  f ir s t  e s s e n tia l s te p  s in ce  the  q u a lity  of the  f ire a rm  could  
m ake  a  d iffe ren ce  in  a  s n ip e r 's  e ffe c tiv en e ss . P ro p e r  c o n s tr u c t io n  a n d  
location  o f sn ip e r  a n d  o b se rv a tio n  p o s ts  w as the  n e x t critica l m e a s u re  for it 
w as h e re  th a t  th e  s n ip e r  d id  h is  w ork . The ability  to  locate  a n d  s u b d u e  the  
G erm an  sn ip e r  e n a b le d  th e  C a n a d ia n  m a rk sm a n  to  s u rp a s s  th e  en em y  in  
sn ip ing . Finally, th ro u g h  s tead y  a n d  effective o b se rv a tio n  of th e  e n e m y  line, 
the sn ip e r  provided a  w ea lth  of in fo rm a tio n  to  B atta lio n  Intelligence.
To w h a t e n d  d id  th e  sn ip e r  w o rk  in  tren ch  w arfa re?  J u s t  a s  ran d o m
artille ry  sh e llin g  p ro d u c e d  m e n ta l “sh e ll shock", s n ip in g  h ad  th e  cu m u la tiv e
effect o f d im in ish in g  e n em y  m orale . A rm strong  ev en  co n sid ered  it to  be one
of th e  p rim ary  ta sk s  o f  th e  sn iper:
If th e  en em y  is  allow ed a  q u ie t  tim e  he will u tilize  it for w o rk  of 
a t ta c k  a n d  d e fen ce  - a  few w ell tra in e d  sn ip e rs  c a n  keep  h im  b u sy  
by th e ir  d o m in a tio n  w ith a c c u ra te  fire and  p ro d u c e  an  effect th a t  is 
n o t m e a su re d  b y  th e  n u m b e rs  o f ro u n d s  fired. 88
This c o n s ta n t  te s t in g  o f th e  e n e m y 's  m in d se t e v e n tu a lly  c o n tr ib u te d  to  the  
Allies' a sc e n d a n c y  over G erm an  sn ip in g . W hen H esk e th -P rich ard  loo k ed  back  
on th e  G re a t W ar. h e  s a w  fou r s ta g e s  in  the  ev o lu tio n  of s n ip in g  o n  the  
W este rn  F ro n t. In  th e  firs t, th e  G e rm a n s  h ad  d o m in a te d ; th e  s e c o n d , th e  
Allies a tte m p te d  to  o u t-d u e l the  su p e r io r  G erm an  m a rk sm en : in th e  th ird , the  
G e rm a n s  h a d  d e s c e n d e d  d e e p e r  in to  th e i r  t r e n c h e s ,  o ffering  few  if  an y
87 McBride: A Rifleman, p.299 .
88 NAC. MG30 E2/V.1, N.A.D. Armstrong Papers, “Chapter VIII - Sniping and the Organization of 
Snipers in Open Warfare', p. 1.
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ta rg e ts : a n d  finally  w h en  th e  sn ip er w as fulfy tra in e d  a n d  in teg ra ted  in to  the  
m ilitary  u n it, he  w as able to  a d ap t to  ch an g in g  s itu a tio n s  a n d  th u s  s u rp a s s  th e  
en em y  a t  th e  g am e  o f p re c is io n  sh o o tin g . 89 F o llow ing  sev era l s ta g e s  of 
evolu tion , th e  C a n a d ia n s  a n d  B ritish  h a d  even tua lly  re a c h e d  th is  fo u rth  level 
by  la te - 1916 . e a r ly -1917. As Cpl. J.A . H olland  re p o r te d  in  h is  d ia ry . J u ly  
12th . 1916:
S n ip in g  w as ag a in  very  b risk  an d  o u r  m en  h id d e n  aw ay  in carefully  
c o n c e a le d  p o s itio n s  p ick ed  off n in e te e n  c a r e le s s  H u n s a n d  21 
p e risco p e s . At th is  gam e o u r c h a p s  a re  im m e a su re a b ly  su p e r io r  
a n d  d u a ls  b e tw een  s h a rp sh o o te rs  w h ich  h a p p e n  freq u en tly  a n d  
so m etim es  la s t  for h o u rs , alw ays e n d  in  o u r favour, so
A p e ru sa l o f H olland’s  d ia ry  will reveal th a t  h is  B atta lio n , th e  24 th . a cco u n ted  
for 113 en em y  fa ta litie s  b e tw een  Ju ly  1st a n d  A u g u st 2 n d , 1916. M oreover, 
in te lligence re p o rts  from  J a n u a ry . 1917 reveal th a t  th e  en em y  w as “rep o rted  
to be m ore c a re fu l in  ex p o sin g  h im se lf ow ing to th e  v ig ilance  of [C anadian] 
sn ip e rs ."  9 ' S n ip in g  c o n tin u e d  to  be a  c o n s is te n t ta c t ic  in  tre n c h  w arfare , 
b o th  d ay  a n d  n ig h t. T hough  n igh t sn ip in g  offered few er ta rg e ts , its  m orale  
effect h a d  a lw ays b een  considerab le . 92
As th e  w a r e m b a rk e d  on  its  fo u r th  y ear, ta c t ic s  ch an g ed  a n d  th e  
d ead lock  o f tre n c h  w arfare  w as broken. As th e  o p p o s in g  forces p rep a red  for 
1918. covered  g ro u n d  w ould  be  m e asu re d  in  m iles r a th e r  th a n  y ard s . O pen  
w arfare  w as a  w hole new  rea lm  for th e  m a rk sm a n , w h e th e r  it be alone in no 
m a n 's  land , a s s is tin g  in  th e  offensive or p u rsu in g  th e  e n em y  in  the  su m m e r of 
1918. The sn ip e r  h a d  a lread y  proven h is  va lue  in  th e  tre n c h e s : he w ould  do 
th e  sam e  in  th e  open .
89 Hesketh-Prichard; Sniping, p.55.
90 NAC, MG30 E574, “War Diary of Cpl. J.A. Holland, 06/01/1916-10/03/1916”. p.21.
91 NAC, RG9 III C3/4146/7/1, “3rd Division Summary of Intelligence, 01/10/1917".
92 NAC. RG9 III C 3/3867/107/2. “Notes from 3rd Cavalry Division", p. 1.
83
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
C h a p te r  V 
Sniping in  Open W arfare
It w as in  th e  tre n c h e s  of th e  G rea t W ar th a t  th e  s n ip e r 's  a r t  w a s  refined 
a n d  from  co n cea led  p o s ts ,  he re g u la rly  te s te d  th e  e n em y 's  m in d -se t w ith  his 
p re c is io n  shoo ting . A nd. th o u g h  th e  m o st co m m o n  im age o f th e  G rea t W ar is 
th a t  o f t re n c h  w a rfa re , th e re  w as a  s tag e  of th is  conflic t w h ich  o c c u rre d  over 
o p e n  g ro u n d . O p en  w arfa re  c a n  ta k e  on  a  n u m b e r  o f m e a n in g s  a n d  for the  
s a k e  o f th is  ch ap te r, it wiU refer to  m ilita ry  ac tiv itie s  ta k in g  p lace  o u ts id e  o f the 
tre n c h e s  a n d  does n o t  n ecessa rily  reflec t th e  la te r  s ta g e s  o f th e  w ar ( la te - 1917 
a n d  1918) exclusively.
S n ip in g , d e s p ite  find ing  re s o u n d in g  s u c c e s s  in  th e  t r e n c h e s  o f the  
W este rn  F ron t, still h a d  a  role to  p lay  in  open  w arfa re . In  th e  BEF a n d  C an ad a  
C o rp s , so m e  of th e  u p p e r  eche lons o f th e  m ilita ry  h ie ra rc h y  believed  th a t  the  
s n ip e r  w as a  p ro d u c t o f  tre n c h  w arfa re . In fact, “th e  officers w ho believed th is  
p ro p h e s ie d  th a t w h en  w arfa re  becam e once m ore  op>en. h e  w ould  be u se le ss ."  • 
T h is  c h a p te r  a im s to  d isp e l th a t  m y th  a n d  sh o w  th a t  th e  s n ip e r  w a s  h ighly  
ac tiv e  in  op en  o p e ra tio n s  th ro u g h o u t th e  w ar. U n d e r th e  tre n c h  co n d itio n s  of 
I 9 1 5 - I 9 I 7 .  the  lone sn ip e r , a t tim es, m oved o u t in to  th e  o p e n n ess  o f no  m a n 's  
la n d  to  c o n d u c t h is  w o rk . T hough  th is  p rac tice  re q u ire d  co n s id e ra b le  skill, it
1 Hesketh-Prichard: Sniping in France. (London. 1920). p.26.
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w a s  e x e c u te d  b y  a  n u m b e r  o f  h ig h ly  p ro f ic ie n t s n ip e r s .  S eco n d ly , th e  
offensive, a  re g u la r  v e n tu re  u sed  to  b reak  the  s ta g n a tio n  o f t r e n c h  w arfare, a lso  
m a d e  u s e  o f th e  s h a rp sh o o te r . H is activ ities w ere  c o n tin u o u s ly  p u t  to  w ork , 
from  before z e ro -h o u r to  co nso lida tion  of the new ly-w on line. Lastly , th e  m obile 
w a rfa re  th a t  c h a ra c te r iz e d  the  s u m m e r  of 1918 a lso  m a d e  ro o m  fo r th e  sn iper, 
e n s u r in g  th a t  th e  fa lte rin g  en em y  w as p u t do w n  b y  a  w ell a im e d  rifle. The 
s n ip e r’s  a r t  w as very  active  in  open  w arfare a n d  h is  c o n tr ib u tio n  w as  a s  m u ch  a  
p a r t  o f v ic to ry  a s  th e  m e n  who su rre n d e re d  th e ir  lives for it.
I
T he a r t  o f sn ip in g  d e m a n d e d  a  c e r ta in  a m o u n t  o f  sk ill from  th e  
so ld ie r. W h en  a lo n e , p a r tic u la r ly  in  no m a n ’s  la n d , th e  s u c c e s s fu l  sn ip e r  
n e e d e d  to  k n o w  th e  n e c e s sa ry  p ro c e d u re s  o f c a m o u fla g e , m o v e m e n t, a n d  
sh o o tin g . F in a lly , e s ta b lis h in g  s n ip in g  p o s ts  in  n o  m a n ’s la n d , a lb e it 
in freq u e n t, w as  a n o th e r  fea tu re  o f o p en  w arfare s n ip in g  th a t  e n a b le d  sn ip ers  
to  ga in  a sc e n d a n c y  over th e  enem y.
S n ip in g  in  th e  o p en  w as so m e th in g  e x c lu s iv e ly  fo r th e  in d iv id u a l 
s n ip e r  w ho p re fe rre d  to  w ork a lo n e . It is tru e  th a t  m a n y  a  s n ip e r  w orked 
w ith  a  fellow  o b se rv e r in  open  te rr ito ry , b u t on ly  u n d e r  th e  c o n ce a lm en t o f 
su rro u n d in g  tree s , s lo p es  or rock. V en tu ring  in to  no  m a n ’s la n d  a s  a  p a rty  of 
two inv ited  enem y  g u nfire  and . m ore  th a n  likely, d e a th . T h u s , th e  lone sn ip er 
w ho so u g h t co m p le te  d o m in an ce  o f  th e  n e u tra l te rr ito ry , fo u n d  h is  n iche  in  
th e  c r a te r s  o f n o  m a n ’s land . 2 T h is  p ra c tic e , h o w ev er, w a s  o fte n  ra re  
b e c a u s e  o f th e  d a n g e r  involved a n d  th e  in te n s e  s h o r t  r a n g e  o f rifle fire. 
F u r th e rm o re , “a p a r t  from  th e  n e rv e -sa p p in g  q u a lit ie s , s n ip in g  b e tw een  th e  
lines w a s  ra re ly  th a t  effective." 3
H ow ever, befo re  a sc e n d in g  in to  th is  d a n g e r  zo n e , a  s n ip e r  n eed ed  to  
follow a  s e t o f p ro c e d u re s  to  e n s u re  h is  safe ty . C am o u fla g e  w a s  th e  first
2 Bill Rawling; Survivina Trench Warfare. (Toronto, 1992). p.50.
3 Adrian Gilbert; Sniper. (New York, 1994). p.71.
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critic a l ex erc ise  a s  c o n c e a lm e n t m ad e  th e  d ifference b e tw een  a  s u c c e s s fu l 
s n ip e r  a n d  a  d e a d  one . A n im als  in  th e  wild o ften  p o s se s s  so m e  form  of 
n a tu ra l  co lour to  d isg u ise  th e m  from  th e ir  s ta lk e rs . Likewise, c am o u flag e  in 
tre n c h  w arfare  follow ed th e  sa m e  p rin c ip les . W ith th e  u se  o f p a in te d  su its  
a n d  hoods, s n ip e r s  u s e d  cam ouflage  to  cover the  o u tlin e  of th e  h u m a n  body 
a n d  m ake th e m  b le n d  w ith  th e  s u rro u n d in g  te rra in . 4 As p h o to s  from  th e  
p rev io u s  c h a p te r  h a v e  sh o w n , k h a k i u n ifo rm s in  g re e n  b ru s h  do  n o t b lend  
well, no t to m e n tio n  th e  fla t-to p  cap  th a t  alw ays reflected  th e  su n lig h t. Two of 
th e  m ost co m m o n  o u tf i ts  w ere  th e  “S y m ien  S n ip e rs  S u it"  a n d  th e  “Boiler 
S n ip e r 's  S u it". T h e  S y m ien . m ad e  o f p a in te d  sc r im , w as a  lo o se  fitting  
g re a tco a t w ith  a t ta c h e d  h o o d  a n d  accom p an y in g  p a n ts .  M ade o f  lin e n , the  
B oiler re sem b le d  a  p a ir  o f  b u lk y  o v e ra lls  an d  c a r r ie d  w ith  it a  rem o v ab le  
hood . Hoods w ere  o ften  fitted  w ith  m e sh  sc reen s  for viewing. W h ere  a  hood 
w as  no t p o ssib le , th e  face  a n d  h a n d s  w ere u su a lly  d a rk e n e d  a n d  th e  h ead  
covered  w ith th e  a p p ro p ria te  co lou red  c lo th  (eg. h a n d k e rc h ie f  o r ba lac lava), s 
The ears, how ever, re m a in ed  exp o sed  so  a s  to not in te rfe re  w ith  h e a r in g  an d  
w ere  d a rk en ed  in  th e  sam e  m a n n e r  a s  th e  h a n d s  a n d  face. W here com plete  
sn ip e r  su its  w ere  u n av a ilab le , m a rk sm e n  m ade u se  o f “sn ip e r veils" in bo th  
d a rk  a n d  ligh t c o lo u rs . A lim ited  n u m b e r  of th e se  veils w as a llo c a te d  to 
b a tta lio n s  a n d  co u ld  be m ad e  m ore  effective by a tta c h in g  som e s u rro u n d in g  
v egeta tion  or like  m a te r ia l to  th e  h e ad  a n d  bodyw ear. 6 Likewise, in  w inter, 
w h ite  cap  covers w ere  u tilized  for m ovem ent in the  snow . D ark c lo th in g  w as 
em p h asized  for u s e  a t  n ig h t a n d . in  one in s tan ce , a  sn ip e r  a p p ro a c h e d  the  
en em y ’s wire w ith  th e  u s e  o f a  lady’s  n ig h t dress! ? H ow ever, cam o u flag e  did 
h ave  its  lim its. C h an g in g  w e a th e r  p a tte rn s  or light co n d itio n s  cou ld  in s ta n tly
4 NAC, MG30 E2/V.1, N.A.D. Armstrong Papers, “Chapter XIV - Camouflage", p.3.
5 NAC, RG9 III C 3/3867/107/2, “Notes on Sniping Collected by the 3rd Cavalry Division”, p.3.
6 NAC, RG9 III C3/4143/8/1 , “Lecture Given at N.C.O.’s  School of Instruction, 2nd Army”, p.2. For 
sn iper veils s e e  NAC, RG9 III C 3/4185/41/3 , “6th Inf. Bde. to 1st, 2nd, 4th, 5th C.M.R. Bn.s, 
0 3 /0 4 /1 9 1 8 ”.
7 ibid., p.2.
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a lte r  th e  effect o f a  sn ip e r’s co n ce a lm en t. 8 T h u s , it w as im p e ra tiv e  for a  
sn ip e r  to b e  aw are  o f  h is  su rro u n d in g s  a n d  be  p re p a red  to  c h a n g e  h is  p la n s  
in  th e  e v e n t o f  w a v e rin g  c o n c e a lm e n t .  N e v e r th e le s s , p ro p e r  u s e  o f  
b a c k g ro u n d  a n d  cam ouflage  e n a b le d  a  s n ip e r  to  v en tu re  in to  th e  p its  a n d  
c ra te rs  of n o  m a n 's  la n d  w ith o u t de tec tio n . T he p h o to s  on  th e  following page 
in d ica te  th e  n ecessity  o f d isgu ise  in  o p en  w arfare  sn ip ing .
O f e q u a l im p o rtan ce  to  th e  s h ro u d e d  s n ip e r  w as p ro p e r  m o v em en t. 
S low ness a n d  cau tio n  were the  tw o keys to  su c c e ss fu l m ovem en t. T ra ined  to 
c ra w l n o  fa s te r  th a n  a  y a rd  p e r  m in u te  a n d  w ith  only th e  m o s t g ra d u a l  
m o v em en ts  o f th e  body, th e  tra in e d  sn ip e r follow ed a  c h o se n  p a th  th a t  he  
m a rk e d  v isu a lly  w ith  p a r tic u la r  fe a tu re s  a n d  la n d m a rk s . ® T h e  p ro c e s s  o f 
m oving  to  a  p o sitio n  in  no m a n ’s la n d  fu r th e r  re q u ired  m in im a l n o ise  a n d . 
a g a in , a  g re a t d e a l o f  p a tie n ce . S u d d e n  je rk s  o r  h a s ty  m o v e m e n ts  co u ld  
d isp e l h o u rs  o f w ork a n d  sh o u ld  s u c h  a n  in s ta n c e  h ap p en , th e  b e s t so lu tio n  
w a s  to  lie co m p le te ly  still. lo O th e r  c ritica l fu n d a m e n ta ls  in c lu d e d  m oving  
fa s te r  d u r in g  perio d s  of o v e rcas t a n d  p a rtin g  v eg e ta tio n  a t  th e  ro o ts  w hile 
m oving.
B esid es  vegeta tion  (cond itions perm ittin g , o f course), on e  o f th e  m ore 
co m m o n  h id in g  p laces  for th e  s n ip e r  w as th e  sh e ll c ra te r . The d e p th s  of 
th e s e  co lo ssa l g a p s  in  th e  e a r th  k e p t him  w ell h id d e n  a n d  a llow ed  h im  to 
e s ta b lish  te m p o ra ry  sn ip in g  p o s ts . A m obile sn ip in g  post for no m a n ’s lan d  
cam e  in th e  form  of th e  “beehive p o st."  11 D riven  by  sp ikes in to  th e  Up o f a  
sh e ll  c ra te r ,  th is  iro n -ca sed  s h r o u d  w as c am o u flag e d  in  th e  a p p ro p r ia te  
co lo u rs  a n d  fe a tu re s  o f a  given zone  (eg. tu rn e d  u p  e a r th , d e b r is  o r brick). 
W ith  a  g au ze  covered  open ing  a t  th e  fron t a n d  a  c u r ta in  h a n g in g  from  th e  
re a r , a  s n ip e r  craw led  u n d e r  th e  beeh ive to  o b se rv e  an d . if  p o ss ib le , sh o o t
8Maj. H. Hesketh-Prichard; Sniping in France. (London, 1920). p. 157.
9 NAC, RG9 III 03/3867/107/2 , ‘Notes on Sniping Collected from the 3rd Cavalry Division”, p .1.
10 Royal Winnipeg Rifles Museum (RWRM hereafter), "Synopsis of Notes by Lieut. J. Scott Cameron, 
44th Battalion C.E.F. on Sniping Course at Aldershot, March 21st to April 1st, 1916 and Report of 
Sam e, p.2-3.
11 NAC, MG30 E2/V.1, Armstrong Papers, "Camouflage”, p .11-15.
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from  it. T h o u g h  the  beeh iv e  p o s t w as h igh ly  u se fu l in  n o  m a n ’s land , it w as 
equally  p ro d u c tiv e  in th e  tre n c h e s . See d iag ram  below.
Source N i D  ArrrsTTong g-eiacra*T SriipinQ a no inteMioence (Aiders hoi p i i 4
A nother a p p a r a tu s  for s n ip e rs  in no m a n ’s la n d  cam e from cam ouflage ex%-)crT<
a t th e  S p e c ia l W orks P a rk  in  th e  form  of a n  artificisd  G e rm an  body , or
"dum m y co rp se" . H esk e th -P rich a rd  m ade one  o f the  first in d ica tio n s  of th e se ;
In  a n o th e r  case , a  h u g e  d ead , ye llo w -b eard ed  P r u s s ia n  lay. on  a  
po in t o f  van tage , s ta r in g  a t the  sk \'. He. too. w as p h o to g rap h ed  a n d  
co p ied , a n d  from  th e  hollow  shell, c lo th e d  in h is  u n ifo rm , a n o th e r  
o b se rv e r fulfilled h is  d u t\- . A dead  h o rse  likewise w as  rep laced  a n d  
u s e d . '2
W hile th e s e  "d u m m y  c o rp s e s "  c o u ld  o n ly  b e  o c c u p ie d  o n  one o r tw o
■•2 Hesketh-Prichard Sniping p 124.
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o c ca s io n s , th e y  were u s e d  su c c e ss fu lly  b y  u n its  in  th e  C a n a d a  C o rp s . '3 
S to rie s  o f  m a n y  c a m o u fla g e d  o b se rv a tio n  a n d  s n ip e r - p o s ts  a b o u n d . In 
a n o th e r  in s ta n c e , the  F re n c h  Army p h o to g ra p h e d  a n d  re p lic a ted  a  m ile s to n e  
in d ica tin g  th e  kilom etric  d is ta n ce  to P a ris . This p o s t re p la c e d  th e  o rig inal in 
th e  m idd le  of n ig h t a n d  a  connecting  tu n n e l  w as d u g  to  a llow  access . V iewing 
o f the  G e rm a n  lines w as su b se q u e n tly  d o n e  th ro u g h  a  g au ze  op en in g  in  th e  
rock . 14
M ovem ent in a n d  o u t o f no m a n 's  la n d  w as o ften  d o n e  in th e  d a rk n e ss  
w hich, a t  tim es, req u ired  a  sn ip er to re m a in  in  the  n e u tra l  g ro u n d  for m u c h  of 
the  d ay tim e . H e sk e th -P rlc h a rd  did n o t a lw ays ag ree  w ith  th is  m e th o d  sin ce  
th e  h o u r s  from  d aw n  to  d a rk  w ere lo n g  a n d  th e  s n ip e r  w as f re q u e n tly  
v u ln e rab le  to  chang ing  co n d itio n s , is F in d in g  th e  w ay  b a c k  to  th e  tre n c h e s  
w as a  fe a t in  itself. T h o se  sn ip ers  m o s t co m fo rtab le  a n d  fa m iliar  w ith  th e  
te rra in  re lied  on  raw  in s tin c t  to  re tu rn  to  th e  safety  o f th e  tre n c h e s . O th e rs , 
m eanw hile , m ade  use  o f a  fish ing  reel th a t  d rew  th e  Une from  a  s e n try ’s  p o s t 
w here th e  s n ip e r  left th e  tre n c h es ; a  tu g  on  th e  line in d ic a te d  th e  s n ip e r ’s 
pend ing  re tu rn  a n d  he follow ed it back  to  h is  d e s tin a tio n . i6
A lthough  m ovem ent in  no m an ’s la n d  a t n igh t w a s  reser\^ed for s c o u ts  
on p a tro l, it w as no t u n c o m m o n  to find a  sn ip e r  jo in in g  a  p a tro l o r s e tt in g  u p  
a  p o s t fo r fu tu re  u se . H .W . M cBride o ffered  a  m o re  a m u s in g  ta le  o f  h is  
ex p erien ce  in  n e u tra l  te r r i to ry . A fter c o n s ta n t  o b s e rv a tio n  o f a  s e c to r  o f 
G erm an tre n c h  a n d  a  ris in g  susp ic ion  th a t  it w as a  site  u n d e r  co n s tru c tio n  for 
a  m a c h in e -g u n  p o s t. M cB ride  v e n tu re d  in to  no  m a n ’s  la n d  - w ith  th e  
a s s is ta n c e  o f th ree  sh o ts  o f  ru m  - to m a rk  it. He q u ie tly  craw led  a c ro ss  th e  
open g ro u n d  in  th e  d a rk , fo u n d  an  o p en in g  in  th e  G e rm a n  w ire a n d  p laced  a  
w hite p iece  of p a p e r on  th e  p a rap e t w h e re  th e  c o n s tru c tio n  w as being  done .
13 NAC. RG9 III C3/4135/22/4, “27th Bn. to 6th Inf. Bde., 12/30/1916”. Placem ent of th ese  corpses  
h as to be careful a s  suspicious G erm ans would occassionally  strafe the post with machine-gun  
bullets.
14 Hesketh-Phchard: Sniping p. 124.
15 ibid.. p. 125.
16 NAC, RG9 III C3/3867/107/2. “Notes...", p 3
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(In day ligh t, th is  b rig h t m a r k e r  gave th e  p o s itio n  aw ay  a n d . it w a s  la te r  
shelled  o u t o f action .) B efo re  h is  re tu rn , how ever. M cB ride w as  e n tic e d  by 
a n o th e r fea tu re  in  th e  G e rm a n  line: the  flag.
Flag s tea lin g  w as a  co m m o n  gam e in  th e  tre n c h e s  o f th e  G re a t W ar
th a t  m ean t n o th in g  m o re  t h a n  som e co m p etitiv e  a n ta g o m sm  a s  e a c h  s id e
lu red  the  o th e r in to  s te a lin g  th e  trophy. O n  th is  occasion. M cBride w as only
100 y ards aw ay from  th e  flag  a n d  proceeded  to  claim  it.
There w ere a  lot o f t in  c a n s  an d  ru b b is h  to  be avoided b u t in  a  s h o r t  
tim e I cam e u p  to  th e i r  flag: it w as p la n te d  right in  th e  m id s t o f  a n  
a rea  of w h a t we c a lled  “tr ip  w ire“: th e  flag sta ff w as firm ly  em b ed d ed  
in th e  g ro u n d  a n d  w a s  fu r th e r  b ra c e d  by  severa l g u y -w ires  w h ich  
were a n ch o red  in  th e  g ro u n d . I m a n a g e d  to u n fa s te n  th e se  gu y - 
w ires a n d  th e n  p u lle d  th e  s ta ff  o u t o f  th e  g ro u n d . G u e ss  1 m u s t  
have overlooked s o m e th in g  - som e w ire co n n ec ted  w ith  a n  a la rm  in  
th e ir tren ch , o r p o ss ib ly  a  “set" rifle o r  two. At any  ra te , a  couple  o f 
sh o ts  ran g  o u t a n d  th e  b u lle ts  cam e u n com fortab ly  c lose . S om eone 
in th e  G erm an  tre n c h  s e n t  u p  a  flare a n d  a  m a ch in e -g u n  c h a tte re d  
for a  while, b u t I lay  s till, an d . in a  few  m in u te s  th e  ex c item en t d ied  
dow n a n d  1 s ta r te d  fo r hom e, i?
M cBride did re tu rn  safely , th o u g h  in  h is  m ild  d ru n k e n e ss  h e  o p ted  to  s ta n d  
u p  a n d  cross no  m a n 's  la n d  ca re le ss ly  on foot.
After fitting  th e m se lv e s  w ith  p ro p er cam ouflage  a n d  m oving  carefu lly  
in to  position , p u llin g  th e  tr ig g e r  w as th e  fin a l s te p  in  th e  sn ip in g  p ro c e ss . 
S n ip ers  often sp e n t h o u rs  a t  a  tim e w a tch in g  th e  enem y line , w aiting  for a 
ta rg e t to p re se n t itself. O n ce  a  ta rg e t w as ex posed , (the av erag e  e x p o su re  
tim e  w as th re e  to  fo u r  s e c o n d s )  aim  h a d  to  be p re c is e  a n d  th e  s h o t 
g u a ran teed , is The m a rk s m a n 's  goal in  s m p in g  w as to  s h o o t to  kill a n d  
tak in g  a  sh o t th a t  w as n o t g u a ra n te e d  w as gen era lly  frow ned u p o n . H old ing  
th e  rifle firmly, th e  sn ip e r e x h a le d  a s  he p u lled  th e  trigger a n d  th e n  re m a in ed  
m o tio n le ss  for a  m o m e n t b e fo re  lo w erin g  th e  b a r re l  o u t  o f  s ig h t ,  is 
R egardless of how  effective th e  p osition  o r co n cea lm en t o f a n  a re a  o f no  m a n 's  
lan d , sn ip ers  w ere  a d v ise d  to  avo id  u s in g  th e  sam e  p la c e s  d a y  a f te r  day .
17 Herbert W. McBride; A Rifleman Went to War. (Mt. Ida, AK, 1987). p. 115-117.
18 RWRM. ‘Synopsis of Notes...", p.4. Also, NAC, RG9 III C3/4143/8/1, “Lecture Given...”, p.5.
19 RWRM, “Synopsis of N otes...’ , p.4.
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T h u s , w h en ev er a  m a rk s m a n  v e n tu re d  Into th e  n e u t r a l  g ro u n d , h e  u su a lly  
ro ta te d  from  a  v a rie ty  o f d ifferent p o s ts  a n d /o r  c re a te d  new  o n es  e a c h  tim e.
L /C pl. H en ry  N orw est, o f th e  5 0 th  Bn., w as  o n e  sn ip e r w h o  w a s  able 
to  m a s te r  h is  t ra d e  in  th e  c ra te rs  o f  n o  m a n ’s lan d . A sa d d le r  b y  tra d e , th is  
C ree  n a tiv e  o f A lb e rta  h a s  o ften  b e e n  reg a rd ed  a s  o n e  o f th e  b e s t  s n ip e r s  on  
th e  W este rn  F ro n t. 20 C red ited  w ith  115 observed  k ills . N orw est o fte n  sp en t 
d a y s  in  no  m a n ’s  la n d  w aitin g  for o n e  sh o t. H is s u p re m e  sk ill, m a s te ry  of 
c am o u fla g e  a n d  in c re d ib le  p a t ie n c e  w ere  h ig h ly  re g a rd e d  b y  h is  fellow  
in fan trym en .
S n ip e r N orw est, M.M., to d ay  a c c o u n te d  for h is  10 0 th  G e rm a n  a n d  
before n ig h t h a d  a d d e d  a n o th e r  to  the  sco re , a  reco rd  e n jo y e d  by 
few, if a n y  o th e r  sn ip e rs  in  th e  B ritish  A rm y. N orw est’s  m e th o d s  
a re  p ecu lia rly  h is  own. “W ait u n ti l  no t a  sing le  H u n  h a s  a  c h a n c e  of 
see in g  y o u r  rifle f la sh , th e n  g e t y o u r m an", is  h is  m o tto . O n  one  
o ccasio n  h e  w a ited  two d ay s  for tw o enem y s n ip e r s  w ho h a d  h e a rd  
h is  rifle, a s  h e  a c c o u n te d  for a n o th e r  of th e ir  fr ien d s , k n o w in g  th e y  
w ere su sp ic io u s  o f  h is  p o st. At la s t  he c a u g h t th e m  off th e i r  g u a rd  
a n d  one w e n t dow n followed t y  th e  o ther in  fif teen  m in u te s . V ery 
few  m e n  c o u ld  d isp la y  th e  p a t ie n c e  em p lo y ed  by  N o rw est. H is 
ind ifference  to  d a n g e r  a n d  h is  ab ility  to  n e g o tia te  p ra c tic a lly  o p en  
g round , m a k e s  it possib le  for h im  to  use  No M an’s  Land a s  a  sn ip in g  
g ro u n d  to  th e  fu llest ad v an tag e . 21
Cpl. N orw est c o n tin u e d  to  m en ace  e n em y  lines u n ti l  18 A u g u st. 1918  w hen  
he  w a s  s tru c k  d o w n  b y  a n  en em y  s n ip e r . N orw est’s  sk ill e a r n e d  h im  th e  
M ilitary M edal m  A u g u st. 1917 a n d . p o s th u m o u sly , a  B a r  for g a lla n try  in  th e  
field in  N ovem ber, 1918. 22 D esp ite  th e  loss of N orw est a n d  o th e r  C an a d ia n  
sn ip e rs , th o se  w h o  excelled  in  th is  fine a r t  were o ften  m a s te rs  o f cam o u flag e , 
m o v em en t an d  te r ra in . C o n sis ten cy  a n d  c o n ce n tra tio n  w ere c r itic a l in  th e se  
fu n d a m e n ta ls  of sm p in g : a  s u d d e n  e rro r , a s  in th e  c a s e  of N o rw est w h o  h a d  
b een  c au g h t h u n tin g  o u t a n  enem y sm p er , could in s ta n tly  spell d is a s te r .
20john Holman; “Indian Veteran; Canada’s  forgotten heroes", Windsoeaker (Vol.7 No.36,
November 10, 1989). p .4 ,------- ; “First World War Indian hero almost forgotten". L eader-Post Reoina.
(Sat. Nov. 11, 1989), p.C9, Desmond Morton; When Your Number’s  Up . (Toronto, 1993). p.78.
21 NAC. RG 9 III 0 3 /4 9 4 1 /War Diary of the 50th Battalion. “April 28th. 1918”,
22 NAC, Military Service Record - Cpl. H. Norwest. For the recomm endations on the M.M. s e e  NAC, 
RG9 III C 3/4217/7/9. “50th Bn. to G.Q.C. 10th Inf. Bde . 01/15/1917".
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nW hile m o st s n ip e r s  found  th e ir  m o st c o n g e n ia l ro le in th e  tre n c h e s , 
th ey  d id  h av e  a  place in  offensive o p e ra tio n s . M u ch  like a ll o th e r b ra n c h e s  in 
th e  C a n a d a  C orps, s n ip e r s  h a d  p re p a to ry  w o rk  to  do  before  th e  a tta c k . 
M oreover, w hile m any  f irs t- ra te  sn ip e rs  ra re ly  jo in e d  th e  “over th e  to p ” ru sh , 
th ey  s t i l l  p rov ided  a s s is ta n c e  d u rin g  th e  a s s a u l t .  L astly , once a n  objective 
w as g a in e d , sk illed  m a rk s m e n  a s s is te d  in  th e  c o n so lid a tio n  o f new ly-gained  
te rr ito ry . W hile it w ould  be  difficult - a n d  u n n e c e s s a ry  - to  d esc rib e  sn ip e r 
ac tiv itie s  in  all th e  m a jo r cam p a ig n s  involving th e  C a n a d a  C orps, th is  sec tion  
win c o rre la te  th e  before, d u rin g  a n d  a f te r  s tag es  o f  th e  a tta c k  while reflecting  
on c e r ta in  exam ples from  som e of C a n a d a ’s m a jo r tr iu m p h s  (ie. th e  Som m e. 
Vimy R idge. P asschendae le ). 23
In  p rep a rin g  for a  m ajo r offensive, the  C a n a d a  C o rp s  h a d  a  g re a t deal 
o f p r e p a r a t io n s  to  m a k e . In fa c t, p r e p a ra t io n  b e c a m e  one o f th e  key 
in g re d ie n ts  in  e n su rin g  su c c e ss . Following th e  S o m m e cam paign , th e  C an ad a  
C orps b e g a n  to  le am  reg u la rly  from  th e ir  m ish a p s  a n d  refine th e ir m e th o d s . 
24 P r e p a ra t io n  ev en tu a lly  a m o u n te d  to  p lay in g  o u t  th e  a t ta c k  o n  a  m odel 
b a ttle fie ld  b e h in d  th e  fo rw ard  line, a s  th e y  d id  fo r th e  Vimy Ridge effort. 
N e v e rth e le ss , w hile m u le  tra in s  a n d  b o x c a rs  b ro u g h t su p p lie s  to  th e  fron t, 
a n d  a rtille ry  form ed u p  a lo n g  the  re a rw a rd  lines, th e  in fan try  p rep a red  for the 
a s s a u lt  b y  g roup ing  in to  respective  C o m p an y  S e c tio n s . Reliefs took p lace  over 
a n  e igh t to  12 day  period , m oving new  tro o p s  in  sm a ll p a rtie s  over th e  co u rse  
o f th e  d a y . T he a tta c k m g  u n its  ty p ica lly  re m a in e d  in  th e  re a r  lin es  u n til
23 Som e historians may consider the Som m e and P asschendaele cam paigns to be more disasterous 
than triumphant. The C anada Corps, however, did su cce ed  in achieving their objectives at 
C oucelette in Septem ber, 1916. This can still be considered a  victory in light of the appalling 
casualties incurred by the French and British from July to November, 1916. P asschendaele, on the 
other hand, w a s  even more disasterous for the BEF - not to mention horrific. By the fall of 1917. the 
Canada C orps had established them selves a s  an elite force following victories at Vimy Ridge, Lens 
and Hill 70. Despite 16,000 casualties, the Canadians su cceed ed  in capturing P asschedaele in two 
weeks: som ething the British could not do in two months. For m ore information s e e  the official 
history by G.W.L. Nicholson's Canadian Expeditionary Force. 1914-1 9 1 9 . (Ottawa, 1964). Canada's 
military s u c c e s s e s  are also ad dressed  by Bill Rawling s  Survivina Trench Warfare, and Daniel 
Dancock's L egacy of Valour.
24 Bill Rawling: Surviving, p.81-86.
9 3
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
sh o rtly  before th e  a s s a u lt .  S p ec ia lis ts , in c lu d in g  sn ip e rs , w en t in to  th e  lin e  
ap p ro x im a te ly  12 h o u rs  b e fo re  th e  re s t o f  th e  b a tta lio n . 25 O b se rv e rs , 
m eanw hile, c o n tin u e d  to  m o n ito r th e  enem y Une, repo rting  th e ir  findings every  
2 4  h o u rs . B a tta lio n  S co u t O fficers p u t th e ir  m e n  to  w ork ch eck in g  u p  o n  
p o s itio n s  in  th e ir  ow n Une a s  w ell a s  th ose  o f th e  enem y. S n ip e rs  u su a lly  to o k  
u p  flank ing  p o s itio n s  in  th e  fo rw ard  tre n c h e s , sn ip in g  from  p o s ts  h id d en  in  
th e  p a ra p e t. S n ip in g  befo re  th e  a s s u a lt  w a s  c ritic a l a s  it k e p t th e  en em y ’s  
o b serv a tio n  in  c h ec k . 26 M oreover, it h a d  th e  com b in ed  effect o f low ering  
en em y  m orale  (a s  in d ic a te d  in  C h a p te r  IV) w h ile  in c re a s in g  th e ir  c a s u a lty  
ra te s . For in s ta n c e , in  the  th re e  m o n th s  p re c e d in g  th e  a tta c k  on  Vimy Ridge 
April 9 th . 1917. th e  1st, 2 n d  a n d  3 rd  D iv isions com b in ed  to  e lim ina te  4 0 6  o f 
th e  en em y  - th e  3 rd  D ivision w ith  262 kills a lo n e . 27 in  som e sec to rs  of th e  
V im y fro n t, n o  m a n ’s la n d  e x te n d e d  5 0 0 -1 0 0 0  y a rd s  a n d  th u s ,  s n ip in g  
o p p o rtu n ities  in th e se  a reas  w ere no t a s  p len tifu l.
W hen  s n ip in g  o p p o r tu n i t ie s  w ere  n o t  q u ite  a s  a c tiv e , C a n a d ia n  
m a rk sm e n  p rac ticed  beh in d  th e  lines on rifle ra n g e s , con tinually  refin ing th e ir  
sh o o tin g  finesse. 28  D is tan ce  o f th e  ran g es  w a s  u su a lly  100-150 y a rd s  w here  
g ro u p in g  an d  sn a p sh o o tin g  to o k  place. P rac tice  o n  dum m y h ead s , o r “B osche 
h e a d s ” a s  th e y  w ere  s o m e tim e s  called , w a s  a lso  c a r r ie d  o u t. 29 W h ere  
availab le . 200  y a rd  ran g es  p ro v id ed  th e  s n ip e r  w ith  g re a te r  sk ills  te s tin g  o n  
th e  sa m e  ta r g e ts .  M u ch  lik e  a  m in ia tu re  c o u rs e  from  a  S n ip e r  a n d  
O bserv a tio n  S chool, th e se  p ra c tic e  se ss io n s  a lso  fam iUarized th e  sn ip e r w ith  
co n cea lm en t v ia  u s e  o f n a tu r a l  cover (eg. h o u s e s ,  hedges, d itc h e s  e tc .) in  
o p en  w arfare .
As ze ro -h o u r quickly  a p p ro ach ed , a n d  w hile  th e  artille ry  p re p a red  for
25 NAC. MG30 E300/19. Army Summaries - the Somme, Jan-D ee. 1916, “Short Notes Obtained from 
Units in the Som m e Area", p. 1.
26 NAC. RG9 ill C3/4146/8/9. “2nd Division N otes From Fighting on the Somme".
27 NAC, MG30 E2/V.1, N A D. Armstrong Papers, “Chapter VII - Sniping and the Organization of 
Sniping in Open Warfare”, p.4.
28 Rawling; Surviving, p.98.
29 NAC, RG9 III C 3/3867/107/3, “N otes and Suggestions - Training of Snipers in Rest, 05/24/1916"
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the  p re lim in ary  b o m b a rd m e n t. B a tta lio n  sn ip e rs  m oved  in to  p lace  in  th e  early
m orning  h o u rs  before th e  a s s a u lt .  In  a n  a tta c k  o n  31 O ctober. 1916. sn ip ers
(positioned) th e m se lv e s  before d a w n  w ith in  fifty to  six ty  y a rd s  o f th e  
en em y  fron t Une. to  sn u ff  o u t a n y  tro u b leso m e m ach in e  g u n s  d u rin g  
th e  c ru c ia l m o m e n ts  o f  th e  a t ta c k  itse lf. O th e rs  (occupied) p o s itio n s  
overw atch ing  m o re  d is ta n t  fian k s . w ith  the sa m e  p u rp o se . 30
Shortly  before  th e  a t ta c k , th e  a rtille ry  sh e llin g  b eg an  in  a n  effort to  b re a k  u p  
G erm an  lin e s , w ire, a n d  c o m m u n ic a tio n s . E ven in  th is  early  s ta g e  o f th e  
a tta ck , th e  sn ip e rs  p ro v id ed  a s s is ta n c e  v ia  th e ir  a c c u ra te  rifle fire. In  one of 
the  first ra id s  fea tu rin g  th e  C an a d ia n s  - D ouve River. 16-17 N ovem ber. 1915 
- “th e  b o m b a rd m e n t w a s  a u g m e n te d  b y  sn ip e r  fire, th e  B a tta lio n ’s  rifle fire 
a n d  rifle -g ren ad es.“ 3i T he  ad d ed  rifle fire e n su re d  th a t  c a su a ltie s  w ould  be 
inflicted a n d  th a t  m ov em en t o f re se rv es  re ta rd e d .
O nce th e  sh e llin g  h a d  done its  d am ag e , th e  la rg e  g u n s  w o u ld  la u n ch  
the  “rolling b a rrag e“. T he b a rrag e  - from  th e  F ren ch  te rm  “barrier"  - w as first 
u sed  a t th e  b a ttle  o f N euve  C h apelle , 10-12  M arch , 1915. B as ica lly , the  
ro lling b a r ra g e  w as a  m o v in g  w all o f  ex p lo d in g  s h e lls  th a t  h it a n  a im ed  
objective, lif ted  a n d  m o v ed  o n  to  th e  n e x t one. 32 it p rov ided  th e  m oving 
in fa n try  w ith  som e d e g re e  o f cover, a n d  th a t  it m o v ed  fo rw ard  a t  tim ed  
in tervals allow ed the  m e n  to  p roceed  to th e ir  objectives w ith  m o d e ra te  safet}\ 
S lig h tly  before th e  in fa n try  w e n t “over th e  top", all a t ta c k in g  u n its  
form ed u p  in  th e ir  re sp ec tiv e  tre n c h e s . T he fron t a n d  su p p o rt fines h o u sed  
two w aves o f a tta c k in g  in fa n try , a  to ta l o f  s ix  p la to o n s . The fo rm er followed 
th e  m oving b a rra g e  a n d  m a d e  in itia l c o n ta c t  w hile th e  la t te r  fo llow ed for 
co nso lida tion  p u rp o se s . In  th e  reserve  tre n c h , two ad jo in in g  p la to o n s  a n d  a 
specia list s e c tio n  of s c o u ts , m a c h in e -g u n n e rs  a n d  sn ip e rs  m ade  u p  th e  th ird  
w ave. T he d iag ram  on  th e  follow ing p a g e  p rov ides a n  il lu s tra tio n  u p  how  
these  u n its  fo rm ed  u p  p rio r  to  action  o n  th e  Som m e, 1916.
30 Paddy Griffith; Battle Tactics of the Western Front. (New Haven. 1994). p.73.
31 Bawling; Surviving, p.48.
32 Ibid.. p.27.
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In  th e  a fte rm a th  o f th e  S o m m e cam psiign. m ilita ry  s tra te g is ts  realized 
th e  im p o rtan ce  o f sn ip e rs  in  o p e n  w arfa re , hence  th e y  w ere given freedom  of 
m o v e m e n t, o r a  “ro v in g  c o m m iss io n " , w hen  c ro s s in g  no  m a n ’s  la n d  a n d  
beyond . 33 The re a so n  for th is  s i tu a t io n  is clear. M oving in  p a c k s  p re sen te d  
m ore favourable  ta rg e ts  for en em y  m a ch in e  g u n n e rs  a n d  since q u a lity  sn ip ers  
w ere few a n d  far be tw een , it w as  b e t te r  th a t  th ey  b e  on  th e ir  ow n. C om pany 
sn ip e rs , u su a lly  of le s s e r  sk ill t h a n  B atta lio n  s n ip e r s , o ften  jo in e d  th e  ru s h  
a c ro ss  n o  m a n 's  la n d  w ith  th e ir  p la to o n , ta k in g  a d v a n ta g e  of ta rg e ts  th a t 
p re s e n te d  th e m se lv e s . 34 O n ce  th e y  re a c h e d  th e i r  f irs t o b jec tiv e , th ey  
rem a in ed  in  the open , w a tch in g  fo r en em y  re ta lia tio n  o r m ach in e -g u n s  while 
th e  o rd in a ry  in fan try  w en t a b o u t th e  tre n c h  c lea rin g  p ro cess . 35 B atta lion  
s n ip e rs , in  the  s e c o n d  o r th ir d  w ave, u su a lly  a d o p te d  f lan k in g  p o s itio n s  
d u rin g  th e  advance, a tte m p tin g  to  cover th e  m oving in fan try . 36
O nce the la tte r  h a d  re a c h e d  th e  first objective. B atta lion  sn ip e rs , like 
C o m p an y  m ark sm en , w ork ed  th ro u g h  th e  b a ttle fie ld  sea rc h in g  fo r p o s ts  to  
concea l them selves. In  n o  m a n ’s  la n d , m akesh ift sn ip in g  p o s ts  w ere  a  rarity , 
a n d  sn ip e rs  were forced to  im prov ise . Those m o st a b u n d a n t w ere sh e ll holes 
w hich  irregu larly  d eco ra ted  th e  o p e n  battlefield . In  ad v an ces  o f 5 0 0  y a rd s  or 
m ore, sn ip e rs  som etim es “d u g  in" a t  th e  b ack  o f a  c ra te r , so m etim es carry ing  
w ith  th e m  a  m eta l loopho le  p la te . 37 T he p la te , p la c e d  o v e rh e ad , offered 
p ro tec tio n  from  s tray  b u lle ts  a n d  sh ra p n e l. From th is  po in t, th e  sh a rp sh o o te r  
cou ld  carefu lly  w a tch  for a n d  fire u p o n  ta rg e ts  in  th e  enem y line. A nother 
a lte rn a tiv e  to  the d u g  o u t w as to  lie u p o n  the  fron t lip  o f th e  c ra te r  a n d  sn ipe 
from  th e re . In one in s ta n c e , a  sm a ll g ro u p  of s n ip e rs  m oved from  sh e ll hole 
to  sh e ll  h o le , sn ip in g  a t  ta r g e ts  a s  th e y  m oved  c lo se r  to  e n e m y  lines.
33 NAC, RG9 III 03/4135/22/4, “Notes on a  Conference of Scout and Sniper Officers. 06/02/1917 \  
p.3 and NAC, MG30 E2/v.l, N A D. Armstrong Papers - “Chapter VI11", p.3.
34 NAC, RG9 III C3/4015/29/4, “1st Division Operations; P asschendaele, Section I, 1917". p.6.
35 Griffith: Battle Tactics, p.73.
36 NAC, RG41/V 11, “CSC Interview - In Flanders Fields with LR. Fennel, 27th Bn., p.7. Also. NAC. 
MG30E2/V.1, N.A.D. Armstrong P ap ers- “Chapter IX - Sniping in Trench Warfare", p .l .
37 ibid , p .l.
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H ow ever, a s  H erb ert M cBride n o te s , in  a  c o n s ta n tly  ch an g in g  b a ttle fie ld , it 
w as c ritica l for th e  s n ip e r  to  a d a p t  a n d  ta k e  ad v an tag e  of n a tu ra l  cover. He 
co n tin u es:
In  an y  so rt o f ad v an ce , th e  ty p e  o f  co u n try  a n d  su rro u n d in g s  m ay 
u n d e rg o  a  d e c id e d  c h a n g e . O ne m oves from  th e  f la t te n e d  ou t 
c o u n try  o f  s h e l l  h o le s  a n d  b lo w n  dow n b u ild in g s  o v e r  in to  
com parative ly  o p e n  g ro u n d , w ith  grow ing veg eta tio n  a n d  s ta n d in g  
bu ild ings - p len ty  o f cover o f  a n  en tire ly  d ifferen t co lour a n d  type.
He m u s t be ab le  to  a d a p t h im se lf  to  a ll so rts  o f re s tr ic ted  p o s itio n s  
a n d  still deliver a cc u ra te  fire . 38
W hen m o p -u p  crew s, th a t  is . th e  firs t wave, m oved th ro u g h  a  tow n or 
village, sn ip e rs  took  ad v an tag e  o f  b u ild in g s  a n d  ru in s  to  conceal them selv es . 
R oom s in  h o u ses , roo fs an d  c h im n e y  p o ts  w ere com m on  a re a s  to  co n d u ct 
p re c is io n  shoo ting . 39 T he e x p a n d e d  fie ld  o f view  offered b e t te r  sn ip in g  
o p p o rtu n itie s  an d  p ro tec tio n , th o u g h  th e re  w as alw ays th e  h a za rd  o f  artillery  
sh e lls . W hen  d o o rs  o r w indow s w ere  too revealing , sn ip e rs  im p ro v ised  by 
rem oving  a  brick from  a n  u n s c a th e d  w all to  do th e ir  w ork. In sm a ll  tow ns 
a n d  v illag es  th e  s n ip e r  w as e s s e n t ia l  to  th e  fu r th e r  a d v a n c e m e n t o f th e  
in fan try . E nem y sn ip e rs  often o c cu p ied  cellars  of bu ild ings, at C o u rce le tte  for 
in s tan ce , shoo ting  a t  tro o p s a s  th e y  p a s s e d  by. 4o in  th is  scenario , o ne  would 
o ften  see  sn ip e r v e rs u s  sn ip e r a s  c o m p a n y  m a rk sm en  w ere o ften  s e n t  In to 
elim inate  th e  enem y c rack sh o t.
T here  were th re e  m ain  ta rg e ts  a t  w h ich  the  sn ip e r  a im ed  m o s t. The 
m a ch in e -g u n . p e rh a p s  th e  fie rcest e n em y  on  th e  battlefield , w as th e  p rim ary  
ta rge t, -n M ach ine-guns often  h e ld  u p  m oving  p a rtie s  for long p e rio d s  o f tim e 
or o th e rw ise  cu t th e m  dow n w ith  h e av y  fire before th e y  could get anyw here . 
T h u s , it w as  the  sn ip e r’s ta s k  to  p u t  th e  g u n , an d  its  opera to r, o u t o f action. 
M ach in e -g u n s  w ere o ften  co n cea led  a n d  ra re ly  in  th e  o p en  for sh o o tin g ; in  
s u c h  a  c ase , the  sh a rp sh o o te r  c o n s is te n tly  a im ed  for th e  g u n n e r s in ce  they  
w ere “h a rd  to  rep lace  a n d  fire d ire c te d  t y  u n tra in e d  m ach ine  -g u n n e rs  [was)
38 McBride; A Rifleman, p.333.
39 N.A.D. Armstrong. Fieldcratt. Sniping and Intelligence. (Aldershot. 1940). p.28-29.
40 G.W.L. Nicholson; Canadian Expeditionary Force. 1914-1919. (Ottawa. 1964). p. 170-171.
41 Ian Skennerton: The British Sniper. (London, 1984). p.67.
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no t v ery  fo rm idab le  to  tackle." 42 As th e  w ar c a rr ie d  o n . sn ip e rs  b e g a n  to  opt
for th e  g u n  itse lf - try in g  to  lodge a  b u lle t in  th e  b re e c h  or m e c h a n is m  w ith
a rm o u r  p ierc ing  am m u n itio n . 43 S n ip in g  from  p re p a re d  p o sitio n s  in  n o  m a n 's
lan d  o ffered  som e p ro te c tio n  for the  a d v an c in g  in fan try .
T h is  m e th o d  w a s  very  su cc e ss fu lly  ad o p ted  b y  a  sn ip e r o f th e  2 9 th  
B n . d u rin g  th e  fighting  on th e  S o m m e. He d u g  in  d u rin g  th e  n ig h t 
w ith in  6 0  y a rd s  o f th e  G e rm a n  p a ra p e t  a n d  in  th e  early  m o rn in g  
w h e n  a  C o m p an y  o f the  2 9 th  a d v an c e d  it w a s  h e ld  up  by  M .G. fire. 
L /C p l. P u m p h rey  sp o tted  the  M .G. a n d  a im in g  carefu lly  th ro u g h  th e  
a p e r tu re , he  fired  a  sh o t an d  th e  M.G. s to p p ed , again  it o p e n ed  u p . 
a n d  a fte r th e  2 n d  sh o t it s to p p ed . Again it o p e n e d  u p  a n d  w ith  th e  
3 rd  sh o t it s to p p e d  a lto g e th er, th e  C o m p an y  c a rrie d  o n  w ith  th e  
a d v a n c e , a n d  la te r , on  en te rin g  th e  tre n c h  Etnd exam in in g  th e  M.G. 
p o s t they  fo u n d  two dead  M achine G u n n e rs  a n d  a  bullet th ro u g h  th e  
m e ch a n ism  o f  th e  g u n  w hich p u t  It o u t o f a c tio n . 44
C a n a d ia n  s n ip e rs  w ere  excep tio n a l in  th is  c a ta g o ry . a n d  H e sk e th -P r ic h a rd
cred ited  th e m  for th e ir  skill.
In  th e  la s t ad v an ce  of the  C a n a d ia n  C orps, th e ir  very  sk illed  sn ip in g  
o fficer. M ajor A rm stro n g , to ld  m e  th a t a  s in g le  sn ip e r p u t  o u t of 
a c t io n  a  b a t te ry  o f 5 .9  g u n s, sh o o tin g  dow n o n e  a fte r a n o th e r  th e  
G e rm a n  officer a n d  th e  m en  w ho  serv ed  it - a  g re a t piece o f w ork, 
a n d  one  th o ro u g h ly  w orthy of G e n e ra l C urrie ’s  sp len d id  C o rp s . 45
T he o th e r tw o ta rg e ts  favoured by  m a rk sm e n  w ere officers a n d  supp ly  
tra in s . A fter a n y  b o m b a rd m e n t, officers a n d  N .C .O .’s  em erged  to  g a th e r  th e  
re m a in d e r  o f the u n it  a n d  co n d u ct o p e ra tio n s  f ir s t-h a n d . These ta rg e ts  were 
fav o u rite s  o f  m an y  s h a rp sh o o te rs  a s  m a n y  G erm an  officers b e g a n  rem oving  
th e ir  e p a u le ts  w h e n  to u rin g  th e  tre n c h e s . In re g a rd s  to  the  s u p p ly  tra in s , 
lo ad s  c a r r ie d  to  th e  fro n t lin es  w ere b ro k e n  u p  b y  s n ip e r  fire, a n y th in g  to  
h in d e r th e  defence o f  en em y  lines. 46 B eyond th e se  favou red  ta rg e ts , sn ip ers  
u su a lly  s o u g h t a fte r th e ir  enem y c o u n te rp a r ts , p re fe rr in g  to  leave th e  m a sse s  
to th e  m a s s e s .  T h o u g h  in  som e in s ta n c e s  - like  th e  P r in c e s s  P a tr ic ia ’s 
C a n a d ia n  L ight In fa n try  a t ta c k  a t th e  B a ttle  o f  th e  S c a rp e . A u g u s t. 1918 -
42 NAC. MG30 E2/V.1, N.A.D. Armstrong Papers, “Chapter Vlir. p.3.
43 Hesketh-Prichard; Sniping, p.27.
44 NAC, MG30 E2/V.1, N.A.D. Armstrong Papers - “Chapter XV - Snipers’ Posts, Observation Posts, 
Loopholes and Hides”, p. 15.
45 Hesketh-Prichard: Sniping, p. 110.
4 6 NAC, MG30 E2Ar.1, N.A.D. Armstrong P apers- “Chapter IX”. p .l .
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“sn ip e rs  w ere  p o s ted  in  a  p o sitio n  w h ere  th e y  cou ld  en filade  the  tre n c h ."  4?
U sing  telescopic s ig h ts  in th e  fie ld  w as d ifficu lt d u rin g  th e  offensive.
C o n d itio n s  o n  th e  b a ttle fie ld  o ften  re n d e re d  th e m  u s e le s s .  After p re lim in a ry
sh e ll in g  o r th e  b a rra g e , v is ib ility  w a s  o f te n  m in im a l a n d  d irt a n d  c lu t te r
a b o u n d e d  o v e r th e  t e r r a in .  In  th e  m o re  d r a s t ic  c o n d itio n s , s u c h  a s
P a ssc h e n d a e le . O ctober-N ovem ber. 1917 . sn ip e rs  w ere  o rd e red  to  leave  th e ir
te le sc o p ic  s ig h te d  r if le s  b e h in d . 48 W h en  c o n d itio n s  w ere  sU gh tly  m o re
favourab le , m an y  sn ip e rs  ch o se  to tak e  a n  o rd in ary  rifle w ith  iron s ig h ts  s ince
a  te lesco p ic  s ig h t cou ld  b e  m is  a ligned  w h e n  c ro ss in g  th e  battle fie ld . Som e.
like M cB ride, p re fe rred  to  u s e  both , c h o o s in g  one o v e r th e  o th e r d e p e n d in g
on  th e  s itu a tio n . 49 T he o p e n  or iron  s ig h t w as u s e fu l for p rac tica l sh o o tin g
a n d  c le a r  ta rg e ts ; m o re  d is ta n t  p rey  ty p ica lly  re q u ire d  v isu a l a s s is ta n c e .
Here, M cB ride acco u n ts  fo r th e  co n d itio n s  on  th e  ba ttle fie ld :
T h e  ba ttle fie ld  s o o n  ta k e s  on  a  w e ird  a n d  g ro te sq u e  a p p e a ra n c e , 
a n d  o rd in a ry  o b je c ts  s u c h  a s  t r e e s ,  b u s h e s , s to n e  w alls b u ild in g  
a n d  s u c h  becom e s o  d is ru p te d  a n d  tw is ted  o u t o f sh ap e  th a t  th e y  
look  like su ch  th in g s  a s  one see s  in  a  m ad  d re a m , so
M cBride n o te d  th a t see in g  th ro u g h  a  te le sco p ic  s ig h t in  th e se  co n d itio n s  w as 
o ften  d ifficu lt, b u t on  c e r ta in  o ccasio n s, it  m ad e  th e  d ifference b e tw een  a  h it 
a n d  a  m is s . O nly th e  m o s t  h ig h ly -sk ille d  m a rk s m e n  ro u tin e ly  b ro u g h t 
te le sco p ic  s ig h ts  w ith th e m  a n d  th ey  co m m o n ly  to o k  u p  flank ing  p o s itio n s , 
well aw ay  from  the  ch ao s .
O n ce  th e  first ob jec tive  h ad  b e e n  s to rm ed , a n d  provided  th e  a s s a u l t  
w as su c c e ss fu l, the  co n so lid a tio n  p ro c e ss  began . As th e  in fan try  s e c u re d  the  
firs t g ro u n d , th e  sec o n d  w ave " leap-frogged" over th e m  a n d  p u s h e d  o n  to  
fa r th e r  ob jectives. In th is  in s ta n c e , s n ip e r s  m oved w ith  th e  "leap-froggers" to 
m o re  fo rw ard  p o s itio n s  in  a n  effort to  “c u t  off a n y  G e rm a n s  who m ig h t be 
re tre a tin g  overland ." A t tim es, s n ip e r s  co m b in ed  th e ir  w ork w ith  Lewis
47 NAC, RG9 III D3/4912/War Diary of PPCLI, ‘Narrative of Operations - August 25 -2 9 ,1 9 1 8 '. p.2.
48 NAC, RG9 ill C3/4015/29/4, “1st Division Operations; P asschendaele. Section 1,1917". p.6.
49 McBride: A Rifleman, p .338-339.
50 Ibid., p .340.
51 NAC, RG9 III D3/4912, War Diary of PPCLI, p.2.
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g u n n e rs , w ho a ls o  m oved fo rw ard , to  k eep  G e rm a n  m ovem ent lim ited  a n d  
th e ir  efforts fo r a  c o u n te r  a t ta c k  quelled . Q u ite  o ften , a  sn ip in g  p a tro l w as 
se n t o u t after co n so lid a tio n  to  oversee th e  en em y ’s  m ovem ent. In  th e  Battle o f 
th e  Scarpe. th e  PPCLI did so  a n d  sp o tted  th e  enem y  reg roup ing  for a  po ten tia l 
c o u n te r -a t ta c k . B etw een  th e  s n ip e r s  a n d  th e  Lewis g u n  c rew  th a t  w as 
su b se q u e n tly  b ro u g h t up . th e  G e rm an  effo rts  w ere th w arted . =2 A fter th e  
ta k in g  of V im y R idge in A pril 1917. L /C p l. N orw est. m en tio n ed  earlie r , w as 
in s tru m e n ta l in  sn ip in g  a t th e  enem y  from  th e  "Pimple". 53 It w as h e re  th a t he 
first earned  th e  M ilitary M edal.
Acting a s  a  co m m u n ica tio n  line w as a n o th e r  d u ty  for th e  s n ip e r  a fte r 
th e  cam paign . C o m m u n ic a tio n s  w ere very o ften  s lip sh o d  a fte r  a n  a s sa u lt:  
te lephone  lines w ere  u su a lly  b ro k e n  h y  sh e lls  a n d  sh rap n e l, p igeons w ere no t 
a lw ay s re liab le , a n d  s ig n a lle rs  w ere  c o n s ta n tly  o b s c u re d  by sm o k e . The 
ru n n e r , it seem ed , co n tin u ed  to  be th e  m o st re liab le form  of co m m u n ica tio n . 
N evertheless, s n ip e r s  rec o rd ed  th e ir  o b se rv a tio n s  w h en  in  fo rw ard  p o s itio n s  
a n d  sen t th em  b a c k  to ru n n e r s  b eh in d  the  Une. A fter all. th e  s n ip e r  w as to 
o b serv e  a s  w ell a s  kill. At th e  S om m e. 1916. s n ip e rs  p rov ided  im p o r ta n t 
in fo rm atio n  a b o u t  th e  e n e m y ’s  lin es  th a t  la te r  h e lp ed  the  in fa n try  in  th e  
c a p tu re  of C o u rc e le tte . 54 in  a n o th e r  exam ple . L /C p l. P a u d a sh  (2 1 s t Bn.), 
w on  th e  M iUtary M edal for in fo rm in g  B rigade  H e a d q u a r te rs  o f  a  p en d in g  
G erm an  co u n te r a t ta c k  a t Hill 70  . 55 The c o u n te r -a tta c k  took p lace w ith in  25 
m in u te s , b u t th e  B attaU on, a lre a d y  well in fo rm ed  of th e  com ing a c tio n , w as 
read y  for the  a s s a u l t .  As th e  b a ttle  died dow n, a n d  a s  new  tro o p s  ru s h e d  in. 
sn ip e rs  w ent a b o u t  th e ir  u s u a l  b u s in e s s , seek in g  o u t new  p o s ts  to  co n d u c t 
th e ir  work. At V im y Ridge th e  C a n a d ia n  C orps g a in ed  h igher g ro u n d  w hich 
a lm o st alw ays o ffered  quaUty sn ip in g  o p p o rtu n itie s . T h a t sn ip ers  a s s is te d  in
52 Ibid.. p.3.
53 CANADA, Veterans Affairs; Native Soldiers. Foreign Battlefields. (Ottawa 1993). p. 12.
54 NAC, MG30 E2/V.1, N A D. Armstrong Papers - “Chapter IX - Sniping in Trench Warfare”, p.2.
55 CANADA, Annual Report of the Department of Indian Affairs, 1918, Sessional Paper No.27, 
(Ottawa, 1918). p .14. Paudash w as a lso  recommended for the Distinguished Conduct Medal for 
saving an officer’s  life at the Somme, 1916.
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th e  co n so lid a tio n  p ro c e ss  m ade  s e c u r in g  new ly-gained  te rr ito ry  a ll th e  m ore 
effective. In g en era l. D ivision. B rigade  an d  B a tta lio n  C .O .'s  w ere  im p resse d  
w ith  th e  sn ip e r’s ac tiv ities  in  th e  offensive, b o th  in  th e ir  ow n w ork  a n d  th e ir  
a ss is ta n c e  to th e  o th e r m en  in  th e  u n it .  56
m
After th e  h o rro rs  o f P a ssc h e n d ae le  in N ovem ber. 1917 h a d  su b s id e d .
th e  C an a d ia n  C o rp s  c o n tin u e d  to  refine  th e ir  ta c t ic s  a n d  p re p a re  for th e
com ing  year. W hile th e  m ilitary  a n d  political elite  a rg u ed  o ver th e  n eed  for
a n o th e r  o ffensive , th e  ta n k  w a s  fin a lly  u s e d  in  a  s u c c e s s fu l  a s s a u l t  a t
C am b ra i. 20  N ovem ber. 1917. 57 G en era ls  n o w  believed  th a t  tru ly  op en
w arfa re  could  o c c u r  in  1918 a n d  a ll  forces, in c lu d in g  the  C a n a d ia n  C orps.
p re p a re d  for a  c a m p a ig n  o f m a n o e v e r . T ra in in g  p ro g ra m s  in  th e  C EF
em phasized  m ovem ent a n d  conso lidation .
S hou ld  th e  enem y re trea t, th e  C an ad ian s  w ere  ex pec ted  to  advance  
from  o n e  ta c t ic a l  p o in t to  th e  n ex t, u n i t s  leap -fro g g in g  a t  p re ­
a rra n g e d  b o u n d a r ie s . S c o u ts  w ould  le a d , follow ed by  a d v a n c e  
p la toons, th em selv es  followed by  th e  re m a in d e r  of th e  co m p an y . As 
u su a l, tro o p s  w ere to a d v a n c e  u n d e r  cover o f rifle a n d  L ew is-gun 
fire, a n d  w h en  th e  p u rsu it  s low ed  to a  craw l, th ey  cou ld  conso lida te  
the ir p o sitio n s  by digging in. 58
The G erm an  offensive o f M arch 1918  th w arted  a n y  sh o rt- te rm  p la n s  for a  large 
cam p aig n , an d  fo r tu n a te ly  for th e  C an a d ia n s , th e  B ritish  bore th e  b ru n t o f the  
G e rm a n  a tta c k . A lthough  th e  G e rm a n s  p u sh e d  th e ir  w ay b a c k  in to  reg io n s  of 
B elgium  an d  F ran ce , th e  effort ev en tu a lly  w ithered  aw ay th ro u g h  th e  su m m er, 
w eak en ed  by re d u c ed  m anpow er a n d  re so u rces . By A ugust, 1918, th e  Allies - 
w ith  new . f r e s h  s u p p o r t  from  A m erican  fo rces  - p re p a re d  for th e  co m in g  
offensive.
W ith re g a rd  to  sn ip ing , th e re  is  som e d isag reem en t over its  em ploym ent 
in  m obile w arfare. As early  a s  the  su m m e r of 1917, sn ip ing  w a s  tak in g  a  b ack  
s e a t  to  sco u tin g  a n d  o b se rv a tio n  in  th e  m ilita ry  h ie ra rch y . O rd e rs  from  th e
56 NAC. RG9 III 03/4052/21/2 , “10th Bn. to HQ 2nd Inf. Bde., 11/20/1917.
57 Nicholson; CEF. p .333-338 .
58 Rawling; Surviving, p . l69.
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B E P s  F irs t A rm y sh o w  th a t  th e  sy llab i a t  S n ip er. O b se rv a tio n  a n d  S c o u tin g  
S ch o o ls  w as  to  be c h a n g e d  d u e  to  a  d ec rea s in g  ro le in  o p en  w a rfa re . 59 “in  
v iew  o f  th e  m ore  o p en  n a tu re  o f fig h tin g  w hich  is  no w  ta k in g  p la c e , s c o u tin g  
a n d  o b se rv a tio n  h av e  b eco m e  of in c re a se d  im p o rtan c e  a s  o p p o se d  to  sn ip in g  
a n d  th e  u s e  o f te le sc o p ic  s ig h ts  o f  t r e n c h  w arfa re ."  so D e sp ite  th e  s n ip e r  
h a v in g  c red itab le  ro les  in  th e  offensive, h ig h er a u th o ritie s  felt th a t  sn ip in g  w as  
o f  d e c re a s e d  v a lu e  a n d , in  so m e  in s ta n c e s ,  th e ir  c laim  w a s  s u p p o r te d  b y  
officers in  th e  field. In  re sp o n se  to  a  p o s t-w a r m em o o n  the  v a lu e  o f sn ip ers  in  
m ob ile  w a rfa re , so m e  b a tta l io n s  p ro v id ed  a  negative  reply . W ith o u t specific  
in s ta n c e s  to  d ra w  from , th e s e  few  u n i ts  felt th a t  th e re  w as "n ev e r tim e o r 
o p p o rtu n ity  to  p rac tice  [their) a rt"  a n d  th a t  th e ir v a lu e  w as co m p arativ e ly  nil. 
O th e rs  s till  felt th a t  re g u la r  in fa n try , prov ided  w ith  good m u s k e try  tra in m g . 
cou ld  d e a l w ith  ta rg e ts  Ju s t a s  well. 62  a  selec t few rem a in ed  in d ifferen t, n o tm g  
th a t  s n ip e rs  co u ld  n o t a lw ays u s e  th e ir  te lescopic s ig h ts  a s  effectively as  In th e  
tre n c h e s . 63
T h ere  w as. how ever, re so u n d in g  su p p o rt for th e  sn ip e r in  o p en  w arfa re  
from  th e  m a jo rity  o f th e  C a n a d a  C o rp s . M any u n i ts  c o n c u rre d  th a t  sn ip in g  
o p p o r tu n  tie s  w ere few er in  th e  o p en , b u t th e ir  v a lu e  in  th e  p u r s u i t  over o p en  
te rr i to ry  re m a in e d  h ig h . 64 in  one  m s ta n c e . B rig ad ie r-G en era l T.L. T rem blay  
(5 th  Inf. B de.) p ra is e d  th e  s n ip e rs  for th ey  cou ld  o ften  “do th e  w o rk  of sev e ra l 
rif lem en  w ho [were] n o t a c c u s to m e d  to  m ak in g  u se  o f g ro u n d ."  65 Follow ing 
u p o n  th is  re m a rk  w as  th e  C .O . o f th e  3 1 s t Bn. w ho  believed, c o n tra ry  to  th e  
e a r lie r  re m a rk  a b o u t good m u s k e try  sk ills  for th e  in fan try , th a t  sn ip e rs  co u ld
59 NAC. RG9 III C 3/4135/22/4 , “First Army to Canadian Corps, 2nd Division & 6th Inf. Bde., 
06 /10 /1917" .
60 Ibid.
61 NAC, RG9 III C3/4069/11/6, “8th Bn. to 2nd Division HQ, 01/14/1919”.
62 NAC, RG9 III C 3 /4192/15/3 , “43rd Bn. Cameron Highlanders of Canada to 6th Inf. Bde . 
0 1 /1 6 /1 9 1 9 ”.
63 NAC, RG9 III C3/4095/3/36, “27th Bn. to 6th Inf. Bde., 01/11/1919”.
64 NAC, RG9 111 C 3/4095/3/36, “4th Inf. Bde. to 2nd Division, 01/15/1919”. A perusal of this file will 
show  a number of positive resp o n ses to the u se  of snipers in open warfare, from Battalion to Brigade 
level.
65 NAC, RG9 111 C 3/4095/3/36, “5th Inf. Bde. to 2nd Division HQ. 01/13/1919".
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engage ta rg e ts  th a t  reg u la r in fa n try  cou ld  n o t. 66 By an d  large, th e  fact th a t  th e  
s n ip e r  w as in s tru m e n ta l  in  ta k in g  o u t m a c h in e -g u n s  and  th e ir  o p e ra to rs  s till 
m a d e  him  e s s e n tia l  to  o p en  w a rfa re . T h o u g h  tre n c h  conditions h a d  declined  t y  
th e  su m m e r o f  1918. the  m a c h in e -g u n  w as s till a  th re a t to th e  ad v an ce . T h u s , 
th e  sn ip e r  w a s  eq ually  im p o r ta n t  in  th e  a s s a u l t  in  1918 a s  h e  w as a t  th e  
S om m e. V im y Ridge an d  P a ssc h e n d a e le . O ne B rigadier-G eneral. D.M. O rm ond , 
e v e n  s u gge s te d  th a t  a  C o rp s  o f  sn ip e rs  be  fo rm ed  a n d  “d is tr ib u te d  a m o n g s t 
in fan try  b a tta lio n s  during  ac tive  o p era tio n s."  67
In d e e d , spec ific  in s ta n c e s  sh o w  th a t  th e  sn ip e r w a s  in v a lu a b le  to  
o p e ra tio n s  d u r in g  the  la s t 100 d a y s  o f th e  w ar. In th e  a ssa u lt o n  M ericourt. 9 
A u g u st. 1918 , m em b ers  o f  th e  2 2 n d  B n . w ere  covered  by th e ir  sn ip e rs  w h ile  
th e y  co n so lid ia ted  the  c a p tu re d  Une. 68 O n A u g u st 2 8 th . 1918 n e a r  Boiry a n d  
A rtille ry  H ill, tw o  5 8 th  B n . s n ip e r s  to o k  p o s itio n  on  th e  ro o f  o f a  h o u s e  
k nock in g  o u t 2 0  G erm an  m a c h in e -g u n n e rs  a n d  four m ach in e-g u n s a t a  range  o f 
3 0 0 -6 0 0  y a r d s .  69 S e v e ra l  o th e r  r e p o r ts  in d ic a te  s n ip e rs ' a c tiv ity  w ith  
re so u n d in g  s u c c e s s  a g a in s t m a c h in e -g u n s . G e rm a n  officers a n d  N .C .O .’s a n d  
e n e m y  sn ip e rs .
It is  m te re s tin g  to  n o te  in  th e se  positive  re sp o n ses  to  sn ip in g  in  o p e n  
wrarfare. th a t  a  n u m b e r  o f  b a tta U o n s  u s e d  th e ir  sn ip e rs  on  a  re g u la r  b a s is .  
T h o se  not in  fav o u r h ad  n o  in s ta n c e s  to  d ra w  from , im plying th a t  sn ip ers  m a y  
n o t have  b e en  u s e d  to  th e  b e s t  deg ree . M oreover, som e of th o se  in  favour w ere  
u n i t s  from  W e s te rn  C a n a d a  w h e re  h u n te r s  a n d  good rif lem en  w ere m o re  
a b u n d a n t .  N ative C a n a d ia n s , w h o  w ere am o n g  th e  b e s t sn ip ers  m  th e  C a n a d a  
C o rp s , were ty p ica lly  from  th e  w e st, m d u d in g  L /C p l. Norwest. P e rh ap s  it w a s  
th i s  ad d ed  sk ill  b y  w e s te rn  m a rk s m e n  th a t  h e lp e d  to  p rom ote  th e  s n ip e r  in  
o p e n  w arfare .
The re m a in in g  d a y s  o f th e  w a r  sh o w e d  ev en  g rea te r s u c c e s s  for th e
66 NAC. RG9 ill C3/4095A3/36. “3 1st Bn. to 6th Inf. Bde.. 01/10/1919".
67 NAC, RG9 III C 3 /4192/15/3, “9th Inf. Bde. to 3rd Division, 01/18/1919”.
68 NAC. MG30 E2/V.1, N.A.D. Armstrong Papers. “Open Wafare”, p.5.
69 NAC, RG9 III C 3/4192/15/3. “9th Inf. Bde. to 3rd Division. 01/18/1919".
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C an a d a  C o rp s . T his elite force, h a rd ly  a n  a rm y  p rio r to  1914, h a d  evolved in to  
one  of th e  b e s t  a rm ie s  on  th e  W este rn  F ro n t. A n efficient u s e  o f in fan try  a n d  
a rtille ry  fin a lly  b ro u g h t th e  C a n a d ia n s  to  th e  B elg ian  b o rd e r  b y  N ovem ber, 
1918. By th e  tim e o f th e  a rm is tic e , 11 N ovem ber, 1918, th e  C orps w as  over 
fo u r m iles b e y o n d  th e  to w n  o f M ons. 70 T h e  C a n a d ia n s ’ ad ap ta b ility  to  o p e n  
w arfare , a n d  th e  G erm an  c a p itu a ltio n  in fa ce  of declin ing  re so u rc e s , e n s u re d  
v ictory  in th e  la te  faU of 1918. T hough  th e  s n ip e r  found  few er ta rg e ts  in  th e  
“p u rsu it to M ons“. he  n ev e rth e le ss  played a n  e sse n tia l role in  the  ad v an cem en t 
of th e  in fan try . He is a s  m u c h  to  be p ra ise d  a s  th e  so ld iers w ho  c o n tr ib u te d  to 
th e  defeat o f  G erm an y  in th e  G rea t War.
In co n c lu s io n , th e  s n ip e r  w as of g re a t  v a lu e  in  open  w arfare . T h o u g h  
som e believed th a t  h is  a r t  w ou ld  v an ish  w ith  th e  tren ch es , th e  sn ip e r’s ab ility  to 
u se  p re c is io n  sh o o tin g  in  th e  o p en  p ro v e d  o th e rw ise . U n d e r  the  h o rr ib le  
cond itions o f  t re n c h  w arfare , sn ip e rs  took th e ir  a r t  beyond th e  tre n c h es  in to  no  
m a n ’s land , u s in g  th e  “d e a d  g ro u n d "  to c o n c e a l th em se lv es  from  the en em y . 
M oreover, th ro u g h  th e  c o u rs e  o f  th e  w a r th e  s n ip e r  p ro v ed  h is  va lue  in  all 
s tag es  of th e  offensive. E ven  a s  th e  "over th e  top" tre n c h  b a tt le s  gave w ay  to 
th e  m obile f ig h tin g  o f 1918 . th e  sn ip e r  s t i l l  fo u n d  a  p la c e  in  the  ro llin g  
cam p a ig n s  m to  B elgium . H is ab ility  to  c a u s e  c a s u a lt ie s  a n d  m h ib it e n em y  
gunfire , th o u g h  on ly  a  sm a ll  p iece  of th e  pu zz le , c o n tr ib u te d  to  th e  la rg e r  
p ic tu re  a n d  v ic to ry  on  th e  W este rn  Front.
S n ip ing , how ever, w a s  a s  m u c h  a  c a s u a l ty  a s  th e  m a n y  so ld ie rs  w ho  
lo s t th e ir  lives o n  th e  fie ld s  o f  F ran ce  a n d  F la n d e rs . A cco rd in g  to  N.A.D. 
A rm strong , " th e re  a p p e a re d  to  be  a  te n d e n c y  am o n g  A rm y m u sk e try  to  s c o rn  
th e  sn ip er - th e y  held  th a t  sn ip in g  w as only  a  ‘p h e n o m en o n ’ o f  tre n c h  w arfa re  
a n d  w ould n o t likely  o ccu r ag a in ."  A rm stro n g  la te r  s ta te d  th a t  sn ip ing  w as  
fo rgo tten  a n d  th e  B atta lio n  In telligence S e c tio n  w as  rem oved  from  the A rm y’s
70 Rawling; Surviving. p.215.
7^1 N.A.D. Armstrong; Fiddcraft. p.v.
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e s ta b lish m e n t. 72 A s th is  c h a p te r  h a s  show n, sn ip in g  w a s  n o t a  p ro d u c t o f 
tre n c h  w arfa re , a n d  th e  sn ip er’s  ab ility  to  p rac tice  h is  a r t  in  th e  open  p ro v es  
th is  p ro p o s it io n  c lea rly . As th e  w a r d rew  to  a  c lo se  in  th e  firs t d a y s  o f 
N ovem ber, th e  s n ip e r  h a d  outlived th e  p red ic tion  th a t  sn ip in g  w ould die in  th e  
tre n c h e s .
72 Ibid., p.v.
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C onclusion
A fterth ou gh ts
The G re a t W ar h a s  b e e n  a  re m in d e r  to  u s  a ll  th a t  w a r  c a n  have  
d e v a s ta tin g  c o n se q u e n c e s . In  a n  age w h e re  n in e te e n th  c e n tu iy  m illta r \ ' 
ta c t ic s  su rre n d e re d  h u n d re d s  o f  th o u s a n d s  o f lives to  m ilitary  techno logy , a n  
e n tire  g en era tio n  o f ch ild ren  w a s  left fa th e r le ss  in  th e  sm o u ld e rin g  a sh e s  of 
th is  d e s tru c tiv e  co n flic t. T h o se  th a t  o u tliv ed  th e  g u n  a n d  s h e ll  fire a n d  
h o rro rs  of t re n c h  w arfare  w ere  p e rm a n e n tly  s c a rre d , m en ta lly , phy sica lly  o r 
b o th .
The so ld ie r o f the  G re a t W ar w as fo rced  to  e n d u re  m an y  h a rd s h ip s  in  
h is  to u r  of the  tre n c h e s . M any w ho jo in ed  th e  ra n k s  o f  th e  C an a d a  C orps h ad  
n e v e r  been  involved m  h eav y  c o m b a t a n d  th e ir  b a p t is m  of fire w a s  o ften  a  
h a rro w in g  ex p erien ce . T h o se  so ld ie rs  a rr iv in g  a t th e  fro n t qu ick ly  lo s t th e  
a p p e a l an d  fe rvou r o f ac tio n  t h a t  th e  w a r sp a w n e d  in  th e  s u m m e r o f 1914. 
T he m an y  tre n c h h n e s  th a t s c a t te r e d  th e ir  w ay  a c ro s s  th e  te r ra in  o f  F ran ce  
a n d  F lan d e rs  w ere  th e  d o m in a n t  fe a tu re  o f  th e  G re a t  W ar. It w a s  u n d e r  
th e se  conditions th a t  th e  s n ip e r  a p p e a re d  o n  a  ro u tm e  b a s is .
Sniping, how ever, w as n o t  n ew  to  th e  w orld b y  A ugust. 1914 . T he a r t  
o f p rec isio n  sh o o tin g  h a d  a  h is to ry  o f its  ow n d a tin g  b a c k  to th e  e ig h te en th  
c e n tu ry . T h o u g h  n o t  in  a n y  o rg a n iz e d  fo rm , m a rk s m a n s h ip  in c re a s in g ly  
d ev e lo p ed  a s  w e a p o n s  te c h n o lo g y  c o n tin u e d  to  b lo o m . In th e  A m erican
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Revolution. A m erican  Civil W ar a n d  o th e r  m ilitary  en g ag em en ts , th e  c ra c k sh o t 
co n tin u ed  to  m ak e  h is  p re sen c e  know n. By the  tu rn  o f  th e  tw en tie th  cen tu ry , 
w ith  fu r th e r  d ev e lo p m en ts  in  rifle techno logy , th e  m a rk s m a n  w as a  c o m m on  
fea tu re  o f th e  h u n tin g  lifesty le  a n d  in  th e  m ilitary  h is  p re sen c e  w a s  only  a 
sem i-organ ized  one.
W ith  th e  o u tb re a k  o f w ar in  1914 . sn ip ing  s ta r te d  on  its ev o lu tio n a ry  
road  a n d  sign ificance w ith in  th e  m ilitary  m ach ine. T h is  th e s is  h a s  m a in ta in ed  
th a t  s n ip in g  m  th e  C a n a d a  C orps w a s  b o th  a n  e v o lu tio n a ry  p ro c e s s  a n d  
critical to  th e  w ar effort. In  regard  to th e  form er co n ten tio n , sn ipm g . th o u g h  
a p p e a rin g  o n  a  sem i-o rg a n ize d  level in  th e  A m erican  Civil W ar a n d  B oer 
conflict, w as  form ally  m stitu tio n a liz ed  in  th e  G reat W ar. S n ip ing  sch o o ls  in  
F ran ce  a n d  E n g lan d  e s ta b lis h e d  a  c u r r ic u lu m  th a t  su rv iv ed  th e  w a r  a n d  
c o n tin u e d  to  t r a in  p ro f ic ie n t  m a r k s m e n  in  th e  a r t  o f s n ip in g . T he  
fu n d a m e n ta ls  o f sh o o tin g , m ovem ent a n d  cam ouflage hav e  becom e u n iv e rsa l 
a n d  have re a p p e a re d  o n  th e  b a ttle fro n ts  o f  the  S eco n d  W orld W ar. K orea  a n d  
V ie tnam . T h o u g h  rifle techno logy  h a s  c h an g e d  s u b s ta n tia lly , a  s n ip e r  like 
H e sk e th -P ric h a rd  o r H e rb e rt M cBride w o u ld  have little  d ifficulty  s n ip in g  in  
th is  day a n d  age. > A lthough  G erm an  sn ip in g  w as d o m in a n t u p  to  1916 . th e  
fact th a t th e  Allies w ere ab le  to  refine sn ip in g  skills a n d  s u rp a s s  th e  e n em y  a t 
th is  gam e is  ev idence  o f fu r th e r  ev o lu tio n . After a ll. A llied sn ip m g  m  1914 
w as e rra tic  a n d  d e p en d e n t u p o n  a sm all n u m b e r o f sk illed  riflem en. By 1918 
C an a d ia n  s n ip e r s , m a n y  o f w hom  a lre a d y  p o sse sse d  a  h u n te r  m s tm c t.  h a d  
em erged  a s  a  force to  re c k o n  w ith  o n  th e  W estern  F ro n t. Among th o s e  m o st 
feared s n ip e rs  w ere N ative C an ad ian s . W ith  som e o f th e  h ig h est ta llie s  o n  th e  
Allied front. C a n a d ia n  s n ip e rs  h a d  re a c h e d  the ir p eak  b y  w ar's  end.
S n ip m g ’s c o n tr ib u tio n  to  th e  w a r  effort w as e q u a lly  im p o r ta n t for it 
w as p re s e n t  in  every  a s p e c t  o f th e  co n flic t. T re n c h  w arfa re  w a s  la rge ly  
re sp o n s ib le  fo r th e  d e v e lo p m en t o f s n ip e r  d o c tr in e  a n d  th e  m a r k s m a n 's  
p re sen ce  m  th e  tre n c h e s  o f th e  W este rn  F ro n t w as s ta n d a rd  on b o th  s id es .
1 Adrian Gilbert; Sniper. (New York, 1994). p.83.
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As tre n c h  w arfa re  w as s ta g n a n t ,  little  c o u ld  be  done to  b re a k  th e  d ead lock . 
W h ere  a ll o th e r  fo rm s of m ilita ry  ac tiv ity  d ro p p ed  in to  period ic  lu lls , th e  
sn ip e r  w a s  ab le  to  c o n d u c t h is  w ork  on  a  re g u la r  b a s is . S n ip ing  in  tre n c h  
w arfa re  w as a  com plex  p ro c e ss  a n d  h a d  a  p ro found  effect o n  b reak in g  enem y  
m ora le  a n d  inflic ting  m a te ria l lo ss. 2
It w as believed  by m a n y  in  th e  m ilita ry  e s ta b lish m e n t th a t  sn ip in g  
w o u ld  lo n g  b e  fo rgo tten  a fte r  th e  tre n c h  sy s te m  h ad  b ro k e n  down. T h is w as 
n o t th e  c a s e  a s  th e re  w ere  m a n y  in s ta n c e s  o f sn ip in g  in  o p en  w a rfa re  
th ro u g h o u t  th e  w ar. W hile in  th e  o p e n , s n ip e rs  m ad e  effective u s e  o f no  
m a n 's  la n d  a n d  th ey  w ere equally  in s tru m e n ta l  on the  offensive. T hus, w hen  
m obile  w a rfa re  re a p p e a re d  in  th e  s u m m e r  o f 1918 th e  sn ip e r  c o n tin u e d  to  
ju s tif t ' h is  ex istence  in  aU face ts  o f com b at.
T he v a lu e  of sn ip in g  in  th e  G re a t W ar ap p ea rs  to  h ave  a t tra c te d  th e  
a tte n tio n  o f som e m em b ers  w ith in  th e  m ilita ry  h ierarchy . In  D ecem ber. 1918. 
B rigade level officers b eg an  re sp o n d in g  to  m em o s req u estin g  th a t a  p e rm a n en t 
h is to ry  o f  sn ip in g  in  th e  C a n a d a  C o rp s  be m ad e . 3 This w as to com e in  th e  
form  of a  m u se u m , d ep ic tin g  n a m e s  a n d  eq u ip m en t o f ex cep tiona l sn ip e rs  in  
th e  C a n a d a  C orps. T here  w as. how ever, n o  evidence of th is  exhibit fo u n d  in  
th e  c o u rse  o f  th is  re sea rc h .
S n ip in g , th o u g h  va lu ab le  to  th e  w a r effort, did even tually  decline a s  a  
specific  sk ill in  th e  y e a rs  following th e  G re a t W ar. The s n ip e r  h a d  su d d en ly  
fa llen  in to  d is fa v o u r a m on g  th e  m ilita ry  e lite  a n d  h is  fo rm al p re se n c e  w as 
rem o v ed  from  th e  m ilita ry  m a c h in e . P e rh a p s  th e re  w a s  a  m o ra l is su e  
invo lved , th o u g h  s tr ik in g  a  m a n  d o w n  in  co ld  blood is rea lly  no  m o ra lly  
d ifferen t th a n  su b jec tin g  h im  to  a ttr it io n a l b a ttle  tactics  a n d  th e  cond itions of 
t r e n c h  w a rfa re . T h ro u g h o u t th e  w a r. s n ip e r s  m ade  few frien d s  w ith  th e  
ex ce p tio n  o f th e ir  o b se rv a tio n  p a r tn e r .  4 T he com m on so ld ie r’s  a t t i tu d e  
to w ard  th e  s n ip e r  re m a in s  to  be  d o c u m e n te d  a n d  th e re  is  little  in fo rm atio n
2 Tony Ashworth; Trench Warfare; The Live and Let Live System . (New York. 19801 p.59.
3 NAC. RG9 til C3/4063/14/6. “2nd Inf. Bde. to 5th. 7th, 8th and 10th Bn., 12/27/1918".
4 Daniel Dancocks; W elcome to Flanders Fields. (Toronto, 1988). p.87.
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re g a rd in g  it. In  tre n c h  w a rfa re , s n ip e r s  w ere  a t  tim es s h u n n e d  by  th e i r  
c o m p a trio ts  b e c a u s e  th e ir  a c tiv itie s  w ou ld  o ften  invite a n  artillery^ sh e llin g . 
M oreover, th e  sc ie n c e  o f s n ip in g  re q u ire d  a  c e r ta in  degree o f  in d e p en d e n c e  
a n d  w orking a lone . This left little  tim e for fra te rn iza tio n . F u rth e rm o re , th e re  
m ay  have b e e n  so m e  re s e n tm e n t from  o th e r  r a n k s  since  sn ip e rs  were s p a re d  
fa tigue  d u tie s  a n d  u su a lly  re s id e d  in  com fo rtab le  b u n k e rs  w h en  in  the  Une. 5 
W hatever th e  r e a s o n s  for th e ir  fa te , sn ip in g  su rv iv ed  the  p re m a tu re  ly n ch in g  
from  th e  m iU tary e s ta b lish m e n t a n d  a p p ea re d  o nce  again  in  th e  S econd  W orld 
W ar. Today, sp e c ia l forces u n i t s  (ie. G reen  B e re ts . Navy S ea ls  etc.) c o n tin u e  
to  be a  p a rt o f th e  mUitary m ach in e .
T he c o s ts  o f  w ar a r e  a lw ay s  e x tra o rd in a ry  a n d  fo r so m e  re a s o n , 
m ilita ry  le a d e rs  m u s t  r e s o r t  to  s ac rif ic in g  m ilita ry  p e rs o n n e l to  ach iev e  
m a te ria l gain . T h is  h a s  b e e n  a  lo n g -s ta n d in g  fe a tu re  of w a r a n d  it h a s  n ev e r 
rea lly  ch an g ed . How to ach iev e  th a t  g a in  h a s  v a ried  over th e  c en tu r ie s  b u t  
th e  goal re m a in s  th e  sam e: v ic to ry . In th e  G rea t W ar th e  sn ip e r  proved th a t  
h e  w as  e s s e n tia l  to  v ic to ry  in  N ovem ber. 1918 . His s to ry , how ever, h a s  
la rg e ly  re m a in e d  u n to ld  - u n t i l  now . T h o u g h  cleverly  c a m o u fla g e d  fo r 
d ecad es , th e  C a n a d ia n  sn ip e r  h a s  m ad e  a n d  fo u n d  h is  m ark  in  th e  a n n a ls  o f 
C an ad ian  h isto ry .
5 Desm ond Morton; When Your Number s  Up. (Toronto, 1993). p .178.
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